

NAA: A1838, 25/2/11 PART 1

Series number: A1838

Control symbol: 25/2/11 PART 1

Barcode: 585878

Number of pages: 237

Title: France - Political - Algeria

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FILE No. *25/11.*

OPENED 30-5-56

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. *CLOSED 30-11-57*

CLOSED

PART 1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET.

BASEMENT

SUBJECT.

FRANCE.

POLITICAL

ALGERIA.

PREVIOUS FILE:

NEXT FILE:

PART 2.

BASEMENT

D82

CLOSED

RELATED PAPERS.

FILE No.

SUBJECT.

BASEMENT

By Authority: A. J. ARTHUR, Commonwealth Govt. Printer, Canberra.

CLOSED

Name of Paper... *The Times*File No. *25/2/11*Published at... *London*Date... *20/11/1957*

U.N. SEARCH FOR ALGERIA COMPROMISE

SOUTH AMERICAN MEDIATION EFFORTS

CONVERSATIONS BEHIND THE SCENES

From Our United Nations Correspondent

NEW YORK, Nov. 29

The debate on Algeria languished in the political committee of the General Assembly to-day, when only two countries took part in it.

Mr. Slim (Tunisia), speaking in moderate terms, put the Algerian nationalist case effectively and at some length, and M. Nisot (Belgium) argued briefly that the United Nations had no business to discuss Algeria, which was a French domestic affair.

The chairman, Mr. Abdoh (Persia), then announced that he had no more speakers on his list, and adjourned the meeting until to-morrow, when the Syrian representative is expected to speak. So far no other speakers have been listed, and it seems likely that no draft resolution will be tabled until Monday at the earliest, when the Arab group is expected to formulate its case in stronger terms than it did last year.

Meanwhile, attempts are being made behind the scenes to find a compromise formula, and to-day Mr. Abdoh gave a luncheon at which were present M. Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Balfre, the Foreign Minister of Morocco, Mr. Slim, and Señor Belaunde (Peru), who has been trying to mediate on Algeria on behalf of several South American countries.

HOPES DISAPPOINTED

When the committee met this morning Mr. Slim recalled that in February the Assembly had unanimously adopted a resolution restricted to an expression of the hope that a peaceful, democratic, and just solution of the Algerian question would be found. Unfortunately, these hopes had come to nothing and the war in Algeria was continuing with greater intensity.

He hoped that this time the United Nations would find "a more realistic and effective solution." He went on to draw a parallel between the "identical" aspects of the situations in Hungary and Algeria, both of which he described as revolts against foreign rule, and he asserted that the casualties in Algeria were much heavier than those in Hungary.

SUBSTANCE OF PROBLEM

The cause of the problem was the desire of the Algerian people for independence and the French insistence on retaining Algeria.

Mr. Slim felt that, within the framework of self-determination of peoples, there was ground for agreement between the two parties when it came to the recognition of the rights of the Algerian people. It followed that to bring about

did not represent Algeria. Similar assertions had been made in the Assembly before Tunisia and Morocco gained their independence. He also rejected the French assertion that self-determination in Algeria would mean anarchy, dissension, or partition; similar apprehensions had been expressed in regard to Tunisia and Morocco here too.

NINE MONTHS LATER

In view of its permanent bonds of friendship with both parties, and the fact that military operations in Algeria had overflowed into its own territory, Tunisia could not remain indifferent to the Algerian conflict.

Turning to the French proposals, he recalled that during the last Assembly meeting the French representative had submitted a similar three-point plan of unconditional cease-fire, free and supervised elections, and negotiations with elected representatives regarding the new constitutional structure of Algeria.

To-day, nine months later, France was proposing a system based on enabling legislation. This legislation was intended to serve the interests of the French population in Algeria and not of the entire Algerian population. Furthermore, it reaffirmed the fiction that Algeria was an integral part of France. He claimed that the parliamentary representation of Algeria in the French Assembly was inadequate having regard to their respective populations.

SAME FATE

Mr. Slim said that if the "enabling legislation" were ratified it would not contribute to peace in Algeria. This legislation constituted a step backwards. It was unilateral, contradictory to democratic procedure, and did not permit of evolution towards the principle of self-determination. In Mr. Slim's opinion it would have the same fate as all such efforts in the past. He asserted that the rebellion in Algeria was not being carried out by a minority.

The people of Algeria recognized that the leaders of the National Liberation Front were qualified for independence. In their own view, Slim quoted from the declaration recently made by the President of Tunisia, that Tunisia was dedicated to cooperation with France to help her end the present painful stage.

COLONIAL VIRUS

In the opinion of the Tunisian President, he said, France would be able to establish new relations if she could rid herself of the virus of colonialism.

M. Nisot (Belgium) said that any intervention by the United Nations was contrary to the Charter. There was

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SUBSTANCE OF PROBLEM

The cause of the present conflict was the clash between the desire of the Algerian people for independence and the French insistence on retaining Algeria.

Mr. Slim felt that, within the framework of self-determination of peoples, there was ground for an arrangement between the two parties which would reconcile their respective rights and interests. It followed that to bring about a cessation of hostilities it was necessary to negotiate on the substance of the problem.

He rejected the French contention that the present leaders of the Algerian revolt

did not represent Algeria. Similar assertions had been made in the Assembly before Tunisia and Morocco gained their independence. He also rejected the French assertion that self-determination in Algeria would mean anarchy, dissolution, or partition: similar apprehensions had been expressed in regard to Tunisia and Morocco here too.

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The people of Algeria recognized that the leaders of the National Liberation Front were qualified to independence. In their struggle for independence, in the conclusion Mr. Slim quoted from the declaration recently made by the President of Tunisia, that Tunisia was dedicated to cooperation with France to help her end the present painful stage.

COLONIAL VIRUS

In the situation of the Tunisian President, he said, Tunisia would be able to establish new relations if she could rid herself of the virus of colonialism.

M. Nisot (Belgium) said that any intervention by the United Nations was precluded by the Charter. There was no threat to international peace in Algeria, and France was doing all it could to establishing complete law and order in that country.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper

The Herald

File No.

25/2/11

Published at

Adelaide

Date

Nov 30 - 1957

GAILLARD GETS GREEN LIGHT ON ALGERIA

Australian Associated Press

PARIS, Friday. — The French Prime Minister, Mr Felix Gaillard, tonight won two confidence votes in the National Assembly supporting his Algerian reform programme.

Members approved his proposal to grant the troubled North African territory a certain measure of home rule and, in a second vote, supported an allied electoral law for Algeria.

IKE LOOKS FIT

Australian Associated Press

WASHINGTON, Fri. — A fitter-looking President Eisenhower than the man who went to church yesterday drove to his Gettysburg farm today.

The two-hour drive to the farm came after a medical bulletin which said:

"The President had a good night's sleep. He slept almost continuously from early last evening until 6 a.m. His progress continues to be excellent."

Reporters who saw him at the Thanksgiving Day church service yesterday and again today agreed that today he seemed fitter, ruddier and in better form.

The White House Press Secretary Mr James Hagerty, told reporters at Gettysburg after the President and his staff had arrived that Mr Eisenhower would go to bed after lunch.

Replying to questions, Mr Hagerty said that Mr Eisenhower had no plans to play golf this week-end.

Before the President left the White House he held a half-hour business session at which he signed 11 documents and initialled another.

"RELAX" PLEA

Mr Adam Powell, Democratic member of the House of Representatives for New York (and a negro), urged President Eisenhower today to "with-

The home rule Bill was passed by 269 votes to 200. The electoral law Bill was passed by 267 votes to 200.

Main purpose of the home rule Bill is to create local Parliaments and local Governments for which Europeans and Moslems will be inscribed on the same register of voters, and for which they will vote on equal terms, without distinction of sex, race or religion.

No women, European or Moslem, have ever voted before in Algeria. Under the Bill, all women, veiled or unveiled, Christian, Jew or Moslem, European, Arab, Berber or Kabyle, will go to the polls.

Voting will be for individual candidates (not party lists) on a simple majority basis, but coupled with this a further number of representatives will be elected in proportion to the total votes cast in the election for each of the communities, thus ensuring a minimum of representation for these minorities.

Mr Gaillard told the Assembly:

Not foreigners

"We shall never agree to consider the million French people in Algeria as foreigners living in a foreign land. Nor shall we ever accept the independence of Algeria."

"We refuse to consider the leaders of the FLN (Algerian Nationalist Liberation Front) as valid representatives except for the purpose of bringing about a cease-fire."

Mr Gaillard said that the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments could not expect any French Government to adopt a different attitude.

Nor could they expect that the French attitude would be altered by any external pressure. The French Government's attitude could not alter this.

→ E.A.M.E.

file 25/2/11

The Role of Communism in the Algerian Rebellion

The collusion between the Communists and the Algerian nationalist movements has long been established. However, although it is frequently spoken of, it is seldom possible to give precise details. The following information on the history and development of this collusion should therefore be of interest.

Origin of the M.N.A. and the F.L.N.

The founder of the first movement towards secession, Messali HADJ, was an active member of the Communist party ranks before founding in 1926 the North Africa Star, affiliated to the Red International Relief.

The North Africa Star's aim was social revolt, and its means was violence. Its organization was copied from that of the secret Communist networks. Its activities, at first limited to the Algerian centres in France, spread from 1936 onwards to Algeria itself.

This organization, which became the Algerian People's Front in 1937, was banned in 1939, but existed in secret during the entire war.

It is this party which was responsible for the abortive insurrection at Setif in 1945. It reappeared in the open under the name of the Movement for the

Triumph of Democratic Liberties.

From this latter issued all the nationalist rebel organizations, notably the C.R.U.A., the M.N.A. and the F.L.N. All still remain faithful to the Communist methods of action and propaganda. Thus the majority of the rebel bands exist within a framework of "political directors" trained in the methods of subversive warfare set out by Mao Tse Tung in his writings. The secret networks are organized according to the system of basic cells of 3 or 5 members. By the same token, the political vocabulary of the F.L.N. often has recourse to Communist terminology. The "cult of the personality" has been condemned in its time, and the merits of "collegiate direction" praised as they had to be after the announcement of the creation of a National Council of the Algerian Revolution "elected" by "democratic methods" which would not have been disowned behind the iron curtain.

The P.C.A.

Properly so-called Communist action in Algeria is led by the Algerian Communist Party (P.C.A.), affiliated to the French Communist Party, and autonomous since 1935. Originally composed mainly of European militants, the P.C.A. has continually spread its influence in Moslem sections, using for this penetration chiefly its satellite organizations, particularly the trade unions.

During the period immediately after the war, the P.C.A., like the Tunisian Communist Party elsewhere, was campaigning for complete integration within a French community.

Towards 1950-1, both these parties, almost simultaneously, modified their attitude in favour of independence, in accordance with the general Soviet directives to the Communist parties in dependent countries. From this time, the European element was progressively replaced by Moslems in the chief posts of direction.

Previously the P.C.A. had already been trying to lead the Moslems to unity of action by the creation of communal organizations:

1946: Algerian Nationalist Democratic Front

1949: Algerian Liberation Front

1950: Defence Committee for Freedom of Expression

1951: Algerian Front for the Defence and Respect of Liberties

1953: Attempt to reconstitute the Algerian National Democratic Front. Several times the Communists offered the Nationalists the assurance that they would be helped in their conquest of total independence - mainly at a meeting held at Algiers on October 31, 1954 on the very eve of the bloodstained events of November 1.

From November 1, 1954 to September 12, 1955

From its first days, the revolt was given the entire support of the Communists.

Their attitude, even in France itself, is sufficiently well known to make emphasis useless.

It is equally useless to recall Radio-Budapest's virulent propaganda campaign in its 1954 and 1955 broadcasts. In Algeria, according to the directives applied by its members, the P.C.A. began to collaborate with the nationalists in the "liberation" of Algeria, in order to claim later on the merit of achieving this, and to separate the Moslem masses from the M.N.A. and F.L.N. leaders, who would then be presented as "traitors to the people's cause" whose elimination would permit the installation of a Communist inspired social and democratic republic.

During this period the P.C.A. press, its means of propaganda and its satellite organizations, particularly the trade unions (C.G.T.) were entirely devoted to the rebellion. The party seized all pretexts to encourage social agitation and wage demands, organized collections of money and clothing for the rebels and created "people's committees for fighting against repression and for amnesty".

From this time also, communist militants were fighting in the bands of Aures and southern Constantine.

In November 1954, contact was made between a member of the Central Committee of the P.C.A., Mohammed GUERROUF, and the Chiefs of the Aurès underground fighters. On November 12, 1954, a meeting took place between the secretary of the P.C.A. and Si SLIMANE, the rebel chief of the southern zone of Aurès, through the mediation of Guerrouf.

As well, the P.C.A. proposed to the rebels during the first quarter of 1955, the convocation of an Algerian Nationalist Congress.

From June 1955, it also undertook to lead terrorist action, and its responsibility for various attacks committed in the towns of Bône, Tlemcen and Constantine has been established.

From September 12, 1955 to the Summer of 1956

The P.C.A. was dissolved on September 12, 1955, as a result of these activities, and the seizure of documents irrefutably proving collusion with the rebels. Driven to secrecy, it pursued its action through the medium of its secret cells and its propaganda through the clandestine newspaper "Liberty". At the same time, the C.G.T. continued its agitation among the workers.

During this period, the P.C.A. reaffirmed at every opportunity, its agreement with the views and aims of the rebels and assumed as its own all their orders for the boycotting of tobacco and theatres for example, or even the Friday strikes. The following is a quotation from number 8 of

the "Liberty":

"Faithful to their tradition of union, the Communists are upholding and will continue to uphold armed patriots whoever they are, who are working towards liberation; whether they are the armed groups of the National Front, groups led by the Communists, by the "fighters of the liberation" or by the M.N.A. or whether they are fighting alone, they must have all our support while we are doing all we can to unify and co-ordinate their action."

But at the same time, the P.C.A. was trying to take an active part in the armed struggle. In December 1955, a new terrorist cell directed by Communist fighters was discovered at Constantine.

From this time, certain Communists fighting under the various banners were no longer content to supply instruction to the rebels, and several of them deserted and went to reinforce the Communist underground which was beginning to form under the name of the "Fighters for Liberation".

Thus, on April 6, 1956, Henri MAILLOT, an employee of the Communist paper "Algiers Republican", enrolled at the rank of aspirant, supplied the rebels with a military truck loaded with arms (120 machine pistols, 62 rifles, 84 revolvers and pistols and ammunition) and went over to their ranks. Henri Maillot was killed in battle on June 5, 1956, near Orleansville, with another notorious Communist militant named LABAN, who had previously fought in Spain with the international Brigades.

It seems obvious that at the time an agreement was undertaken between the F.L.N. and the P.C.A.,

assigning to the latter some operational zones, notably in Orania and the region between Miliana-Orleansville and the Sea. Numerous disappearances of Moslem and European communist militants who departed to join these groups were noted by the police, and the secret newspaper "Liberty" never failed to publish notices for those among them who fell while fighting.

During the same period, numerous Algerian Moslems who had been living in France returned to Algeria, after having been indoctrinated by the Communists and taught their subversive techniques (at the Bobigny centre mainly). Some of these men are sent to join the F.L.N. underground in order to ensure the organization of the cells.

After the Summer of 1956

During the year 1956, a change occurred in the tactics of the P.C.A. Disappointed by the meagre results obtained by its underground, and worried by the general weakening of the rebellion on the military level, the P.C.A. decided to devote itself mainly to urban terrorism, which seemed to it more spectacular and less costly. A tract dated July 1 announced the dissolution of the Organization of the Fighters for Liberation and invited them to "rejoin in a body the Army of National Liberation, with all their arms and material, and to accept the control of the National Liberation Party". At this time, the efforts towards consolidation indicated in the paragraph above were already well advanced; it can in fact be con-

sidered that many of the bands obedient to the F.L.N. or the M.N.A., unknown to themselves, contained Communist members who were awaiting the opportune moment to take over the direction.

In September 1956 "Liberty" considered an established fact "the integration of the Fighters for the Liberation in the national army of liberation, after friendly discussions between the representatives of the two organizations"- an integration "sanctioning" the unification of the armed resistance.

The integration policy was not however, always applied, and wherever the P.C.A. found the local populace sympathetic, it tried to keep its bands independent and to act on its own, as in the Tenes-Cherchell sector. In Orania on the contrary, the P.C.A. put all its men at the F.L.N.'s disposal, according to the admissions of the deserting Communist, Sub-Lieutenant Lucien GHERAB, captured on September 1, 1956.

On January 8, 1957, a well-known Communist militant Abd El Kader Gerroudj "head of the Fighters for Liberation" in Algiers and its suburbs was arrested. He revealed that the Communist cells of Algiers had joined with those of the F.L.N., forming in most quarters of the town mixed groups under the town's command in liaison with the F.L.N. on the higher levels. This network contained about 60 Europeans and Moslems divided into five groups, which were also divided into smaller units.

Soon the P.C.A. was occupied in helping the rebels in the domain of terrorist action, for which the latter's technical preparation was often insufficient. After the summer of 1956, not content with lending its technicians and supplying material (bombs, explosives etc.), it took in hand the organization of terrorism in the towns.

In August, 1956, the accidental explosion of a secret explosives factory in a house in the suburbs of Algiers, led to the discovery of a terrorist cell led by a Communist, and containing several European members, also Communists.

In December 1956, the capture of the deserting officer Lucien GHERAB permitted the disbanding of a terrorist network containing about forty Communists, mostly Europeans, in the Oran region.

The French police have still not been able, unfortunately, to unmask all the communist terrorist cells which operate in Algerian towns, notably Algiers, Oran, Bône and Blida, where, since the autumn of 1956, bomb attacks have reached alarming proportions. It is enough to recall the attacks of the "Milk Bar" and the "Cafeteria", which on September 26 in Algiers, claimed nearly 80 victims, as well as the three attempts of November 12, about forty victims being claimed by the attack at the railway station. Hussein Bey. The "Cafeteria" and "Milk Bar" attacks caused so much more feeling because most of the victims were women and children, often appallingly mutilated.

On November 14, 1956, another still more murderous

attack was narrowly averted by the arrest of a member of the P.C.A. at the moment when he was attempting to blow up the Algiers gasworks.

Since this period, bomb attacks in public buildings, churches, public transport, hotels and in particular houses have continued increasingly.

On May 16, 1957, a mixed Communist-F.L.N. cell of eleven members, six of whom were Europeans, was discovered in a workshop of the Air Army at Blida. It was engaged in sabotage and victualling the rebels.

These attacks are obviously tending to develop an atmosphere of insecurity and to demoralize both the French and Moslem population at the times when the military actions of the rebel bands is losing its vigour. Everything is done as if the P.C.A. is preparing to relieve the M.N.A. and the F.L.N. in case of their weakening.

It intends to profit in any case from its participation in the rebellion by being present at the final negotiations. In a "declaration" dated September 24, 1956, it affirms that "free discussions must be held:"

- " - first with the Army of National Liberation (in which nationalist patriots, communists and independents fight without distinctions) to discuss the conditions and methods of a cease-fire.
- then, with the representatives of the Algerian people, without exclusions, to discuss the future institutions of Algeria."

Its aim, according to the same tract, is the

"building of a new Democratic and Social Republic".

This policy of the P.C.A. draws all its significance from the fact that a great part of the adherents of this party are of European origin, and are consequently more naturally disposed to feel in solidarity with the ethnic community to which they belong than the partisans of a local nationalism.

The whole power of the party machine^{has}/been needed to force the European based militants to accept the participation of the Communists in the terrorist action by justifying it in their eyes by the installation of a Communist regime in Algeria. The orders come from outside.

It is possible to believe this when one considers the identity of views held by the Soviet press (Pravda articles of July 7, 1956 and the Soviet Orientalist Review of April 1956) the French Communist Party (report presented to the French Communist Party on July 18, 1956) and the P.C.A. The tactic adopted by the latter, compared with the current Soviet efforts towards the penetration of the Near East, shows the existence of a vast plan for the elimination of all western influence on the southern coast of the Mediterranean.

The echo of this is found in number 15 of the "Liberty" (secretly published), which appeared the day after the Suez affair:

"The Algerians understand that the support of the U.S.S.R. for the national and democratic forces of Hungary against the imperialists and fascists is the same as the support

they accord to the Egyptian or the Algerian causes. The U.S.S.R. remains faithful everywhere to her mission of liberation and progress and support against reaction."

It will be noted, finally, that in all countries where the propagandists of the F.L.N. have travelled during the summer of 1957, it is the Communist newspapers which have reserved the best place for their declarations. This is particularly striking in Scandinavia and Latin America.

The preceding factors show the importance of the part played by the Algerian Communists and International Communism in the rebellion, in applying the directives received from outside. This struggle, in which the P.C.A. has already lost many of its best fighters, would certainly not have been undertaken if it had not been necessary ^{in order} to reach the goal which is of prime importance to those who ordered it. This goal can only be the creation in Algeria of a popular democracy which will serve as advance base for Soviet penetration towards the Atlantic and coloured Africa.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

AS

I.17958.

Dated: 29th November, 1957.
2038.

FROM:

Rec'd: 30th November, 1957.
1650.

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

(Via leased channel)

NY.1932. UNCLASSIFIED. 25/11

Addressed Canberra NY.1932 repeated Washington
for information.

First Committee. Algeria.

Slim (Tunisia) said the Algerian War was continuing with even greater intensity and for that reason the item had been raised again. Instead of working towards a solution as suggested in resolution of the Eleventh Assembly, France had increased its forces in Algeria to total of 760,000 men compared with 50,000 before the revolt began. French estimates of 45,000 Algerian casualties were too low. French pacification measures had forced at least 50,000 persons to take refuge in Tunisia. In addition French forces had pursued refugees into Tunisian territory. The Loi-Cadre was intended to serve the interests of the French population in Algeria and to reaffirm the "fiction" that Algeria was integral part of France. Loi-Cadre was step backwards because it abandoned idea of negotiations for the purpose of defining the future status of Algeria offered by France at Eleventh Assembly. It was one more attempt to sidetrack the Algerian people in the struggle for freedom and would have the same fate as previous constitutional efforts. Rebellion was not being carried out by minority and the chiefs of the F.L.N. were qualified to represent the Algerian people. As regards French pre-conditions for negotiations, i.e. cease-fire and elections, Slim said there was no similar case in matters of this kind in which solutions had been found, by means of prior cease-fire without negotiations on political and military conditions of that cease-fire. As for elections they would by their very nature reaffirm the French contention that Algeria was part of France. Rejected French argument that self-determination would mean anarchy and partition. Tunisia had done its best to bring the parties together to negotiate settlement which would ensure independence of Algeria while safeguarding legitimate interests of France. He quoted text of Tunisian-Moroccan offer of good offices. Offer was sincerely and honestly made and F.L.N. had responded to this appeal "in most hopeful terms". Hoped France would do likewise.

3. Nisot (Belgium) said Algeria fell within the national jurisdiction of France and under Article 2 (7) the Assembly was not competent to interfere. France was very close to re-establishing law and order in Algeria and the Loi-Cadre demonstrated France's peaceful, just and democratic objectives.

4. Committee adjourned. General debate will continue to-morrow, Saturday.

MIN&DEPT E.A.
MIN&DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'S

1st December, 1957

SEC A/Ss IA UNO CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME
E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P MR.GOSS
G

LONDON.

CONFIDENTIAL

JERC:ABK.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

Dated: 29th November, 1957.
2135.
Rec'd: 30th November, 1957.
0830.

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.

447. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated to Singapore 58, Austunat New York 1.

Your telegram 445, Netherlands New Guinea.

I can see no grounds for linking the reported attack "Gian Seng" with the Netherlands New Guinea campaign. While I cannot identify this latest incident from reports published here, it can surely only have arisen from Indonesian attempts to prevent smuggling between Sumatra and Singapore and Malaya, which have led to various incidents in recent weeks and which are unconnected with the current campaign.

2. As for Nawawi statement, any Indonesian can say what he likes about New Guinea and be sure of seeing it in print, and this one is typical of the various extravagant suggestions thrown up in recent weeks. I do not believe Nawawi's proposals reflect any serious intention of the Indonesian Government, nor is it within their present capabilities. Other relatively subordinate officers in the Provinces are airing their views, possibly taking advantage of the current absence of their Senior Officers at the National Reconstruction Conference in Djakarta.

McIntyre.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. TERRITORIES.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

30th November, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA E.A.F&ME
E INF DL MT C&P.
LONDON THE HAGUE.

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.17898.

RR:ABK.

Da ted: 29th November, 1957.

1048.

FROM:

Rec'd: 30th November, 1957.

0830.

Australian Embassy,

PARIS.456. RESTRICTED. 25/2/11

Repeated New York 17.

Algeria.

1. Government has called for votes of confidence on un-amended text of both Outline law and Electoral law.

Despite disapproval of independents who consider Outline law too liberal, it is anticipated enough of them will vote for it to ensure its passage and save the Government. The new text of the Outline law is little changed from that which emerged from the round table conference 6 weeks ago.

It creates 2 Assemblies for each territory, a "Council of community" in addition "Lower House".

2. It is said that President Coty himself intervened in the Council of Ministers yesterday, urging there should be no internationalisation of the Algerian question (i.e. non-acceptance Tunis-Morocco mediation).

3. Voting will take place to-morrow night 29th November.

Stirling.

(Ø Corrupt group)

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

30th November, 1957.

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LONDON.

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Name of Paper *The Times*File No. *25/2/11*Published at *London*Date *Nov 28 1957*

CONFIDENCE VOTE TO-MORROW ON PLAN FOR ALGERIA

"10,000 OBSERVERS" REPORT DENIED

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, Nov. 27

M. Gaillard this afternoon "put the question of confidence" on the outline law for Algeria and against any amendments to that law with the exception of two: one of these is an unimportant procedural matter, and the other is an amendment by M. Soustelle, the former Governor-General, to exclude the Sahara territory from the scope of the law. The confidence vote is to be taken on Friday.

Late to-night the Assembly was due to begin debating the Bill which provides for a new electoral system in Algeria, designed to ensure that within a single electoral college the European minority should not be swamped by the Muslim voters. The Bill is closely linked with the main outline law, and if it is necessary for the Prime Minister to ask for a confidence vote on this issue as well, he is likely to do so some time to-morrow so that both votes may be taken together.

The debate yesterday and to-day on the outline law has been largely without interest, and the confidence procedure seems to have been used to ensure a speedy and effective result, rather than because the Government is in any danger. Different people certainly regard the proposals in different ways; as M. Lefort said in to-day's *Paris-Journal*, there is something unreal about the measure, which, if passed, will take effect only at some future date and will leave many important issues undecided.

M. LACOSTE AGAIN

M. Lacoste, the Resident Minister in Algeria, made his usual speech to-day about the progress in pacifying Algeria, about the illusory nature of the Nationalists' claim to have opened a Saharan front, and about what he called the increasing signs of a gulf between the Algerian population and the rebels.

He was convinced of the urgent need for a vote on the outline law, "which will constitute a stage in a policy of pacification." He said that a solemn French commitment must be given to those Muslims who were abandoning the Nationalist cause for the French, and to the community of the French in Algeria about conditions in the future.

After M. Lacoste had spoken, M. Gaillard introduced the question of confidence. Earlier he had formally denied, as had the Quai d'Orsay in a separate statement, foreign agency reports that M. Pineau, the Foreign Minister, who is in New York for the United Nations meetings, would be announcing that France was ready to accept international supervision, involving as many as 10,000 international observers, for elections in Algeria.

These reports, when circulated in Paris, evoked angry comments from right-wing circles, forever on the lookout for any signs of the Algeria problem being "internationalized." M. Gaillard warned the Assembly not to listen to the reports, which were contrary to "the clearly defined policy" which he had set out before the National Assembly. There was no question of organizing elections in Algeria under international control "even if the United Nations had thousands of people available."

ANGLO-FRENCH TALKS

M. Gaillard will make a statement in the Assembly on Friday about the results of his conversations with Mr. Macmillan, as well as on the recent Moroccan and Tunisian offer of good offices for a negotiated settlement in Algeria. He reported this morning to the Council of Ministers on

so far as a political solution was concerned. The Ministers considered that sovereignty and independence (the Tunisian-Moroccan offer had mentioned the first but not the second) were one and the same thing.

On the other hand, the spokesman explained, where the chance of a cease-fire was concerned "every possibility of a solution will be envisaged." What would be absolutely unacceptable to the French Government would be any suggestion that it and it alone was not solely responsible for settling an essentially French problem. In answer to a question whether the Government would be answering the Tunisian and Moroccan offer with a rejection purely and simply, the spokesman said that this was not so.

Meanwhile, the reception given in the Press and by public opinion generally to the result of the meeting between the British and French Prime Ministers stops well short of enthusiasm. The suspicion is widespread that in spite of what may have been said to the contrary, there will be steadily increasing pressure from London (and Washington) upon France to change her North African and specifically her Algerian policy.

REPRESSION CHARGE

There is still little news from Algeria, but in Paris the vendetta between rival nationalist groups continues. Last night a young Algerian Muslim was killed in the Bois de Boulogne by the occupants of a passing car.

The National Union of Reserve Officers and N.C.O.s has published a resolution condemning acts of repression by French forces in Algeria. "Acts contrary to military honour" are frequently happening, it states, and urges that they be condemned outright to safeguard the honour of the French Army.

Name of Paper *The Times*File No. *25/2/11*Published at *London*Date *16/2/57***M. PINEAU PUTS
ALGERIA CASE****ARAB LEAGUE MOVE
EXPECTED AT U.N.****SEARCH FOR FORMULA**From Our United Nations
Correspondent

NEW YORK, Nov. 27

When the Algerian question came up to-day before the political committee of the General Assembly, M. Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, set forth at some length his Government's case for a solution based on what he termed "the three panels of our triptych: cease fire, elections, and negotiations."

M. Pineau's speech lasted some two hours and is expected to be followed on Friday by a statement, to be made by the Tunisian representative, of the other, or rebel, side of the Algerian story. As yet there is no resolution before the committee.

Last year the political committee and then the Assembly adopted unanimously (with France taking no part in the vote) a compromise resolution expressing the hope that "in a spirit of cooperation, a peaceful, democratic, and just solution will be found, through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the charter of the United Nations."

This year it seems likely that an attempt will be made by the Afro-Asian group of countries, headed by the Arab League, to define more precisely the "appropriate means" to be adopted, and it may be that the formula to be propounded will embody some reference to consultation by France with "interested parties," possibly naming Morocco and Tunisia.

The attitude of the western world, headed by the United States and the United Kingdom, has yet to be stated, but provided the suggested resolution contains no reference to Algerian independence or to a joint approach by France in concert with others, it may be that a form of words may be found which will prove acceptable to the Assembly as a whole.

AID FOR REBELS

To-day M. Pineau explained why his Government felt unable "to follow through with the offers of good offices recently made by two heads of friendly States," the King of Morocco and the President of Tunisia. He explained that their joint statement, issued in Rabat a week ago, appointed the National Liberation Front as the "only spokesman" of Algeria. He maintained that this group could not claim for itself the title of exclusive representatives of the Algerian people. Only free elections could appoint undisputed spokesmen.

"Furthermore," he said, "we do not see the way clear to bringing into conversations to settle the Algerian problem governments whose freedom of action regarding the National Liberation Front is more than dubious. Mediation always presupposes the neutrality of the mediator."

M. Pineau was followed by Dr. Louthi (Egypt), who sought to refute the assertions that the Algerian rebels had received military aid from Egypt. Dr. Zeineddine (Syria) asserted that the rebels were nationalists operating against French domination. On the proposal of Mongi Slim (Tunisia), the debate was then adjourned until Friday.

French Assembly debate, page 8.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

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I. 17821

Sent: 27th November, 1957
2105
Rec'd: 28th November, 1957
2143

FROM: (Via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

25/2/11

NY1900. UNCLASSIFIED.

First Committee.

Algeria.

Opening the General Debate, Pineau said the discussion appeared neither useful nor timely and he did not believe that there was any possibility of a speedy solution. The United Nations is incompetent to deal with the question because Algeria is an integral part of France. The rebellion is not a national uprising but a "political enterprise undertaken by the minority, wed to the well known methods of terrorism and of a war of subversion". He summarised the French proposals for the cease-fire as follows:-

- (a) Negotiations of the cease-fire without any pre-conditions of a political nature;
- (b) Elections with a single electoral college for the Algerian Assemblies. (France prepared to invite Governments "of countries which are accustomed to democratic procedures" to send observers).
- (c) Establishment of the Assembly and thereupon "discussions to decide upon the definitive institutions of Algeria".

He supported, with quotations, the statement that the Nationalists insisted on recognition by France of Algerian independence before negotiations on the cease-fire. This was one reason why France could not accept the offer of good offices made by Morocco and Tunisia. The others were that only one group of Algerians (F.L.N.) was included in the offer;

Offer referred to "precondition of recognition of sovereignty of Algeria" which has identical legal meaning to "independence"; and France had doubts about bringing into negotiations "Governments whose freedom of action regarding the F.L.N. is more than dubious".

Pineau then outlined the conflicts between the two main political groups in the Algerian rebellion;

The Algerian National Movement (M.N.A.) and the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) which have led to mutual intimidation, extortion and assassination both in France and Algeria, examined the methods of terrorism in Algeria which were directed as much against the Moslems as the French. The Algerian Communist Party has joined the F.L.N. and its participation in the rebellion consists largely of Urban terrorism. If France withdrew from Algeria

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the Communists would be in the best position to assume power because of their discipline. Doctrine and foreign assistance to the rebellion consists of propaganda from Cairo and Damascus, Egyptian arms shipments and money, and F.L.N. bases in Morocco and Tunisia from which to operate into Algeria. The French reforms in Algeria comprise decentralisation of administrative power; creation of specialised administrative sections; and municipal reform giving the Algerians equal status in local administration. Moreover the loi-cadre at present before the French Assembly will provide for -

- (a) The institution of universal suffrage;
- (b) the establishment of regional and central legislative and executive organs; and
- (c) machinery for the evolution of Algerian institutions.

If self-determination so often invoked in the United Nations was applied to Algeria, it would result in the partition of Algeria into two or more states, a state with a European majority in Coastal area and at least one, or perhaps two, Algerian states in the rest of territory. France intends to associate the North African countries in task of the economic and social development of North Africa, particularly the Sahara region. In conclusion Pineau said the United Nation's duty was to allow France to continue to put into effect peaceful, democratic and just solution.

2. In brief interventions, Egypt and Syria denied that there countries were giving military assistance to the Nationalists. There was no objection to the Tunisian proposal to adjourn the Committee to Friday morning (tomorrow being a public holiday on which, however, the Security Council and other Committees are scheduled to meet).

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

29th November, 1957.

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LONDON

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

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Dated: 27th November 1957
2007
Rec'd: 28th November 1957
1700
(Transmitted via leased channel.)

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

25/2/11

File 90

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Commonwealth Meeting.

The United Kingdom raised the forthcoming debate on Algeria and said France was making great efforts to solve the problem. The United Kingdom role would be to help France. Said advocacy in the United Nations of any individual solution would not be productive.

2. Pakistan thought the debate would proceed on the usual emotional lines. Said France had made a bad start by refusing the Moroccan offer of mediation.

3. Australia said she wished to see how the debate developed while expecting Pineau to put the French case with moderation.

4. Canada was disconcerted by French indecision regarding the manner in which she would present her case.

5. Answering the Pakistan question the United Kingdom said the French Government was optimistic on the chances of the French Assembly adopting Loi-Cadre.

6. The United Kingdom said it was hoped the debate on Cyprus would take the form of a progress report. There had been a great improvement in the situation and the United Kingdom had taken the initiative in the diplomatic field. They had already talked to the Turks on tactics and planned to speak to the Greeks.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

29th November, 1957.

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CONFIDENTIAL

*Avec les compliments
de l'Ambassade de France*

7.11.11
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→ Mr
Cooper

file 25/2/11

ADDRESS BY M. CHRISTIAN PINEAU
FRENCH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL COMMITTEE
ON NOVEMBER 27, 1957

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TRIBUTE TO ALI CHEKKAL

Last February, when the Algerian question was brought up before the Political Committee, a member of the French Delegation was at my side. That man, a French Moslem of Algeria, has now left nothing in that place but a memory. He was a victim of a premeditated murder. I want to pay tribute to his public spirit and to the courage with which, braving the threats of death to which he had been subjected, he chose to risk his life for the cause that he believed to be just.

If today, Mr. Chairman, I have brought up the memory of Ali Chekkal, I am sure that you will realize that it is not in order to exploit this memory--even in the slightest degree--to help support the French cause, but because of a higher reason that is of concern to all the nations represented here.

Yet Ali Chekkal was killed because, as his murderer said, and as those who stood behind the murder have admitted, because he came to the United Nations Assembly, because in the corridors of this building he expressed his attachment to France.

Now, gentlemen, I put it to you: Can any of you agree--despite your views on the substance of the problem--that any of you, no matter who, may be done away with tomorrow because of the stand he took freely in our organization?

One single solitary affirmative reply to this would prove that whoever had the courage to give it, refused to adhere to the very spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, and would also prove his unworthiness to sit among us.

I have no right for a moment to doubt the unanimity of your feelings. France will not tolerate that the expression of an opinion be answered by murder. France never has, and never will, place strictures upon anyone who has made use of the most sacred right of every man--that of giving free expression to his thoughts.

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Mr. Chairman :

Scarcely nine months ago, our General Assembly carried out a careful and at times impassioned examination of the Algerian question. A certain number of delegations have seen fit to reopen the case, and to reproach France with not having abided by the hope expressed in the resolution adopted on last February 15, for a "peaceful, democratic and just" solution to the Algerian question.

We shall no more refuse this discussion than we did the last, although it appears to us to be neither useful nor timely. Despite important and even decisive progress achieved during short space of time, one would truly have to be naive--or be actuated by bad faith--to believe in the possibility of speedily solving such a delicate problem as is that of Algeria.

P A R T I

I - FRANCE'S POSITION ON THE COMPETENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

During the present session of the Assembly, as at the last, my delegation raised no objection to the inclusion of the Algerian question on the agenda. This does not in any way mean that our position has changed, nor that today we accept, any more than we did then, the interference of the United Nations in a matter which falls squarely within the jurisdiction of our national sovereignty. The French Delegation is thus consistent with the stand it has always taken regarding the incompetence of the Assembly to deal with the Algerian problem. It only proposes, in this debate, to bring the truth of the Algerian question to the knowledge of international opinion, to stress the efforts we are making to bring a peaceful settlement to a drama that has already caused too much bloodshed and too many tears, and to refute the calumnies piled up against us, in order, in turn, to make our own grievances heard.

The reasons behind the French position regarding the question of competence are no doubt uppermost in the minds of most of the members of this Committee. One of the basic articles of the Charter sets up as a principle the nonintervention of the United Nations in matters falling essentially within the national sovereignty of States. Without the slightest doubt, it applies to the question at present before us. France has been in Algeria since 1830. In 1848, when the Constitution of the Second Republic was adopted, Algeria became integrated within the national territory, that is to say, long before the integration of such authentically French provinces as Savoy and Nice, and also before many States represented here had assimilated much of the territory that is today under their legitimate sovereignty. These are historical and de jure facts upon which no one has ever tried to cast the slightest doubts.

Like all other members of our Organization, France joined the United Nations with the frontiers that had been traditionally recognized as belonging to her--including Algeria, which is therefore placed under the restriction from intervention mentioned in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter.

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Perhaps some may regret that this be the case, and that they did not, at the time, make known the reservations that they feel today. But that still does not give our Assembly the power to exceed its rights, waiving an obligation to which you have all subscribed and without which there could be no international life at all.

I want also to mention that 1,200,000 persons of European origin are settled in Algeria and have been so for numerous generations, representing one eighth of the local population. And on the other hand, more than 300,000 French Moslems from Algeria live and work in France. There, they enjoy the same rights as other citizens, without distinction of origin or religion. There is no obstacle to an Algerian Moslem having access to the highest positions in the Republic, as experience has shown.

Therefore, be their nature and complexity what they will, the problems that arise in Algeria fall without doubt within the framework of French sovereignty. Nothing has ever been found in the Charter that might motivate or justify an interference on the part of the General Assembly.

In the last analysis--in the course of the last session of the General Assembly, it was amply proved--what is occurring in Algeria is not a national uprising against foreign oppression but a political enterprise, undertaken by a minority, wed to the well-known methods of terrorism and of a war of subversion. It would have foundered long ere this had it not received help from certain countries which supply it with arms, money, directives, and even bases of operations. If the Algerian question did, in fact, contain an international aspect, this would be the only one. So that, according to the Charter, it ought not to be France standing in the dock, but those who thus threaten her security and sovereignty.

II - THE FRENCH PROPOSALS FOR A CEASE-FIRE

Before undertaking a recital of the present state of affairs in Algeria, I feel I should correct a reproach too often levelled against France. Acting in either good or bad faith some have become the echo of the rebel propaganda, expressing amazement that my country has not as yet undertaken negotiations with those fighting against her, and thus has not taken into full account the terms of the resolution of last February 15.

But, the only offers of negotiation were those coming from the French side, and these were made without any unacceptable preconditions, yet they have all been rejected.

The French Proposals

As long ago as March 9, 1956, M. Guy Mollet, then President of the Council, made a public appeal to the rebels to agree to a "cease-fire" that would allow free and honest elections to be held, followed by conversations on the formation of a new Algeria.

Later on, especially on January 9, 1957, this offer was repeated and further clarified. It has just been solemnly renewed by the new President of the Council of Ministers in his declaration of investiture. France is still ready to negotiate a cease-fire with those who have taken up arms against her. As far as we are concerned, these conversations would not be subject to any precondition of a political nature but would be coupled with every legitimate guarantee of security that might be required in a similar case. The only reason for such conversations would be the return of calm and security, without which no honest consultation of the people is possible.

The second panel of this triptych is the holding of elections with a single electoral college, which will allow the populations of Algeria freely to choose the men to whom they want to entrust the renewal of conversations. The French Government will recognize, as legitimate representatives of the populations, only those nominated by popular will and without constraint. To the French, ballots are the only valid letters of accreditation.

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Terror cannot confer authentic titles of representation. No movement, seeking to achieve power by terrorism alone, can expect to be recognized as the sole valid negotiator in a country where, as I shall show later, it has the support of only a fraction of the population--a fraction, active no doubt, but in the minority.

The French Government feels that no one should be given ground to doubt the sincerity of the popular consultation. As it has already promised, it will itself take the initiative of inviting Governments of countries, which are accustomed to democratic procedures, to send as many observers as necessary.

The third stage will begin when, the will of the people having been ascertained, the Algerian assemblies will have been set up. Thereupon, discussions will be held to decide upon the definitive institutions of Algeria, taking into due account the aspirations and the, at times, divergent interests of the various communities, thus permitting individual rights and freedoms for all to be fully assured.

The method I have just outlined was already put before the Political Committee at the last session; at the time, it seemed logical to all those who truly wanted a settlement to be arrived at.

Last February 15, the Assembly unanimously expressed the hope that the Algerian question would be peacefully, democratically and justly solved. It is not entirely by chance that these terms coincide with the three panels of our triptych : cease-fire, elections, negotiations.

France is determined to continue this policy, of which the "loi-cadre" (enabling legislation), at present before the French Parliament, is one of the instruments. This legislation, the terms of which I shall analyze in due course, is only intended to bring closer the moment when the peoples of Algeria will be able to express their desires with complete freedom and without fear of reprisals.

The Intransigence of the Rebels

Why did the French proposals for a cease-fire remain unanswered ? It is because those who head the rebellion put forward preconditions that were unacceptable.

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In its desire to end bloodshed as soon as possible, the French Government did not hesitate last year, nor again this year, to enter into unofficial contact with certain of its adversaries.

Thus, last July 24, when interrogated after an Anglo-American press luncheon, M. Bourges-Maunoury declared quite clearly that "contacts are being made on a permanent basis by all sorts of persons with the rebels, and they will continue."

In the course of the previous session, I submitted a brief account of the background of these contacts, in order to strip the fiction from some novelesque versions that were being bruited about. I can state today that no noticeable changes have been registered among the heads of the rebellion. Recent, as well as the earliest, experience has proved that they refuse any negotiations on a cease-fire, until all their own demands are met by the French : "Prior independence"--that is the blind alley which our good will is up against.

Everyone can find confirmation of this in public documents and statements. Here are some examples : July 10, 1957, a representative of the F.L.N. stated in New York that : "Our position has not changed--and will not change. We will not enter into negotiations with the French until they have recognized the independence of Algeria."

On July 22, in a letter to Mr. Hammarskjöld, with which all the delegations present are familiar, the same spokesman wrote that the F.L.N. set as a condition for the opening of negotiations "the announcement by the French Government of an official policy recognizing the independence of Algeria". He was to say later that same day to the press that this recognition of Algerian independence would be only the starting point of fruitful negotiations for a cease-fire. He added : "At present we see no possibility of negotiations, nor even of Franco-Algerian contacts."

Finally, quite recently, on October 30, a communiqué from the Executive Committee of the F.L.N. was published in Tunis, and it solemnly reaffirmed "that there would be no negotiations without the prior recognition of the independence of Algeria."

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It is difficult to imagine a more brutal slamming of a door that we have always tried to keep ajar.

While the emissaries sent by the F.L.N. to different member countries of the United Nations declare--for the benefit of the local press--that it is France that refuses to negotiate, they simply omit mention of the fact that their attitude is the real obstacle to negotiations.

The question must be correctly put in order to understand it.

Can anyone imagine the opening of negotiations--of any sort--being made contingent upon the acceptance of all the claims put forward by some of the possible spokesmen? For France to be willing to recognize the independence of Algeria tomorrow, even without knowing if that is the true will of all the populations concerned, would mean that there would really be no negotiations, properly speaking, except on the relatively secondary questions of the modalities of implementation.

Thus, the fact that our offer of a cease-fire, coupled with all legitimate safeguards, is met by the rebels with an unacceptable political precondition, which is tantamount to a rejection, is something for which France can in no way be held responsible.

The position of the French Government can be summed up in two sentences :

- 1) Representation is the result of free elections, and not of terrorism.
- 2) The political preconditions constantly raised in opposition to opening negotiations only make the latter pointless.

The Offer of Morocco and Tunisia

That is one of the basic reasons why we have felt unable to follow through with the offers of good offices recently made by two heads of friendly States : His Majesty the King of Morocco, and the President of the Republic of Tunisia. The joint communiqué issued in Rabat, on November 21, appoints as the only spokesman, the F.L.N.

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No more than any other party or organization can this group claim for itself the title of exclusive representative of the Algerian populations. Only free elections, held without any constraint, can, I repeat, appoint undisputed spokesmen.

Though the communiqué no longer contains the precondition of independence, it replaces it by the precondition of recognition of the sovereignty of Algeria, a less precise term than the other, perhaps, but bearing absolutely identical juridical meaning.

Furthermore, we do not see the way clear to bringing into conversations to settle the Algerian problem, Governments whose freedom of action regarding the F.L.N. is, as we shall see further on, more than dubious. Mediation always presupposes the neutrality of the mediator. Finally, we would not want to run the risk of jeopardizing, perhaps definitively, the chances of a Franco-North African community which we, too, desire to create when the moment for it is ripe.

Anyway, to the proposals of Rabat, the F.L.N. has replied by reiterating its intransigence. The communiqué which the F.L.N. itself published on November 23 repeats all its previous ideas, without the slightest progress having been achieved; and in it, we can specifically find the following words : "straightforward, official negotiations on the basis of independence will end the shedding of blood and the ravages of a colonialist war."

III - CONFLICTS BETWEEN REBEL GROUPS

The heads of the F.L.N. regularly state that France is wasting time demanding free elections before entering into discussions on the future institutions of Algeria.

In fact, they contend that they are the real representatives of the peoples concerned, simply because they kill more people than the others--which everyone is willing to admit. In order to ensure themselves of this monopoly, they have undertaken the destruction of other parties in the purest totalitarian tradition.

Last February, I answered that contention of the F.L.N.; but have the events of the last nine months been such as to justify a reappraisal? That is the question which I should now like to answer.

It is sufficient for me to analyze the behavior of the rebels--which is there for all to see.

Outside of Algeria, there are groups, committees, which, calling themselves the only accredited spokesmen of the rebellion, claim military and diplomatic responsibilities. It is difficult to gauge the exact scope of their authority, but it is easy to see that harmony does not reign among them and that they mutually accuse one another of the most heinous treacheries.

In Algeria itself, the situation is even more confused. The forces of pacification do not find anything in the nature of a unified army opposing them. On the contrary, independent bands of widely varied strength, at times showing open hostility toward one another, is all that they meet. A report that appeared last June in the Austrian journal "Die Presse" sums up the situation in the following terms :

"In the Aurès Mountains and in the coastal cities, terrorists take the law into their own hands, and generally speaking, do not follow the instructions sent them from Tunis, especially if such instructions displease them. In the mountains, the partisans lead an adventurous life, full of variety, which they would not be willing to exchange for the toilsome existence that is the normal lot of the Arab peasant and the underemployed proletarian. The Emigré leaders would obviously have dealt with M. Guy Mollet, but they lack unity and especially are they unsure of their authority over the 'activists.' They have few illusions regarding their own influence."

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The Rivalry Between the F.L.N. and the M.N.A.

At the present time calm has been restored in most of Algeria but--alongside the normal life of most--the quarrels and acts of revenge of rival factions continue.

Two political groups are the main contenders in the Algerian rebellion : the M.N.A. (Algerian National Movement), and the F.L.N. (National Liberation Front).

The relations existing between the two groups are marked by a cruel competition for a monopoly of the Algerian nationalist movement. First of all, they wage a propaganda war, but also, since the very beginning of the rebellion, a military war as well. Each of the groups tries by all means to lure away the other's men; when persuasion fails, intimidation occurs, and even murder. For example, the F.L.N. is responsible for the assassination of numerous M.N.A. chiefs, such as Moustafa Ben Boulaid, one of the most important rebel chiefs in the Aurès, and of Chihani Bechir, who operated in the Constantinois region.

Probably out of regard for its hosts, the F.L.N. itself did not liquidate the two representatives of the rival party in Cairo : Ahmed Mezerna and Chadli Mekki, but instead it had them interned, and for almost two years now, no news of these men has been received.

In the interior of the country, the bands fight at gun point over control of the sectors that bring in the fattest dividends in pillage and gun-running. The F.L.N. has achieved obvious military successes over its adversaries, since in 1957, it destroyed numerous groups of the M.N.A. in the South of Algeria. The prisoners taken were slaughtered unless they were willing to go over to the victors. But the fortune of arms changed in that region, where the M.N.A. is now revenging itself on its enemies.

Internal Rivalries

Added to these political rivalries--if one can call them that--are the antagonisms created by differences in race and language.

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At present, within the F.L.N. itself, the relations between the Kabyles, Chaouias and Arabs are anything but cordial. Recent clashes causing more than a hundred victims have taken place in the Médéa region, between Kabyle and Arab partisans, both belonging to the same movement.

As for the Chaouia rebels of the Aurès, they reject any Arab or Kabyle authority over them, whether it be under the banner of the F.L.N. or the M.N.A. Operating as they do in one of the most coveted sectors of the Algerian territory for purposes of gun-running, they refuse to share the military, and especially the financial, advantage with anyone. A few months ago, the F.L.N. chiefs, settled in Tunisia, tried to get these dissidents back in hand, but their emissaries were met with open gunfire.

Strife Among Nationalists in Metropolitan France

Such dissension, however, is not restricted to the bands who carry on guerrilla warfare in Algeria. They can be found also among those the above-mentioned Austrian journal calls the "Emigrés".

In Metropolitan France--where it is not a question of fighting against French control--the struggle between tendencies is characterized by attacks and assassinations which mount to numbers unprecedented in the history of conflict between rival groups.

The F.L.N., in particular, undertook to decapitate the trade union organization which is dependent on the M.N.A., the Federation of Labor Unions of Algerian Workers (U.S.T.A.), by having a number of its chiefs murdered, especially the President, Ahmed Bekhat, who was killed in a Parisian suburb on October 27. These crimes have brought indignant protests from organized labor in France, and outside the country and even from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which had believed itself in duty bound to admit the so-called trade union organization of the F.L.N.

During the first 10 months of 1957 alone, there have been in France about 600 Algerian Moslems killed and more than 2,000 wounded, victims of other Algerian Moslems. In point of fact, it is not a question here merely of a struggle for political

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preponderance but a struggle to obtain the benefits of a racket, organized to tap the income and wages received by Algerians working in France. Banditry has, in this case, the upper hand over nationalism.

Even in Belgium and Tunisia, similar settlings of accounts have occurred.

All over the country, the working population, eager to work in peace, is made the victim of these methods, which it constantly protests. In fact, if one forgets the rivalries that I have just described between factions or leaders, to try to deduce the true aspirations of the fellah and the Algerian worker, things become much clearer. And there can be no doubt that the Algerian people are fed up with this tyranny that they are forced to endure because of the desires of the Lords of Civil War.

Anyway, it is pointless to discuss endlessly the representative character of this or that rebel movement, when the question can be readily settled by free elections. Why does the F.L.N. shrink from the verdict of public opinion? Doubtless, because it relies more on totalitarian methods than on the support it might get from that opinion.

IV - THE METHODS OF TERRORISM

Last February, I painted a picture for you of Algerian terrorism. Not relishing a taste for horror, I shall spare you certain descriptions.

The final result of the methods used by the rebels has been to underline the resistance, active or passive, offered them by the Algerian population.

Every passing day confirms this fact. The disgust aroused by certain methods used, now alienates the majority of those who, abused or under duress, had at one time supported the rebellion. Practically all over Algeria, life has returned to normalcy. The cities that, a few months ago, paid the heaviest tribute to terrorism, have now been freed from its threat; last June, more than a hundred victims fell in Algiers; no attacks occurred in September, and but one in October.

The immediate objectives of the rebels were, if I may recall them for you :

- 1) To spread terror, at all costs, so as to create the myth of their being all-powerful;
- 2) To impose a blind obedience to their orders on the Moslem population;
- 3) To create an ineradicable hatred between the Moslem and European communities.

Between November 1, 1954 and November 1, 1957, the rebels murdered 8,429 civilians, of which 310 were women and 120 children. This tragic picture includes 1,126 European victims, and 7,303 Moslems, of which 222 were women and 84 children.

The proportion of Moslems killed by those who claim that they are fighting on behalf of the Algerian people is, therefore, approximately 7 Moslems to 1 European. If any conclusion is to be drawn from these figures, it is that the rebellion does not enjoy spontaneous support from Moslems any more than from Europeans.

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The Failure of Urban Terrorism

The most spectacular attacks were generally blind; their aim was to sow fear and disorder everywhere and in the minds of everyone : bombs thrown into crowds, machine guns fired on passers-by, in schools and in cafes; murderous devices hidden in public places or in vehicles of public transportation. Moslem and European victims were cut down indiscriminately.

We trust that this ordeal has now ended. The network that organized urban terrorism has been dismantled everywhere, thanks to cooperation given the authorities by the population.

The Failure of Rebel Instructions

To the collective murders, must be added the individual executions that have taken place and that were intended to impose by terror, the most outrageous instructions, and thus to force villagers and city dwellers to aid subversion. These efforts failed.

The traditional family and religious celebrations had been prohibited under pain of death by the F.L.N. Yet, peace was the keynote of the last commemoration of the birth of the Prophet, the "Mouloud".

Patronizing public places, smoking, even owning a dog were so many crimes that were punished cruelly. Yet, streets and public buildings have now taken on their usual look; men smoke there openly, and although this may seem a negligible detail to us, it is in the nature of a symbol to the population.

We know furthermore of the failure of the order to boycott schools : our schools have never been as well attended as they are this year; about 400,000 Moslem children attend classes, compared to approximately 300,000 on October 1, 1954, on the eve of the rebellion.

At the same time, the Moslem students in France have gone back to the Universities, spontaneously, without paying any attention to the still standing order to strike.

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These facts prove that, although the rebels have not renounced these methods, they no longer have the means, today, of imposing themselves by them.

I can no better illustrate the reversal of the situation, than by the statements of certain responsible leaders of the rebellion itself. In the Constantine area, a political commissar, signing himself Abdel Krim, wrote, last October : "The people of the sector no longer abide by our orders ... particularly, the inhabitants of Ouled-Driss refuse to recognize our authority. Far worse, they challenge it outright."

I have, at the disposal of the members of the Committee, photostatic copies of this document, and of others to which I shall refer in due course.

In Algiers itself, where, I repeat, terrorism has practically disappeared in the last few months, one of the rebel chiefs, recently arrested, wrote on September 21 : "To mark the United Nations debates on the Algerian Question, a strike, however short, would be a failure here." What he meant to say by this was that the F.L.N. no longer has the strength to force obedience, by its usual methods, to an order for a political strike.

In passing, I want to point out that the rebels have not hesitated to turn to the services of paid professionals. Twenty of the chiefs of the F.L.N. terrorist cells who have been arrested in the last three years, were ex-convicts. In France, the M.N.A. killers receive a fixed fee of 20 to 25,000 francs per month, plus 15 to 20,000 francs for each coreligionary executed.

One of the main orders was also to prevent any form of cooperation between Moslems and Europeans, as well as any participation by Moslems in public life, by means of the suppression of any of those who help to ensure its continuity, whether politically elected or appointed officials.

Here too, the rebellion has miscarried despite the murders : for each municipal, departmental or regional delegate who paid with his life for enlisting voluntarily in the effort to build up a New Algeria, a volunteer has come forward to replace him. Amongst these are more and more new men, whom the events have caused to emerge from the bulk of the masses : militant labor-unionists nominated by their organizations; heads of municipal delegations elected by their peers, and--a most important innovation--young Moslems.

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Religious chiefs themselves have not been spared, be they priests, rabbis, imams of mosques or sheiks of brotherhoods. On last August 22, one of the most highly revered personalities of Moslem Algeria, the old Sheik Ben Tekkouk, was murdered at the same time as his son. Two days later, the F.L.N. spokesman for Radio Tunis rejoiced over this feat of arms. Despite the F.L.N. prohibition, however, thousands of Algerians were present for the funeral of the Sheik, whose prestige extended even to Libya.

The violence that has struck the notables, did not spare the people. Thus the rebels tried, and in parts, still try, to stop the villagers from attending regional markets, for fear that they should come into contact with the administration, or seek the free assistance of hospital services. But in one year, free medical consultations have gone from 250,000 per month, to 610,000.

An F.L.N. official in the Oran region, on May 28, 1957, wrote to one of his lieutenants : "I have noted that many people give information, and about 80 or 90 of them go daily to see the S.A.S. officer. It would be appropriate to send armed men to execute all the men and the women who present themselves there, so that not one is left."

Alas, such orders have very often been carried out. The rebels have resorted to the wiping out of entire villages. The F.L.N. orders, dated last April 17, contained the following passage : "Orders are given to burn all villages having requested protection of France, and to cut down all men more than 20 years old inhabiting such villages." It is thus that Ain Manas, Wagram, Sédoui, Bouandas, and especially Melouza, became such sadly celebrated names.

Last June 4, the Washington Post wrote as follows : "The pitiless massacre of Melouza has filled with horror and disgust even our own blasé and hardened generation ... The words 'liberty' and 'independence' cannot be invoked to excuse such crimes ... Such a brutal, such a cruel massacre will be neither understood nor forgiven in any civilized country whatever."

These crimes against humanity have had a contrary effect

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from that sought by their authors. The Moslem population has learned no longer to accept them meekly. All over the territory, sporadically, village communities have spontaneously set up self-defense groups; they demand weapons to ensure protection to their villages. The number of these groups has not ceased to grow and the rebels have been impotent to hinder their action. The same applies to the "harkas", and to groups of rural police, auxiliary units composed of civilian volunteers.

Ever more numerous, Moslem groups of this type take an active part alongside the regular forces to destroy the rebel bands. Since the beginning of this year, their strength has tripled; on November 1, they amounted to 57,000 men. This growth must be linked to the surrenders which have become more and more numerous among the rebel bands.

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Thus, despite the use of the most violent means, despite recourse to the most effective revolutionary techniques, and thanks to the reactions of the Moslem masses themselves, the rebellion has failed to carry out the main objectives it had set for itself.

With regard to the attacks perpetrated against the population of European origin, the majority of them were intended to give rise to the most violent reactions, in order to feed hatred on both sides. True, faced with so much horror and so many excesses, the soldiers charged with maintaining order, and even civilians themselves, must have been sorely tempted to start reprisals, and indeed, a systematic counter-terrorism. The instructions given by the Government to those vested with its authority, and their psychological effect on European opinion, have constantly tended to avoid such aberrations.

Generally speaking, these instructions were obeyed, as is testified by the reports of a number of international commissions; and if individual mistakes were unfortunately committed, investigations were held and sanctions applied.

At present, although terrorism is still perpetrated--but in a sporadic manner--Algeria is on the road to the recovery of peace. Everywhere, in the country as well as in the cities,

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people are at work; cars travel on the roads; children crowd into schools; and--this detail is important for a country which we are supposed to believe is in the throes of an insurrection--taxes are collected normally.

This re-establishment of normalcy, this return to trust, the friendliness that is once again apparent in the daily contacts between Algerians of the different communities would, I assure you, never have been possible if, even in its worst moments, the Moslem population as a whole had not preserved its attachment to France and spontaneously cooperated with the restoration of order.

V - THE ROLE OF ALGERIAN COMMUNISM

After analyzing the different factors in the rebellion, and their methods, I wish to call attention to the activities of the Algerian Communist Party.

I do not intend to identify Algerian nationalism with international Communism, but rather to note facts. But they show the specific character of the aid given the rebellion by the Algerian Communist Party.

I dwelt on this problem at great length in the course of the last debate. For the benefit of those of our colleagues who were not here at that time, I shall limit myself to a brief resumé of Communist activity, and of its doings since last February.

I want to recall for you that, in 1935, the Algerian Communist Party, originally affiliated with the French Communist Party, became autonomous.

Immediately after the war, when the French Communists were part of the French Government, the Communist parties of North Africa--Algerian and Tunisian--promoted a campaign for complete integration within a French entity. It is since 1950, and in obedience to orders received from outside, that the Algerian Communist Party has adopted the idea of independence, and ever since, it has supported this idea with whatever means were at its disposal.

On October 31, 1954, on the eve of the day when the Algerian tragedy broke out, in the course of a secret meeting held in Algiers, M. Frachon and M. Dufriche, speaking on behalf of the French Communist labor union federation (C.G.T.) and the World Federation of Trade Unions, offered the nationalists their unconditional support in their struggle for independence. From the very beginning of the rebellion, in the Aurès, militant Communists fought in the nationalist bands.

In the course of the previous session, I emphasized the close contacts established between nationalist leaders and Communists during 1954 and 1955, as well as the terrorist action

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carried out by certain Communist cells. The statement of these facts, and their dates, can be found in the records of the Committee.

Now, I shall merely mention the fact that, in January 1957, the arrest of a militant Communist has made it possible for us to establish that the Communist terrorist organizations of Algeria had merged with those of the F.L.N., and formed joint groups.

The participation of the Algerian Communist Party in the active rebellion takes two forms :

1) First of all, the Algerian Communist Party has specialized in the organization or urban terrorism, which is more striking, requires fewer people for perpetration, and for which its members are technically better prepared than those of the F.L.N.; in particular, the Communist Party has supplied specialists in explosives and also men to carry out mass attacks.

The Algerian Communist Party is directly responsible for a major portion of the explosions of murderous devices which, in the city of Algiers, claimed hundreds of victims, both European and Moslem, and mainly, women and children.

What gives us food for thought, regarding the aims sought by the Algerian Communist Party, is that it not only uses Moslem members, but especially members of European origin who have certainly not entered the fray to support the cause of Algerian nationalism, but rather with the hope that the triumph of the rebellion will permit the setting up of a regime of their choice, in Algeria.

To give an example : On November 14, 1956, it was a European Communist, Yveton, who placed a time bomb in the gas plant in Algiers, which would have claimed many hundreds of victims had the author not been caught red-handed.

2) The Algerian Communist Party has successfully attempted to get its members into the F.L.N. This, perhaps, is the most disturbing aspect of its participation in the rebellion. We know, furthermore, that numerous Moslem Communists, trained outside Algeria in underground centers, have been given the task of infiltrating the rebel bands.

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Were France to withdraw from Algeria, it would be these Communist elements that would be in the best position to assume power. They are the only truly disciplined forces involved in the rebellion. They are the only ones who have a real doctrine taught them, and who may rely on powerful aid from foreign countries when they are ready to carry out their schemes.

To avoid any misunderstanding, I must repeat : I do not contend that the Algerian rebels obey Communist orders alone. I only want to draw your attention to the grave danger for the future, inherent in Communist participation in the Algerian subversion.

Even were the rebellion to be sincerely opposed to the setting up of a Communist regime in Algeria, it may, one day, even unwillingly, turn out to be the Trojan Horse of Communism in North Africa.

VI - FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO THE REBELLION

It is conceivable that some might have an interest in maintaining insecurity in North Africa. It is less easy to understand how the interests of certain countries could be served by prolonging the Algerian conflict through the moral and material support that they are giving the rebellion.

Aid From the Near East

As the French Delegation showed at the last session of the United Nations, much of the assistance given the rebellion comes from countries of the Near East. The first orders came from Cairo, and on November 1, 1954, they unleashed the first uprisings in the Aurès. It was in Cairo that the F.L.N. was set up, with the encouragement of the authorities, and to a large extent, on the orders and with the moneys of the Egyptian Secret Services. And it was also in Cairo, that the sham National Committee for Algerian Resistance held its latest full-dress meeting last August.

The official radio stations of Cairo (the Voice of the Arabs) and of Damascus daily launched crazed appeals beamed to Algeria, calling for a Holy War, calling for murder and violence, and also broadcasting extravagant false news.

The Arab League, for its part, has, since January 1954, included yearly in its budget a "North African Fund" intended to support subversion. In certain member States of the League, public fund-raising campaigns are periodically carried out under the patronage of local authorities to aid the rebellion. One of the Arab leaders, who is among the most zealous defenders of the cause of the F.L.N. before the United Nations, took upon himself recently in his own country the initiative of starting a money-raising campaign to help that organization.

But all this is a relatively small matter. The constantly increasing shipments of weapons are much more serious. The investigation following the boarding, off the Algerian coast, in October 1956, of a ship flying no flag and carrying no papers made it possible to establish the grave responsibility incurred by Egypt in this matter. The ship in question, the Athos, carried hundreds of tons of arms and ammunition intended for the rebel

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bands of West Algeria. As the investigation showed, the ship was chartered by the Special Egyptian Services, and the matériel discovered on board had been supplied by Egypt. Prior to this, numerous clandestine deliveries of arms had already been made in North Africa, always by sea, and always from Alexandria. As you know, France submitted a complaint to the Security Council on this serious violation of international obligations.

Egypt, however, has not given up, and we have proof of other shipments of arms intended for the Algerian rebels. Thus on last June 13, the Spanish authorities in Ceuta seized, aboard a ship flying their flag, the Juan Illueca, a cargo three times larger than that of the Athos, also loaded at Alexandria under the supervision of an Egyptian military detachment. Furthermore, other shipments are made, under less hazardous conditions, to other ports--mainly Tunisian-- from which they are secretly forwarded to Algeria.

The Case of Tunisia and Morocco

There is nothing difficult for us to understand in the fact that the situation in Algeria concerns Tunisia and Morocco, as neighboring States. We fully understand that the Governments of these two countries wish for an early and peaceful settlement of this strife. Unfortunately, the various forms of assistance, which they more or less willingly give the rebels, lead to the opposite end.

The most serious question is that the very sovereignty of these two States is being threatened in the end, because of the pressure that the Algerian rebels exert on them.

In Morocco, in the province of Oudjda, the F.L.N. is so firmly entrenched that it levies its own taxes, recruits young men, runs camps for training and regroupment. With all this, for several months, it has been able to carry out incursions into West Algeria in relative security. This situation led the French Command to set up a line of permanent field fortifications that, for the last few months, has fortunately contributed to limiting the number and the impact of these raids.

In Nador, in eastern Morocco, is one of the largest reception and dispatch centers for arms sent to the rebels from foreign countries.

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The situation in Tunisia is even more serious. Until the beginning of this year, assistance to the rebels was kept relatively secret, but lately it has become more and more open, until it has become as disturbing for Tunisia as it is for France. Thus, in Tunis, under the orders of Mr. Ouamrane, a military headquarters of a sort has been set up that claims to direct the operations all over eastern Algeria. This Mr. Ouamrane has at his disposal, facilities, the use of which runs beyond and counter to international law. His equipment and men are at times transported in Tunisian military vehicles. Barracks of the Tunisian National Guard have been placed at his disposal, for instance, in Tunis and Souk-el-Arba. Furthermore, he has been able to set up real logistic bases in Souk-el-Arba, Tadjerouine and Tozeur, and camps in Teboursouk, Ain-Draham and Thelepte, etc. From these centers, the commandoes leave to infiltrate Algeria, and there to regroup so as to carry out their surprise attacks. No sooner do they feel threatened, than they scurry back to the safety of Tunisian soil.

The tension that exists on the Algerian-Tunisian frontier, and the incidents that have taken place there, have no other cause. They cannot therefore be imputed to France, who cannot renounce her right of legitimate defense.

No doubt the position of Tunisia, partially occupied by the fellaghas, is not a comfortable one. That country could at least avail itself of the rules of International Law, to put an end to this situation, or at any rate, to limit its embarrassments.

It was to these facts that I referred a few moments ago in emphasizing that Morocco and Tunisia are not sufficiently free to determine their own attitude toward the F.L.N. for their good offices to be used to good advantage.

A Violation of the Charter

Wherever they come from, these moral and material encouragements given the Algerian rebellion are so many violations of the most established principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Need I recall that the Charter imposes on members the obligation to "live together in peace with one another as good neighbors"; and, according to Article 4, paragraph 2, they are enjoined to refrain from threats to the territorial integrity of other States. The Resolution "Essentials of Peace",

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adopted in the course of the fourth session of the Assembly, furthermore, invites all States "to refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife ... in any State"

Permit me also, in conclusion, to refer to two of the five famous principles of peaceful coexistence, adopted at the Bandung Conference in 1954, and which certain members of this Assembly bring up in other circumstances : they are those bearing on the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, and on nonintervention and noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

P A R T I I

I - REFORMS IN PROGRESS

As I have shown in the first part of this statement, the Algerian rebellion, led and supported from outside the country, could not have lasted until the middle of 1957 without the reign of terror which it made every effort to bring about. It continues, with more and more difficulty, thanks to the help it receives from abroad. In view of the intransigence with which its leaders have always rejected all offers of negotiation for a "cease-fire", the French Government found itself placed in the following dilemma : either to use only force, or else, without delay, to undertake reforms in all fields intended to assure the renewal, in mutual trust, of conversations with the Moslem populations. In the darkest hours, France chose the second alternative, proving the sincerity of her intentions and her confidence in the future.

Social Reforms

At the last session of the Assembly, I explained in detail the complexity of the economic and human problems that beset a country, poor in natural resources, lacking in power potential, and that sees its population growing at one of the fastest rates in the world. I also described the efforts deployed by France, in the fields of equipment, public instruction, social services and education, in order to protect the Algerians from want, and to ensure their children a better future. I shall limit myself to pointing out that the implementation of our plans continues methodically, and that basic reforms as important as that of the civil service, the agrarian reform or increased school enrollments, are giving us daily more encouraging results. Thus, for example, the number of Moslems recruited to the public services has increased by 3,000 in a single year. As far as schools are concerned, the number of opened elementary classes has risen from 11,000 in October 1956, to 13,230 in October of this year.

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Political Reforms

But what I should like to stress are the political reforms in progress. France's objective in Algeria is not only to carry out a task of human solidarity, but also, as soon as possible, to transfer to populations grappling with the obligations of modern life, responsibility for administering their own affairs. Social and economic improvements would be incomplete, without profound political changes.

Without waiting until the restoration of order makes an electoral consultation possible, as well as the free discussions that we want, some changes--which may, to those who wish to see things from afar, appear unimportant, but in reality are of vital interest--have already been made in the administrative and political structure of the country.

The most important of these changes has been to take from the central administration of Algiers part of the wide powers that it enjoyed before, and to give them to the local authorities. The number of services and departments of the central administration has been reduced from 24 to 9.

The powers thus withdrawn have been delegated to the local administration : the three regions, the Departments whose number has risen from 4 to 12, the public agencies, the Specialized Administrative Sections, and, especially, the communes.

The Specialized Administrative Sections

I should like to stress the importance surrounding the creation of the Specialized Administrative Sections, and the putting into practice of the communal reform.

As long ago as the end of 1955, within the framework of the existing circumscriptions, Specialized Administrative Sections (S.A.S.) were organized to permit increased personal contacts through a very flexible administrative system, adapted to local characteristics. Working in the very heart of the territory assigned them, involved in the daily life of the populations, the Officers of Algerian Affairs at their head have been given the task of extending administrative action in all fields. Their initiative is given the widest play : they administer and give advice to the population. They are assisted by doctors, teachers,

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specialized personnel, medical social workers, etc. Their work, which calls for a dedication close to abnegation, has everywhere met with an enthusiastic reception from the populations. The number of S.A.S. units which, on January 1, 1956 was 180, is, at present, more than 600.

The principles of the municipal reform were decided upon in June 1956. It was just beginning to be applied when I last spoke in February of this year. Since then, thanks to the cooperation of the Moslem populations, it has gone even farther than we had expected. The idea was to substitute for direct administration a municipal administration, run by the representatives of the population under the same condition as obtain in Metropolitan France. While waiting for the single-college elections to the Municipal Councils to take place, provisional assemblies were created by the appointment of qualified persons, after oral consultations between chiefs of families, in accordance with local traditions. Their membership reflects accurately the ethnic composition of the administrative circumscriptions. These assemblies, at present, comprise about 80 % Moslems enjoying personal Koranic status, and 20 % having French civil status. A total of 3,400 Moslems sit in the Municipal Assemblies, compared with less than 800 Europeans.

This reform of the communes has received wide support from the populations. That is why, encouraged by the results obtained, the Government has extended the same system to larger administrative circumscriptions, and set up Provisional Departmental Assemblies. There are 12 of these, and also 3 Regional Assemblies.

Candidates for the posts to be filled have been numerous. Members of the Municipal Councils and Assemblies everywhere bring to the exercise of their functions the maximum of initiative and zeal.

Of course the rebels have assessed the danger of such cooperation. The Moslems who have contributed to the application of these reforms have received threatening letters enjoining them to choose between resignation and death. But few have given in: practically all have persevered, at the risk of their lives, in the direction which they feel to be in keeping with their civic duties. Dozens of them have been butchered. But every time, in their cities or villages, others immediately rise to carry on their work. Such facts illustrate the attitude of the Moslem population of Algeria with regard to the French initiative, and are a resounding rebuttal to certain affirmations of the rebels.

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II - THE "LOI-CADRE"

The important reforms to which I have just alluded do not suffice wholly to define what the French Government has called the "Algerian personality".

That is why the Government has deemed it necessary to undertake, without delay, the application of a program to bring about a peaceful, democratic and just solution. May I stress, in passing, that these words figure in the statement of cause of the "loi-cadre", and underlie its provisions.

May I remind members of the Committee, that the term "loi-cadre", in French, denotes a law which lays down principles, but does not go into all the details of implementation.

The first of our concerns was to assure absolute equality to all citizens and communities. This is made manifest by the suppression of the double electoral college, the institution of universal suffrage under a single college for elections to all Representative Assemblies. This means that all voters, regardless of which community they belong to, will appear on a single electoral list, will cast their votes in the same polling places with the same ballots, and will choose between the same candidates.

The second of our concerns was made manifest by the setting up of legislative and executive organs in regions defined by physical--as well as economic and human--geography, as well as central bodies. Each region will have its Assembly, elected by a single college and universal suffrage; its Council of Communities, its responsible Government. In Algiers, the corresponding central organs will be set up according to the procedures that have almost always been followed for the establishment of federative institutions, especially in the United States and many other countries. The powers of these organs will be determined with a view to as great a political decentralization as possible, permitting the Moslems, on different levels, to manage their own affairs.

Concerning the powers reserved to the French Republic, to a certain extent, they will still be exercised by the Algerian population itself, since these can have their representatives in the Metropolitan Parliamentary Assemblies.

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The third of our concerns deals with the evolutionary character of the "loi-cadre". This legislation provides the machinery for the evolution of Algerian institutions, and permits the adaptation, in accordance with the experience gathered, of the powers devolving upon the different legislative and executive organs.

It, therefore, is not a question of a granted statute. Free discussion can be instituted between France and the validly appointed representatives of the Algerian population, on the very meaning of their institution.

Some will no doubt try to bring up the matter that a first draft of a "loi-cadre" was rejected last September by the French National Assembly /. It is useful, then, to point out that the ballots of those who wanted a more liberal law outnumbered those of the deputies expressing reservations or wanting restrictions. I take this to mean that the rejection cannot be interpreted as a refusal of France to find a political solution to the problem of Algeria; the deputies who voted in favor of the governmental draft, after all, represent the average opinion of the country.

According to the rules obtaining in democratic countries, the new Government has taken into account the reservations of the National Assembly to the original draft, and this latter was consequently modified, without the new text in any way lessening the historical import of the "loi-cadre".

Appended to the "loi-cadre", was a draft Electoral Law which contains the principle of proportional representation, applied in many democratic countries, in order to assure minority representation, without being unjust to the ethnic majorities.

Furthermore, Councils of Communities have been provided for, so as to avoid that provisions creating discriminations between the different parts of the population be passed or decreed in Algeria. They will not constitute additional Legislative Assemblies, but special bodies intended exclusively to preserve harmony among the communities.

Those who thus far have proposed nothing but preconditions, at variance with all democratic usage, are hardly the ones to criticize the French initiatives.

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As far as we are concerned, the "loi-cadre" is the first edifice.

It bears witness to our desire to establish conditions of a peaceful equilibrium and to set in motion the practical machinery required to implement the principles constantly upheld by France : cease-fire, elections, negotiations.

It permits of an evolution, in liberty and respect for human dignity, of institutions which, undoubtedly do not embody all virtues, but that make possible, without any further delay, the promotion of a new elite in whose hands will be placed the future of the country.

Everyone here should wish for the success of an effort which is so much in keeping with the principles which underlie our Organization.

III - THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION

There are some who criticize the reforms already introduced by France, as well as the "loi-cadre" that I have just outlined, for taking insufficient account of the principle of self-determination, so often invoked at the United Nations, and in whose behalf sincere men often take a stand in causes about which they know little.

We do not by any means underestimate the value of this principle, but it was never written into the text of the Charter that a right to secession would automatically be derived from it.

What would happen in fact if, this principle of self-determination having been affirmed, France wanted to put it into effect in Algeria ?

In the present circumstances, the inevitable result would be partition, in other words, the division of Algeria into two or more States.

First of all, the population of European origin, which is in the majority in some regions, especially the larger coastal cities (there are more than 50% Europeans in Algiers and 65% in Oran), would be perfectly justified in applying the principle to their own advantage. They might demand the breaking up of Algeria and the right to administer the territories where they are in the majority.

Regarding the other territories--the largest, though not the most prosperous--would they then become a unified, Moslem Algeria ? That is by no means certain. Everything leads us to think that local powers would spring up, resolutely determined not to submit to outside authority. The populations of the Aurès, the Tlemcen region and Kabylia would make it their first concern to maintain their autonomy and to give their independence a local character.

To those who do not twist it to support their theories, the history of Algeria shows that that is the way things would occur; that is, unless a new force were to spring up--with outside support and having no respect for the true will of the peoples, and then bring about an enforced unity under the yoke of the strongest and the most brutal.

...../

Perhaps, though, this is the solution that some hope, one day, to achieve.

Can we take it as being good-or even merely acceptable ?

In Algeria, partition would bring, face to face, a small but relatively wealthy State, with large ports, alone having access to the resources of Metropolitan France, and one or more poor States, without outlets to the sea, living in want, in regions which no one could possibly develop.

Such a solution would, strictly speaking, be in keeping with the principle of the self-determination of peoples, but contrary to the interests of the peoples concerned, thereafter consecrated to constant conflict.

Is it one of the tasks of the United Nations, to contribute, even by one iota, to the setting up in North Africa of a source of local and international conflict ?

Can we, to cleave to the illusion of a theory, turn a blind eye to the practical results on the existence of the populations concerned and the peace of the world, merely in order to apply that theory ?

In point of fact, the indiscriminate invocation of the right of peoples to self-determination, very often goes against morality, and especially if it overlooks what we feel to be the most sacred rights of mankind and the international community.

Naturally France, like other members of this Organization, recognizes the principle of self-determination; but it can only be conceived of within a framework of respect for individual freedoms, protection of minorities, the gradual promotion of an elite capable of making valid decisions, the enjoyment of true democracy and the maintenance of order, without which man cannot fulfill himself except as compelled by violence and fear.

IV - THE FUTURE OF NORTH AFRICA

To complete this recital, I should like to evoke the future that is already dawning for Algeria and North Africa, despite the present difficulties.

Much has been said lately, regarding the solution of the Algerian problem, by placing it in a wider North-African context. I have said why, under the present circumstances, confusion between two different ideas must be avoided. Isolation is not a French tradition. At present, more than ever before, France wishes to broaden her cooperation with other countries, and especially with those to which she is linked by ties of history and friendship. This is the case with North Africa.

To involve them in the difficult settlement of the Algerian problem is one thing; to associate them in an economic, social, and even political entity is another.

The prospects in that domain are vast indeed. For Algeria, and also for her neighbors, new wealth recently discovered in the Sahara may mean the beginning of a new economic era.

France, in mobilizing her efforts, her technology, her capital and her men for the prospection and exploitation of the resources of the Sahara, does not intend to introduce in these areas what you might call a neo-colonialism of the desert. On the contrary, she intends to associate the neighboring countries in this huge task of economic and social development, and to bring them to share in the hoped-for results.

We are ready to consider all aid that might be given for the development of this area and the exploitation of its resources.

Far from being of interest only to Africa and Europe, the increased trade that will result from this program of expansion will be channeled in such a way as to benefit other continents as well.

In this chamber, where Algeria becomes a topic only where her contemporary difficulties, or the more painful aspects of her problems are concerned, I have wanted to give a quick sketch of these prospects in order to show a bright side of her future.

...../

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I now come to the end of my speech.

As I have shown, the situation in Algeria has become considerably simplified. The rebels have lost on the military front. They have also lost on the psychological and political fronts. They know that France is ready to meet, with positive action, the legitimate aspirations of the Algerian populations without thereby abandoning their territory to anarchy and poverty.

What can they hope for now, except that you help to give them back the prestige they are now losing? The internationalization of the Algerian conflict is their main hope for a comeback, which they know they are incapable of achieving on their own.

What is your duty in this case? I think it is a very clear one. It is to allow France to continue putting into effect the peaceful, democratic and just solution, which you were right in hoping for.

You are impatient. But then, you would be neither warm-hearted nor peace-loving men if you were not impatient. But you cannot substitute for the time that seems necessary to quiet emotions, to effect a meeting of minds, and to create conditions for harmony and peace.

Thoughtless interference in this distressing affair would not only be a violation of the Charter on your part, but would have no practical result other than to risk postponing a solution that we all wish to find as soon as possible.

France intends, in this matter, to show herself worthy of the traditions to which many among you graciously referred last February. But France would betray her mission if she showed unforgivable weakness toward those who have chosen violence and murder as the only methods of proving their existence.

I know how attached you are to principles whose value France appreciates as much as you. The problem that faces us is not to defend these principles today in the abstract, but to apply them to human beings.

...../

If you wish to remain true to your role, you must ask yourselves only one question : what is in the real interest of the populations concerned ?

Must we deliver them to terror, to poverty, to totalitarianism or to anarchy ? Or must we, on the contrary, give them their only chance of attaining democracy, which will guarantee every man and woman freedom and peace ?

Take your choice. France has already made hers.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.17725

Sent: 26th November, 1957.
2205
Rec'd: 27th November, 1957.
1413

SHL/DH

Transmitted via leased channel

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

25/2/11 file
JP

NY1886. CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY.

Repeated Washington for information.

London (For External) Saving 373 Ottawa Saving 425,
Paris Saving 11.

Algeria.

Pineau asked to see me today and outlined the French position in the debate which is likely to start tomorrow. He said the situation in Algeria had undergone a substantial improvement since last February but France would not take advantage of this to retard constitutional development. The essential difference at present is that whereas the P.N.F. insists on immediate negotiations with them alone, the French believe the order must be a cease-fire first, then elections which would reveal the relative strengths of the various Algerian groups and then negotiations with the representatives of all Algerians and not merely P.N.F. Pineau said it was important that France was willing to negotiate with the Algerian representatives established by elections to an Algerian Assembly rather than to the French Parliament.

2. Referring to the Moroccan-Tunisian appeal for negotiations, he said he favoured the ultimate development of a Franco-North African Federation (although French Public opinion had not yet fully accepted this objective) and that progress in Algeria is a necessary preliminary to such a development.

3. Pineau seemed fairly optimistic. He said he did not know what resolutions might be proposed but he would welcome a United Nations appeal for a cease fire.

walker.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

27th November, 1957

SEC A/Ss LA UNO CR PAC&M AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT C&F
G.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SS:VA:MC

I. 17469/79.

AMENDED COPY

Sent: 21st November, 1957
2020
Rec'd: 22nd November, 1957
1548

(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1425. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated New York, information copy to London.

Pineau's Visit.

Logram (French Affairs) gave us the following summary of Pineau's discussions with Dulles:

1. Arms to Tunisia.

Dulles had agreed to Pineau's requests that United States would consult with United Kingdom and France before giving further arms in order to determine the volume of arms actually required by Tunisian army in light of supplies coming from all sources; that arms would be given directly to the army rather than stored in depots which could easily be pilfered and passed to Algerian rebels; that no further arms would be given until after Assembly vote on Loi Cadre, and that United States would again impress on Bourguiba need to prevent arms from being passed to Algerian rebels. Logram thought that France would now agree to supply arms to Tunisia without adding impossible conditions, provided the vote on the Loi Cadre was successful. Dulles insisted, however, that no "directive" should be given to Bourguiba and that Tunisia has right of national sovereignty in this matter should it be questioned.

2. Algeria.

Pineau said that military situation in Algeria had improved considerably and that there was fair hope that in General Assembly a resolution might be adopted similar to that adopted last February. He said that in General Assembly debate he would emphasise this improvement and say that because of it the French Government could well go back to its stand before Loi Cadre was formulated. However, France would not do this, but would press on with liberal reform. He thought there was some possibility that no resolution

/would be involved....

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INWARD CABLEGRAM.

- 2 -

I.17469/79.

* would be involved at all and that United Nations discussion might follow the same pattern as the Syrian debate. On the other hand, Dulles thought that the atmosphere at the United Nations this year would not be as favourable to France as last year and he urged Pineau to start his lobbying campaign as soon as possible. The United States thought it would be helpful if Pineau could announce that France would be ready to discuss Algeria with representatives of Tunisia and Morocco. Pineau said he might be able to do this, but if the resolution was adopted he would not want reference to mediation to either Tunisia or Morocco mentioned. Tunisia could not help now, but there might be some point in Moroccan "good offices" later. Logram said that the United States attitude in the Algerian debate in the General Assembly was not final and would depend on the type of resolution introduced. However the United States would continue to oppose any resolution condemning France or proposing a good offices commission.

3. N.A.T.O. Council Meeting. Pineau had indicated that France would be interested in obtaining intermediate range ballistic missiles and in assuming responsibility for the manufacture of certain weapons or parts of weapons (if a plan were agreed to by N.A.T.O. on the division of weapons production among N.A.T.O. countries). Dulles referred to his remarks on the subject of missile bases abroad at his press conference on 19th November, but according to Logram did not go into details with Pineau. He said that the questions of missile bases and division of weapons production were still under study, but that the United States hoped to be able to make an announcement on these subjects at the December meeting. Pineau said that France would require intermediate range missiles to attack the enemy at the source. If France possessed only short range missiles she would be left in the position of having to wait until the enemy was outside her gates before she could retaliate.

* Amendment

MIN & DEP E.A.
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M's

23rd November, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P

G

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *The Economist* File No. *25/2/11*
Published at Date *10/9 - 1959*

Unhappy Anniversary

THE Algerian war has this week entered its fourth year; what hope is there that it will be the last? Admittedly M. Gaillard, an economist and a European, is reputed to have liberal views on the subject. But his investiture speech gave no hint of a new departure; and the maintenance of M. Lacoste as minister resident in Algiers looks like a symbol of continuity. There is no sign of government willingness to start negotiations with the rebels.

Intransigence is similarly the rebel slogan. The leaders of the FLN (the National Liberation Front), at the end of a conference in Tunis last week, emphatically repeated that French recognition of Algerian independence must precede any negotiations. This is a precondition that the French are unlikely ever to accept. Obviously, the Algerians had little inducement to put out peace feelers, since there was at the time no government in Paris to receive them, but their uncompromising stand was no doubt dictated by military self-confidence. It seems generally agreed that the French have managed to get the situation under control in the towns, where acts of terrorism have decreased. On the other hand, mobile rebel forces, estimated variously at between 60,000 and 100,000 men, control large parts of the countryside. Their leaders are in no hurry to compromise.

President Bourguiba is the most disappointed character in the caste. He had invited the Algerians to Tunis in the hope that they would make some reasonable proposals, and for the first time he has blamed them openly for their lack of flexibility. The Tunisian leader knows that the extremists in both camps strengthen one another, but he has not given up all hope of following the vocation of interested matchmaker; when the time comes for economic realism to prevail in France, and for political wisdom to descend on the Algerians, his good offices will be welcome. The war cannot go on for ever.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM.

I.15853

Sent: 23rd October, 1957.
Rec'd: 29th October, 1957.

BH

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

25/2/11
file
No.

Sav Ex 430. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Australian Embassy, Washington Ex 369.
Australian Mission to the United Nations,
New York... Ex 156.
Australian Embassy, Paris... Ex 50.

From External.

Algeria.

Reference your savingram No. 87.

African Department, Foreign Office, have informed us that, as there were still perhaps two or three weeks before the Assembly debate was likely to take place, United Kingdom had given little thought to the position they would adopt if the Outline Law were not passed in time. The Foreign Office, according to our informant, were being assured by the French at the official level that the first task of any new French Government would be to have the Law passed by the Assembly without any significant amendment; and we formed the impression that the Foreign Office had not given up all hope that the Law might be passed in time.

2. If however, the Outline Law was not passed by the time of the Assembly debate on Algeria, our informant believed that the United Kingdom would devote its efforts to defeating any anti-French resolution on the grounds that in present circumstances it would not help towards a settlement. He did not think the United Kingdom would take any lead in trying to have a pro-French resolution passed in the Assembly.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.

28th October, 1957.

SEC A/S LA UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AP&ME INF DL MT
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G.

CONFIDENTIAL

Name of Paper *The Times*File No. *25/2/11*Published at *London*Date *Oct. 22 - 1957*

Imperial and Foreign

SAHARA PATROL
MUTINIESFRENCH OFFICERS
MURDERED

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, Oct. 21

The Algerian rebels have struck again in the central Sahara. Information has just reached Algiers that eight French soldiers were killed about five days ago in the Timimoun area, 400 miles south of Oran. The soldiers were in charge of a camel patrol of 60 Muslim troops who deserted and joined a rebel band. There is evidence that the rebels encouraged the cameleers to mutiny and to murder their French officers and n.c.o.s.

The deserters and the rebels have since been sighted and attacked from the air. The French claim to have killed 10 of them by machine-gun fire and to have killed or wounded 180 of their camels. French ground forces have not yet succeeded in making contact with them.

This incident is further evidence that the National Liberation Front is now making a concerted effort to extend the rebellion into the Sahara, largely for propaganda purposes. It follows two recent encounters on the Libyan frontier and the blowing up of the power station at Laghouat. The rebels want to prove their nuisance value in the Sahara at a time when the French are beginning to make headway with its industrial development, so as to show that the pipelines and installations will never be safe unless France comes to terms with her enemies.

REBEL SUCCESSES

There have been two other serious incidents in Algeria in the past 48 hours. Near Saïda, in the Oran district, seven French soldiers were killed and three wounded in a rebel ambush. At Michelet, in Kabylia, a band of 100 rebels attacked a French unit and killed eight soldiers.

The measures used by the Government to deal with the Algerian rebellion have been heavily criticized at a three-day meeting in Dijon of left-wing politicians, jurists, and others. They have condemned what they call "the violation of rights and liberties in Algeria" and have issued a resolution calling on the Government to put an end to such things as the arbitrary arrest of suspects. They call for more severe action against those responsible for acts of torture and repression.

It was obvious that many of those present had a purely political axe to grind. They included several leading Communists and left-wing Socialists and also M. Mendes-France, who has always been eager to criticize the policy of recent Governments. But the presence of such people as M. Emile Kaha, president of the League of the Rights of Man, is enough to show that the meeting was not entirely inspired by political motives, and that the issues of excessive police action and brutality in Algeria are still very much in people's minds.

Name of Paper *The Economist*File No. *245*

Published at

Date *Oct 17 - 1957*

The Real Crux for France

African nationalism faces France with a choice. The decision cannot be postponed much longer, nor can it be taken merely on the basis of parliamentary arithmetic. There is a danger that if it is not taken, the Algerian question may poison French political life and disrupt the Fourth Republic

FRANCE, the birthplace of national revolution in Europe, cannot stomach the revolutionary nationalism of 20th century Africa. The African continent is heaving politically under the impact of twin nationalist waves, one coming from Arab Egypt, the other from black Ghana. Yet French deputies behave as if they could solve the Algerian problem in isolation and in the frame of domestic politics.

The present government crisis in Paris is, in its essentials, the same as the crisis of five months ago. Once again, well-informed people explain that the next government will have to take drastic measures to avoid bankruptcy at home and to ward off a crisis in external payments. Once again they stress that the political difficulty lies in bringing the Socialists and the conservatives into the same coalition.

All this has the familiar air of unreality. The present crisis was set off by the government's proposal of an outline law for Algeria (which, incidentally, had no chance of winning Moslem support). But the subject has been completely submerged in the economic discussions which dominate the current *ronde*. The ingenuity of French politicians who manage to dissociate the Algerian war from their country's economic plight is baffling. But the real puzzle is to know how France has managed to cling for three years to formulate so

obviously unworkable in face of a growing expenditure in terms both of men and resources. What magic influence exerted by Algeria prevents successive French governments from reacting rationally?

Of all the facts on which rests the myth that Algeria is and must be French, the extent of European settlement there is the most important. Lying just across the Mediterranean, Algeria has long been a place to which Frenchmen migrate. Of its total population of nearly 10 million people, about one million are non-Moslems, mostly of French origin. A substantial proportion of these, including some large and influential landowners, would at least lose their privileges, and would probably leave the country, were Algeria to gain its independence even in conditions favourable enough to tempt some to stay. Hence, it has been possible to proclaim that any step taken by France away from the *status quo* and towards independence would mean betraying kith and kin. This emotional, and natural, appeal is coupled with the threat that, rather than be "betrayed," the settlers would take the law into their own hands, and that French soldiers would refuse to fight against their compatriots (though, in law, the Moslems are their compatriots as well). But a white revolt seems unlikely; settler militancy hitherto has been bolstered by the presence of two French soldiers to every adult male settler. Yet the prospect of such a disaster is for ever brandished as a reason for being tough with North Africa.

ON the other hand, the argument that peace is just round the corner ought to have lost force through sheer repetition. But some people still swallow it. Refusal to negotiate a settlement is not based on logic but on emotion, which feeds on racial feelings, on

this refusal to acknowledge it was born of the principle of the French revolution that all men are equal. It may have sounded somewhat empty to a Moslem whose income was less than one-sixth of that of his French *concitoyen*, and who felt that the political promises made to him remained on paper. But the real defect of the policy is its unreality. Politically, proportional representation for the Moslems would enable them in present circumstances to control the parliamentary life of France—a prospect that Frenchmen will certainly not accept. Economically, the experiment is ruled out by the galloping Arab birth-rate. The ratio between the Moslem and non-Moslem population of Algeria is now about 9 to 1; it is likely to be nearly 18 to 1 by 1980. To provide this fast-growing population with the social and educational facilities that Frenchmen enjoy would be an enormous task.

France open, or close, its mind to the demand for further change?

The choice is not easy. The French can try to contract out of Africa and pursue their destiny in Europe. Or they can try to ally themselves with the political forces of Africa. But they cannot succeed in either course while they remain saddled with the Algerian war—and while the solution of all problems must be sought in the parochial terms of Palais Bourbon arithmetic. It has been said that the second French empire collapsed because Napoleon III failed to understand the movements for national unification in Italy and Germany. Will history pass the same verdict on the Fourth Republic for its failure to comprehend the nationalist wave sweeping the African continent? The "pacification" of Algeria is not just an economic burden; it threatens the Republic.

Thursday at least, appeared to be a dead-tired man), or with the foreign affairs debate which seemed mainly concerned with bewailing that Britain cannot have a foreign policy (but in which Mr Selwyn Lloyd, after having loudly applauded in some unwise places during other people's speeches the day before, earned credit for his realistic declaration of dependence on America). But in the speeches where ministers indicated specific things that they were going to do, as distinct from commenting on things that they had done, the trend seemed consistently to the side of caution, if not to the right. The one apparent (but only apparent) exception to this—the one subject where the Tory left thought by Saturday that it had won its single victory—was the debate on industrial relations; it deserves separate analysis.

The background to this debate—the strange incident of Lord Hailsham's advertisement of a conspiracy to an open-mouthed audience in the Aquarium—is discussed in a note of the week on page 200. The story here must begin with Mr Macleod's speech to the conference as a whole. Mr Macleod's was, in every sense, an electric performance. He emerged again as one of that—on the evidence of this conference, diminishing—band of leading Tories who always seems to think before he feels. His speech, however, contained three arguments of very differing worth.

(1) First, he warned the party against an attack on trade unionists as a whole: "If we are not a national party, representing both trade unionists and employers, we are nothing." That argument must be right, and so must Mr Macleod's initiative in preparing an official booklet that will advertise the best employment and redundancy practices of good firms, to encourage the others.

(2) Secondly, however, perhaps in contrast to Lord Hailsham, he did not seem to like attacks on trade union leaders. His wisdom here may be more open to dispute. When the Labour party sprang into being fifty years ago, it did some good in this country by its determination to attack (albeit often unfairly) the worst practices of employers; now that the big trade union leaders have attained a position of privilege commensurate to

of the engrained civil service attitude in his own department. It is a decision that must make more difficult the success of the economic policies on which the Government is now embarked.

And, in most of the other policy decisions adumbrated at Brighton, the same criticism—that of retreat into caution and before established interests—can fairly be said to apply. On pensions, the Government's decision looks as if it is going to be to raise existing pensions and flat contribution rates next year, but to leave aside for later consideration all new thinking about relating contributions to earnings and about superannuation schemes for those now in work; the impulse of a really dynamic government (as a note on page 199 suggests) should surely be precisely the other way round.

In the debates touching on European free trade, Mr Heathcoat-Amory appeared to say that Britain will not discuss any concessions affecting its agriculture, while Sir David Eccles implied that we will discuss them, but probably then say no. Mr Maudling was thus accorded less elbow room for this week's negotiations in Paris than would have been economically sensible. On the Franks reforms there is apparently to be some action (perhaps especially as regards land), but Mr Simon did not make very clear what. In the local government conference, Mr Brooke did not strengthen one's confidence that he will stand up for realism and against romanticism in his coming bill. On mental illness, the Minister of Health's reply could not decently have been more stonewalling.

WHERE, then, is now the Conservative dynamic? The talents, it would seem, are being buried in the ground; and Lord Hailsham, after some of his speeches this week, would seem well fitted to tell Cabinet colleagues what judgment was passed upon the unwise agricultural protectionist who did that. Unfortunately, the conference suggested the main way in which the Conservatives hope to avoid that judgment: they intend to rely on the ever louder (and not untrue) assertion that

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Name of Paper *The Economist*File No. *293*

Published at

Date *Oct 19 - 1957*

THE ECONOMIST, OCTOBER 19, 1957

memories of imperial greatness, or on the more recent memory that North Africa was the springboard for the liberation of France from the Nazi Germans. Yet French immobility cannot be explained simply in terms of emotion. The fact is that the mass of the French people are only now beginning to feel the pinch of a campaign that has become a long drawn-out colonial war.

Although half a million French soldiers have been away from home for some time, French casualties have been few. And the war has coincided with an unprecedented domestic boom. As it has seemed, France could be intransigent and prosperous too. Algeria took the place of Indo-China; the residue of dollars provided by the Americans for one war helped the French to carry on the next. But now the dollar flow has dried up, the foreign exchange reserves have been eaten away, and the position has become highly uncomfortable. M. Gaillard's devaluation has already proved inadequate.

To treat these economic difficulties as separate from the Algerian war is absurd, even though the actual cost of that conflict is difficult to compute. A reasoned study, published recently in *The Banker*, put the total French budgetary expenditure on the Algerian war at some 700 billion francs, about 5 per cent of the net national income. The total burden on the country's economy is naturally much greater; imports required for defence production, as well as potential exports lost, have to be added to the bill. Last but not least, with a labour force strained to the full, the maintenance of nearly half a million young men in Algeria is a fearful inflationary factor. The Algerian war is obviously not the only reason for French economic difficulties. Modernisation of the French economy must in any event consume great resources. The programme of social reform, which has been judged politically indispensable, must add to the strain. But the pursuit of these two objectives is incompatible with continuing the war; and France will go from crisis to crisis until this is realised.

ALGERIA, Frenchmen still hold, is part of France. The policy of integration which they base upon this tenet is not ignoble; it was born of the principle of the French revolution that all men are equal. It may have sounded somewhat empty to a Moslem whose income was less than one-sixth of that of his French *concitoyen*, and who felt that the political promises made to him remained on paper. But the real defect of the policy is its unreality. Politically, proportional representation for the Moslems would enable them in present circumstances to control the parliamentary life of France—a prospect that Frenchmen will certainly not accept. Economically, the experiment is ruled out by the galloping Arab birth-rate. The ratio between the Moslem and non-Moslem population of Algeria is now about 9 to 1; it is likely to be nearly 18 to 1 by 1980. To provide this fast-growing population with the social and educational facilities that Frenchmen enjoy would be an enormous task.

Simultaneously, to bridge the gap separating their standard of life from that of metropolitan Frenchmen is an undertaking that France is neither able nor willing to carry out. French trade with Algeria, inflated by the war, may seem an attractive prospect. But, while the end of political domination would inevitably hit some French exporters, the continuance of the present policy hits the whole country.

Just as these economic truths were beginning to sink home, the protagonists of a policy of force gained a new lease of life from a vision of wealth from the desert. The discovery of oil in the Sahara raised hopes that France would finally be able to eliminate its fuel deficit. This, argued the apologists, was not the moment to let so glittering a prize slip away through "defeatism." The prize may look somewhat less exciting when it is measured in the less romantic language of development costs. But the important thing is that a French calculation is once again divorced from political realities. Saharan oil will need to be carried to the coast by pipelines which must cross Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, or (conceivably and at a pinch) Morocco. But the present Algerian deadlock is ruining France's prospects as an African power, and pipelines through hostile country are costly and risky.

To say that the French are completely unaware of the forces sweeping across Africa would be inaccurate. At times they appear to grasp them admirably; moves are made in the right direction; then suddenly the process is stopped. They granted independence to Tunisia and Morocco. Forgetful that freedom is contagious, they are now indignant when President Bourguiba suggests that they should crown their work with its inevitable conclusion—Algerian independence, which he would have in the framework of a North African federation linked with France. They have granted the French territories of black Africa an enlightened and substantial measure of self-government. But now the political leaders of the 30 million inhabitants of French black Africa are going on to clamour for a federation of autonomous republics. Will France open, or close, its mind to the demand for further change?

The choice is not easy. The French can try to contract out of Africa and pursue their destiny in Europe. Or they can try to ally themselves with the political forces of Africa. But they cannot succeed in either course while they remain saddled with the Algerian war—and while the solution of all problems must be sought in the parochial terms of Palais Bourbon arithmetic. It has been said that the second French empire collapsed because Napoleon III failed to understand the movements for national unification in Italy and Germany. Will history pass the same verdict on the Fourth Republic for its failure to comprehend the nationalist wave sweeping the African continent? The "pacification" of Algeria is not just an economic burden; it threatens the Republic.

NOTES OF THE WEEK

EUROPE

Breaking the Ice

A FIRST attempt to break the ice of the frozen negotiations on a free trade area in Europe has been made at the OEEC meeting in Paris this week. As *The Economist* goes to press it appears that the attempt has had more success than many people expected. An article on page 235 shows that there is a wide gulf between the views of Britain and the six common market countries. But Mr Maudling has made an encouraging start. He has made a clear gesture on agriculture, which has been welcomed by the countries like Denmark which are most concerned.

His first remarks on institutions, too, implied a readiness to negotiate; he recalled that the whole question of the scope of a free trade area (its rules and institutions) is a subject for discussion. And he rightly emphasised that the two essentials in the tricky problem of the "country of origin" of goods are to keep tariffs as low as possible and to approach it through "exhaustive analysis and practical experience." Disarmed in some measure, the six common market countries have also adopted a conciliatory approach. They emphasised that the common market would function as one unit within the free trade area, and that this, like the common market itself, must be something more than arrangement for tariff reductions, but they did show interest in pursuing the wider scheme.

In Paris Britain is suitor; at Geneva the six common market countries are on the mat. There they have got to convince the members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, now assembling for its most important session since the war, that the common market does not conflict with GATT. An article on page 236 suggests that they are not going to find this easy. All over the world trading nations are concerned lest the common market damage world trade by excessive discrimination, and expand trade between European countries only at the expense of their trade with the rest of the world. There is some ground for these fears. In the next ten years regional free trade not only in Europe but in South America and other areas may well prove a constructive indirect approach towards world economic growth. But there will be a need for a watchdog, making sure that regional development is not autarkic but outward-looking. As such, GATT may well have a more practical part to play than it has had in the past decade.

MIDDLE EAST

Egypt back in the Lead

TWO heads are said to be better than one, but the same is not necessarily true of two armies. Those of Egypt and Syria combined are no match for Israel's, let alone Turkey's, and this week's move of Egyptian troops into Syria—whatever its volume—has no military signifi-

cance whatsoever. The context in which it is important is diplomatic and political.

For President Nasser, it is a temporary triumph; it makes headlines and wins back from King Saud the blue riband of Arab solidarity. This the King captured last month by his surprise grace-and-favour visit to Syria's left-wing government; this week, seated in the stadium at the Arab games in Beirut, he cuts no figure at all by comparison with Egyptian soldiers rattling ashore in tanks at Latakia. Both he and King Hussein of Jordan have kept in the swim by saying they too will go to Syria's aid if Syria is attacked.

But President Nasser may have a second, much less obvious, motive for the move. He is not a communist; indeed, Mr Khrushchev, during his long interview with Mr J. Reston of *The New York Times* last week, remarked that he had "no hope for Nasser." (Simultaneously, President Nasser was distributing to Egyptian government departments and the press a directive enjoining "strict neutrality" in matters ranging from government purchasing to blurb about the sputnik.) Syria's C-in-C, General Bitar, is, by contrast, red or nearly so, and is willing to see the Syrian army trained exclusively by Russians. By seizing the opportunity to land, President Nasser turns the joint-command agreement of 1956 into a practical reality and enables the joint armies' C-in-C, the Egyptian General Hakim Amer, to trump General Bitar's aces. There is a possibility that Syria's out-and-out pro-Russians will lose ground to its socialist, pro-Egyptian element. The relative positions of Mr Akram Haurani (who represents the latter group) and Mr Khaled el Azm (rich, but self-hitched to Moscow) are discussed by our special correspondent on page 231.

Whether the move will contribute to the much talked of union between Egypt and Syria is doubtful. The winning of Syrian hearts will be particularly difficult in the Aleppo region where the Egyptians have gone, for the district is notoriously anti-Egyptian, and many of its citizens would welcome the arrival of the "shadow" Syrian government at present installed in the Hilton hotel at Istanbul. Foreign armies, even if affording stout cover and spending high pay (*à l'Américaine*), seldom win over the natives; Egyptians in Syria are likely to be no exception.

Roman Palaver

THE progress of financial reconciliation between Britain and Egypt is slow, secret and subdued. The only cheering thing is that the haggling has at least begun. The chief negotiators, Sir Denis Rickett of the Treasury and Mr Hasan Abbas Zaki of the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, made the briefest of contacts in Rome and are now back in their respective capitals. The reason for this abrupt breach is that Mr Zaki, who is by no means a plenipotentiary, was confronted with a situation for which he had not been briefed. Exchanges are continuing between the delegations left in Rome, but with the heads away consulting their

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD SAVING **CONFIDENTIAL**

MC.Mlc

O.12698

Sent: 10th October 1957
1331
* (Transmitted via leased channel.)

TO:

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N.....SAV. 87

Repeated -

Australian Mission to the United Nations, *
N E W Y O R K...SAV. 56.

Australian Embassy,
W A S H I N G T O N...SAV. 117 *

File
25/2/11

CONFIDENTIAL.

Algeria.

It appears there is now no hope that an Outline Law will be enacted before the debate in the General Assembly. Please advise what position the United Kingdom/United States plans to take in the debate in the light of this development.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.N.'s.

11th October, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LA UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
E.AF&MEC E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

25/2/11
File

(origin 159/4/1)

File No. 201/2/8/4

Memo No. 685

28th September, 1957.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

ALGERIA: M. LACOSTE, RESIDENT MINISTER.

I enclose an extract from an interesting
British Embassy despatch to the Foreign Office. It
gives a good picture of the architect of present French
policy in Algeria. Please handle with care.

AMBASSADOR.

SECRET



25/2/11 (original 167/2/2)

Australian External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SECRET

25th September 1957

Secret

Memo.No..

1405

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.T.



b
European (the same)
cl
3/10

File 3/10.

Algeria

...

Attached for your information is a copy of a
report of 19th September from the United Kingdom N.A.T.O. delegation
in Paris.

2. Copies of this memorandum and its attachment have
been sent to Washington, Paris and New York.

G. B. FEAKES

(G.B. Feakes)

for Senior External Affairs Representative

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

ALGERIA

The Council in private session yesterday heard a statement by Crouy-Chanel on Algeria.

Crouy-Chanel began by describing the reforms which had been put into force in Algeria during the last year. He emphasised that they had been based on the same principles as inspired the Loi Cadre. In other words, the Loi Cadre had been formulated over a long period and was not simply a tactical manoeuvre designed to gain favour with the General Assembly of the United Nations. Moreover, the reforms of the last twelve months had enjoyed the support and collaboration of the Algerian people, which augured well for their reception of the Loi Cadre.

Under these reforms 1,130 new communes had been created, each enjoying an "autonomie de gestion". In 518 of these communes the old councils had been replaced by special delegations nominated by the Prefects after consultation with heads of families according to local secular tradition. These 518 delegations consisted of 3,226 members, of whom 2,460 i.e. 80 per cent, were Moslems. 287 of the communes had Moslem mayors. In the 12 departments created, the departmental councils included 266 members of whom 140, i.e. 60 per cent, were Moslems. In addition, three regions had been created with a single assembly appointed by the departmental councils. These assemblies consisted of 96 members of whom 48 were Moslems.

There had been no difficulty in finding Moslems to undertake the responsibilities, although there was clearly a personal risk. 2,000 of them had been assassinated and still there were volunteers to replace them. As a matter of fact, security in Algeria had improved greatly in recent months. For instance, circulation between the large towns and in many regions had improved. About 300,000 hectares of land had been recovered by irrigation and had been distributed to about 10,000 farmers. In Algeria itself the F.L.N. must be considered to have lost ground. Abroad, unfortunately they had organised and consolidated their position in the political sense and they had also set up a network of arms depots and training establishments. The French authorities were especially concerned about the use of Tunisia as a base from which the brigands could operate. They were bringing strong diplomatic pressure to bear on the Tunisian Government to prevent the use of their territory for aggression against Algeria.

Turning to the Loi Cadre, Crouy-Chanel reminded the Council that at the last U.N. General Assembly the French representative had laid down three prerequisites for any settlement of the Algerian problem. These were a cease fire, elections and negotiations. In drawing up the Loi Cadre the French Government had borne in mind these three essential conditions. There was of course no doubt about the necessity of a cease-fire. As regards the elections, he stressed that when they eventually took place all "truly democratic" countries would be invited to send observers. After describing in detail the federal system under French sovereignty which it was intended that the elections would bring into existence, he said that, in general, the system was regarded by the French Government as constituting a point of departure for negotiations for a final settlement. It must be strongly emphasised that the Loi Cadre was not designed as an imposed solution (a "charge octroyee"). The final settlement must be considered as being still open for negotiation, while the Loi Cadre indicated the direction in which the French authorities thought constitutional development of Algeria should be steered. In that sense it had a transitional and provisional character. If it was asked how far this development would eventually proceed, the answer was that it must stop short of independence. The French Government sincerely believed that independence was not the right solution. It could never guarantee the peaceful co-existence of groups with different ethnic and cultural backgrounds and ensure that one group could not oppress another. Three of the five or six regions to be set up under the Loi Cadre would correspond approximately to the three main ethnic groups, while the two or three remaining regions would contain mixed populations. Crouy-Chanel added that the benefits of the exploitation of the Sahara would accrue not only to France but to all the countries bordering the desert.

SECRET

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-2-

Finally, Crouy-Chanel again emphasised that the Loi Cadre was not a tactical exercise undertaken with an eye to debates in the General Assembly. The French representative at New York would, however, do his best to explain the provisions, while maintaining the formal position that Algeria was a domestic problem and that the U.N. was therefore not competent.

A short discussion then took place in the Council. Spaak asked for clarification about the scope which the Law would provide for negotiations. Crouy-Chanel explained that in the transitional stage the institutions provided for under the new system would be set up by French authorities with the least possible delay. When the elected assemblies had come into existence, negotiations could then be initiated between them and the French Parliament. The French Minister resident in Algeria could act as arbitrator.

De Staercke (Belgium) asked what the French were aiming for in the long term. Would the Loi Cadre really provide sufficient flexibility for future negotiations? In reply, Crouy-Chanel said that under Article 24 of the Law there were only two limitations to development, i.e. respect for the liberty of the citizen and of the ethnic communities and the constitutional link with the French Republic.

Blankenhorn (Germany) asked whether Crouy-Chanel could say anything about the reaction of Algerian public opinion to the proposed law. Crouy-Chanel repeated what he had said about the acceptance by the Algerian public of similar reforms during the last 12 months and then told a story to show that the Algerian people would take part in such reforms so long as they had an assurance that the French would not later leave them to their fate.

Crouy-Chanel's restrained and factual statement seemed to impress the Council, and he made it clear that he would be ready to try to answer any questions which his colleagues might raise after they had had time to consider the statement.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

Sent: 30th September, 1957.

2055

Rec'd: 1st October, 1957.

0830

POH/BH

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

25/2/11

File
70

358.

SECRET.

Your telegram No. 275.

There is no danger with the American Ambassador of getting Algeria and Indonesia mixed in discussions. My idea was to meet his request for Australian information about recent trends toward Communism in Indonesia. He would report to the State Department and this would help our efforts to shift Americans from their neutrality in coming to the debate on Dutch New Guinea.

Stirling.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. TERRITORIES.
P.M.'S.

1st October, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LA UN PAC&AM AMASP EXFAME E AFAME INF DL MT
C&P

DJAKARTA UN. NEW YORK WASHINGTON LONDON THE HAGUE.



INWARD TELEGRAM

(This document is the property of Her Majesty's Government in New Zealand)

FROM: N.Z. Ambassador, Paris
TO: Minister of External Affairs, Wellington No.15 Sev.
D: 20 September 1957 R: 30 September 1957

No.15 SAVING CONFIDENTIAL

ALGERIA

The debate on the Loi-Cadre seems likely to take place in circumstances of the greatest confusion. For it to be satisfactorily applied in Algeria (assuming that it can be so applied) it is necessary that it both escape the censure of the United Nations and be decisively endorsed in Paris. For reasons given in my telegram No.71 there can be no great optimism as regards the latter condition being fulfilled. For the purposes of this message however I am assuming that the Loi-Cadre is adopted.

2. There does not seem to be much discussion as regards the regional arrangements. But as regards the central authority, there is argument about its federal nature (can this, it is asked, be reconciled with the unitary charter of France herself? - this seems hardly an insoluble problem). More important is the argument about the form of the federal body, the extent of its powers and the position thereon of the French representative. The French are extremely sensitive about the Tunis and Morocco precedents and of formulae such as "independence in interdependence" which of course was merely camouflage for separation. Hence there is opposition both in Algeria and France to any provision at all for an all-Algeria body, and if the Loi-Cadre is rejected it will probably be on this ground.

3. Personally I would think that a certain amount of haziness as regards the central authority does no harm (especially as the process of setting it on foot begins only after two years) provided an early start is made with the regional institutions. The law after all is an "outline" law, and as I have reported (Saving 14) is intended to begin an evolutionary process. In any case the powers to be exercised by the central body cannot be very important, since they are received by delegation from the regions, whose own powers are closely circumscribed. Indeed the powers reserved to France under the Loi-Cadre are very extensive, even in regard to such matters as education. One feels that in the interests of making a stronger appeal to local opinion more liberality might have been shown. But the French have always ridden with a tight rein.

4. I do not think foreigners who, like ourselves, do not call into question France's authority in Algeria are called upon to sympathize with those French politicians who are determined to guard against every

(J.7578)

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

2.

remote possibility of independence. Admittedly any Algeria political organization, however limited its powers, is a channel through which an independence movement may express itself; but it could also provide an opportunity (though this is somewhat optimistic) for reconciling the communities while maintaining those links on which the French insist. In any case, there is a difference between taking this risk (as the Government itself has taken it), and pressing upon France policies which inevitably promote separation in a short time.

5. One can make various criticisms of provisions of the Loi-Cadre (an analysis is being sent by memorandum). However it is the thing which has been hammered out under the pressures existing in Algeria and in the National Assembly. It seems to me that even if we were to suppose (for the sake of argument) the French offering to adopt whatever liberal provisions we might put forward, we should be at a loss what to propose since it is a matter not of good intentions but of detailed knowledge.

6. In denouncing the Loi-Cadre the Nationalist leaders of course claim that they have the full support of the Moslem population. One may reserve one's judgment on this if regard is had to the alleged extent of present cooperation with the French authorities (Savign 14).

7. What really does concern all of us is whether the French have put forward the Loi-Cadre in good earnest as a working programme for Algeria. Has it in fact been hammered out or merely placed together to impress the United Nations? Now I think Bourges Maunoury's statement (reported yesterday) that the Loi-Cadre was not made for the United Nations was excessively economical. Nevertheless I know nothing to suggest that it is not intended to be applied. A strike and demonstration in Algeria by European exponents of the Loi Cadre has been called off because of firm action by the authorities, including the ordering out of General Massu's parachutists. I find that Jebb, who is always very candid about French intentions, thinks the Loi-Cadre is a distinct step forward. (This was said at a meeting of Commonwealth Ambassadors; the Asian members, substituting for their chiefs, thought it was merely an attempt to 'Balkanize' Algeria).

8. Though all countries favourable to France will hope she will find the way ahead (and the Loi Cadre must be one of the last chances) there seems no need for us positively to endorse it. It may happen that in spite of the immense effort - military, political, financial and diplomatic - which is being put forward the ultimate end will be secession. What it would be against international comity for a friendly country to advise, and ultra vires for the United Nations to recommend, could occur through the sussin of facts. This consideration

CONFIDENTIAL



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3.

should I think save us from any fear that through the caution we have shown hitherto we are tying ourselves to the corpse of a dead policy. For one thing we have never tied ourselves to any French policy. Secondly it seems premature and defeatist to assume that secession must be the end. In any case it does not seem in our - or Western interests to encourage it: since recent events in Syria the prospect of a seceded Algeria falling under Soviet influence (as well as into other troubles) cannot be dismissed merely as an item of French propaganda. At the same time we are certainly amongst those who are conscious of the tragedy of Algeria, with its daily toll of dead, and would expect to see a definite break with the past.

9. I have no comments on the draft brief paper for the Assembly which seems to me to have been prepared with the above considerations in mind.

(Signed) KOWHAI

(J.7578)

Minister of External Affairs
Secretary of External Affairs +ACTION

30.9.57

CONFIDENTIAL

25/2/11

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

:ABK.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

Sent: 30th September, 1957.
1110.

TO:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

275. SECRET.

Your telegrams no. 309 and 342.

After consideration we do not believe it would be helpful to Australia for questions of Algeria and Indonesia to get mixed in any discussion. Indonesian and Algerian situations seems to have little in common except anti-colonial aspect. Arab nations and Afro-Asian bloc generally seems to feel more strongly about Algeria than West New Guinea, and it is not in our interests to link two questions.

2. We have not determined what attitude we should take on Algeria in United Nations pending further clarification of French Government's intentions.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. TERRITORIES.
P.M.'S.

(Cost £5/14/-)

1st October, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LA UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA@ SEA E.AF&ME E
AF&ME INF DL MT C&P.
G.
DJAKARTA UN. NEW YORK LONDON WASHINGTON THE HAGUE.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

FEL:AS

I.14026.

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

Dated: 30th September, 1957
1535.
Rec'd: 1st October, 1957.
0830.

*File
np*

356. UNCLASSIFIED.

My telegram 309 of 4th September.

Your memorandum 424 just received is very useful and I shall be glad of anything further on these lines.

Transit by bag took 16 days.

...Stirling.

A/MIN&DEPT E.A.
P.M'S

1st October, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LA UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA@ SEA E.A.F&ME
E INF DL MT C&P
G

DJAKARTA U.N. NEW YORK LONDON WASHINGTON THE HAGUE.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *The Times*

File No. *25/2/11*

Published at *London*

Date *Sept 25 - 1957*

**ALGERIAN RIFT
WIDENING**

**"ROUND-TABLE" TEXT
IN TATTERS**

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, SEPT. 24

The confusion over the outline law for Algeria, which began to appear yesterday when the National Assembly's committee for the interior set to work on the Bill, grew wider and deeper to-day, until in the early afternoon a temporary stalemate was reached with four negative decisions about the vital article 12 of the Bill which foresees the establishment of a federal council.

The debate in the National Assembly is due to begin to-morrow afternoon, but in present conditions nothing is certain. What is plain is that the much vaunted "round-table" agreement, reached by the party leaders at the end of last week, is proving hardly worth the paper it was written on.

Yesterday it was the right-wing who retracted in their endeavours to press the idea of a single voting college (Muslims and Europeans voting together). Then the Communists added to the confusion by voting whichever way brought the maximum damage. To-day, the committee, after rejecting two right-wing amendments, threw out the "round-table" version and the original Government text. Destruction complete, the committee adjourned. The important right-wing group of the Assembly, carrying about 100 votes, are now meeting to consider their attitude.

SHADOW BOXING

In all this manoeuvring tactics as well as principle is involved. Next week a series of general elections on the Government's economic and agricultural policies is due. If the vote on Algeria has not been reached by then, it will be possible for the opponents of the Bill to bring the Government down without having to appear formally as the opponents of reform. To defeat this move the Prime Minister put the question of confidence against any amendment which would alter the "round-table" text.

In Algiers to-day operations in the Casbah led to the arrest of Yacel Saadi, said to be the leading representative of the National Liberation front in the Algiers area. This capture is being hailed as a great success for the French effort to uproot terrorist organizations.

M. Gilles Martinet, one of the editors of *France-Observateur*, an extreme left-wing French weekly paper, was today charged with participating in an attempt at "demoralization of the Army and of the nation." This charge is the sequel to some months of judicial inquiry carried out by the permanent military court in Paris.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper

The Times

File No.

25/2/11

Published at

London

Date

Sept 23 - 1959

FRENCH REACH COMPROMISE ON ALGERIA "OUTLINE LAW"

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, SEPT. 22

A compromise on the "outline law" for Algeria was reached yesterday between the Government and the party leaders. The concessions came more from the left than from the right, and it is feared that M. Mollet may have difficulty in securing Socialist consent to the agreement.

It was reached only by shelving a decision on the most controversial issue—that of the powers of the proposed Algerian federal council. The Bill now stipulates that these shall be laid down in a later Bill to be presented to Parliament 18 months after the election of the proposed territorial assemblies.

The right wing have thus secured the exclusion of the clause which would have allowed the federal council to elect its own leader. He would almost certainly have been a Muslim, and might have provided a challenge to the Minister sent from Paris to govern Algeria. Also they have secured the inclusion of a phrase which will confine the role of the federal bodies to that of "coordinating the territorial bodies without infringing on their autonomy," and the exclusion of another which would have allowed the French Parliament gradually to transfer some of its reserved powers to the federal bodies.

INDEPENDENTS PLEASED

The Bill now says that Algerian institutions and their powers can at a later stage be modified by agreement between all concerned, including the French Parliament. In return the right-wing

leaders have agreed to the establishment of federal bodies, to which some of them were totally opposed, but the Bill provides little sign of the "real powers" for these bodies which the Socialists and the M.R.P. regarded as a matter of principle.

M. Duchet, the Independent leader, said last night: "We think that we have won a certain number of advantages. The federal assembly cannot now become an Algerian assembly, the Republic cannot give up the matters reserved to it, the Minister for Algeria will preside over all discussions." M. Mollet and M. Pflimlin (M.R.P.) spoke more guardedly about the agreement.

The Bill has since been approved by the Council of Ministers and will be debated in the Assembly on Tuesday. The debate is expected to be lively, but the Government should have a majority of about 100, enough, perhaps, to enable M. Pineau to claim that a substantial majority of French non-Communist deputies are behind the Bill.

ENHANCED REPUTATION

The agreement holds out the prospect of a further lease of life for the French Government, and M. Bourges-Maunoury's reputation as a tactician is enhanced. The right-wing deputies who are looking for a chance to secure his downfall will probably now have to wait until the proposed vote of censure on the Government's agricultural policy in about 10 days' time, but it is unlikely that the farmers' grievances arouse sufficiently wide support in the Assembly for them to succeed.

INWARD CABLEGRAM UNCLASSIFIED

WM.Mic

I.13464

Dated: 20th September 1957

2150

Rec'd: 21st September 1957

1100

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
P A R I S.

25/2/11 file

338. UNCLASSIFIED.Algeria.

Acute divisions of opinion over the "outline of law" and particularly proposed Federal Executive at Algiers, have led Prime Minister to call a Round Table Conference today, 20th September, of the Leaders of all Parties, except the Communist and Poujadists, in last effort to obtain an agreement before the Assembly debate. Failure of this Conference might well result in the departure of the Minister of National Defence, Morice, with several Radical Party colleagues, and possibly the refusal of Lacoste to resume his assignment in Algeria. Press almost unanimously stress the necessity of agreement as overriding arguments for and against particular aspects of the proposal. Some of the more excitable claim that the fate of the Regime is at stake. The Treasurer, Gaillard, yesterday announced he could not now leave to attend the International Monetary Fund Meeting.

Stirling.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.'s.

21st September, 1957.

SEC A/SS LA UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA ER
E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P

G

28/2/11
RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

FWL:AS

I.13379.

FROM:

Dated: 19th September, 1957.
1712.
Rec'd: 20th September, 1957.
0830.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

333. RESTRICTED.

The French Government is $\emptyset$ again 11th October. The Assembly met yesterday, 17th September, to debate "outline law for Algeria which is expected to be voted on 28th September (followed by a vote on economic policy two days later). Dissident Radicals, led by the Minister of Defence, Andre Morice, have persisted in their objections. In particular, they are opposed to giving title of "President" to an elective member of the proposed Federal Executive in Algeria. They hold that this title must be reserved for the Minister appointed by the Government in Paris. Morice offered his resignation at Cabinet meeting this morning.

I believe Morice's objections go deeper than the ostensible reason given above on which Bourges Maunoury has already made concessions. He is, in fact, opposed to any Federal Executive in Algeria which he thinks would be tantamount to giving independence.

...Stirling.

A/MIN&DEPT E.A.
P.M.'S

($\emptyset$ Group apparently omitted)

20th September, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
E.A.F&ME E AF&ME INF DL NT C&P
G

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11
RESTRICTED
(copy -
25/2)

I.13232

Sent: 17th September, 1957.
1257
Rec'd: 18th September, 1957.
0900

JG/BH

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

330.

RESTRICTED.Algeria.

Text of basic law has had a mixed reception. It is of Socialist inspiration and final text is attributed to Abel Thomas principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister and militant socialist. Thomas is close to Commin, Deputy Secretary General of the Socialist Party, who during the Mollet Government was entrusted with numerous missions of contact with more moderate Algerian nationalists and possible intermediaries.

The spearhead of the opposition is Soustelle, former Governor General of Algeria, who has rallied behind him almost unanimous opinion of the French in Algeria and much of centre right opinion in France. He accepts most of the basic law but strenuously opposes the creation of Central Executive at Algiers. The Independents are haunted by the autochthony they consented to in Morocco which was rapidly transformed into complete independence. They fear the effect on French black Africa.

"London Times" leader today headed by Faute de Mieux labels the proposals as "not inspiring" and "hardly liberal" and fears they will open the road as much to partition as to separation.

The Government faces difficult debate and may not obtain for the project that wide Parliamentary support which would strengthen its hand in New York.

Stirling.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

18th September, 1957.

RESTRICTED

Name of Paper.....

File No.....

Published at.....

Date.....

**LIMITED AUTONOMY
FOR ALGERIA****CRITICISM OF FRENCH
LAW**

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, SEPT. 15

After its approval by the Government on Friday, the text of the "outline law" for Algeria is this weekend being studied by the Council of State, the supreme French advisory body. It must decide, among other things, whether the limited autonomy allowed by the law is compatible with the clause in the Constitution stating that the French Republic is one and indivisible.

A great many thinking Frenchmen hope that by the time the outline law is fully in force, the Constitution will have been revised on more federal lines, so that Algeria and other overseas territories can develop their autonomy more flexibly, within the framework of the Republic.

The law has the support of all the Cabinet, including the Socialists, who consider that it responds to the resolution on Algeria voted at their last national congress. The Defence Minister, M. Morice, is maintaining his reserves about some of its provisions until he has seen his dissident Radical colleagues on Monday; but his opposition is not so serious as to justify talk about a Cabinet split.

EXPECTED OUTBURST

Nevertheless, the law has aroused the expected outburst of criticism from the Europeans in Algeria and the suspicions of the main right-wing parties in Paris. As ordinary Muslim opinion in Algeria has no outlet of expression, it is impossible to gauge Muslim reactions, but the law has already been condemned by the two main rebel movements.

The text was yesterday published in the French Press. It provides for the division of Algeria into several semi-autonomous regions, probably six, though the text gives no precise figure. These will each have an elected assembly and council of government, from which will be drawn a coordinating or "federative" assembly and council to sit in Algiers. But most important matters will remain in the hands of the French Government, which will continue to be represented in Algiers by a Minister of Cabinet rank.

Name of Paper *The Guardian*File No. *25/2/11*Published at *London*Date *Sept 16 - 1957*

FULL CITIZENSHIP GUARANTEES FOR ALL ALGERIANS

SAFEGUARDS IN FEDERAL PROPOSALS

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, SEPT. 15

The following is a summary of the 28 articles of the French Government's draft law for Algeria, to be submitted to Parliament this week:—

(Article 1).—"Algeria, an integral part of the French Republic, is composed of federated territories which democratically and freely manage their own affairs." The French Republic recognizes and guarantees the individual character of Algeria, and takes account of its diversity by instituting territorial autonomy. Common interests are looked after under a "federative system." All citizens of the Republic living in Algeria have a share in French sovereignty.

(Article 2).—Algeria's federative institutions will result from agreement between the territories.

(Article 3).—The Republic guarantees to all citizens without distinction an equal enjoyment of all the democratic, political, economic, and social rights and liberties that are the prerogative of French citizenship.

ETHNIC COMMUNITIES

(Article 5).—All elections, territorial and national, are to take place under suffrage and with a single college. The various ethnic communities must each secure fair representation.

(Article 7).—In each territory there is to be a legislative assembly, elected under the principles of Article 3, and a Government responsible to it, under conditions that the assembly shall itself fix.

(Article 11).—The representative of the French Republic in each territory is to appoint, after consultation, the person to be charged with choosing the members of the Government.

(Article 12).—When two years have elapsed after its own election each territorial assembly is to decide on the powers and functions that it is to allow to the federative bodies. The French Parliament will likewise be able to bestow upon these bodies some of the attributions reserved to it under Article 16.

(Article 13).—As soon as a majority of assemblies has reached a decision, the federal assembly is to be set up, composed of equal numbers of elected delegates from each of the territorial assemblies.

(Article 14).—The federative council is likewise to be composed of delegates elected for a fixed period by each of the territorial assemblies. It will elect a new president annually from each territory in turn.

RESERVED SUBJECTS

(Article 15).—Algeria will continue to send representatives to the French Parliament, under conditions to be worked out later.

(Article 16).—The French Republic retains control over the following subjects: Nationality and French civil rights; foreign affairs, national defence, general security; electoral matters and the organization of Algerian political institutions (see Article 24); currency, finance, Customs, taxes, State expenditure; justice, with certain exceptions; education, at least as far as preparations for all State examinations is concerned; administration of public property and energy resources; public services and establishments.

(Articles 17 and 18).—The depositary of these powers of the Republic in Algeria is to be a Minister, a member of the French Government. He will direct the Civil Service, except for justice and education, and will have authority over Government servants in Algeria. He will see that the provisions of the present law and of the French constitution are obeyed. He will of signature the meetings of the federative

council. He can appeal to a court of arbitration against any decision of the federal assembly, but only on grounds of the assembly having exceeded its powers. The appeal must be judged within six months or be considered rejected.

(Articles 19 and 20).—The representative of the Republic in each autonomous territory is to be appointed by the French Government. Under the authority of the Minister in Algeria, he will direct the activities of Government servants in his territory, and see that the present law and the French constitution are respected there. He will preside at meetings of the territorial Government.

(Articles 21, 22, and 23).—A court of arbitration will assure the juridical protection of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Republic to the various communities. Its members—nine or 11—will be appointed by the President of the Republic. There is to be no appeal from this court.

(Article 24).—The French Republic recognizes and guarantees the possibilities of evolution for the Algerian institutions, within the framework of the Republic. The institutions fixed by the present law will be able to be modified by agreement between the territorial assemblies, the federative assembly, and the French Parliament.

DECREES BY MARCH 1

(Article 25).—Until elections can be organized in each territory, provisional assemblies can be set up, and a provisional consultative federative council is to be formed to help in making the changeover.

(Article 26).—After Parliament has approved the outline law, the Government must work out the details of its application in the form of a series of decrees, and present these to Parliament before March 1, 1958. Parliament then has four months in which to examine them, at the end of which time they will come into force.

(Article 27).—These decrees will be concerned principally with the boundaries of the territories, the conditions under which the various assemblies and councils and the representatives of the Republic are to exercise their powers, and the rules and competence of the court of arbitration.

(Articles 27b and 28).—The Governor-General's office is abolished, and the 1947 statute is abrogated.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

JERC:SS

I. 13110

Dated: 15th September, 1957
1715
Rec'd: 16th September, 1957
0830

Australian Embassy,
P A R I S

*File
25/2/11*

327. SECRET

Algeria.

1. Pineau has returned from America and, according to the American Ambassador, he presented the "Basic Law" well and made a good impression on Dulles.
2. The Law has not yet been finalised. According to Joxe, Minister of Defence, Morice is in a minority of one in the Cabinet. It is by no means certain, however, that he will resign if beaten or that his going, would ~~weak~~ the Government.
3. In its present form the Law provides for six Territories of which five would certainly have Moslem majorities and possibly even the 6th (Algiers and surroundings).
4. The Government hopes, as soon as possible after the Law is accepted by the French Parliament (i.e. after preparation of the electoral rolls) they will hold elections for the Territorial Assembly in all the Territories where practicable. Where impracticable they will nominate the Assembly.
5. The stumbling block is still the status of the Central Executive. The majority of the Cabinet favours an Executive responsible to the Federal Assembly. It would be presided over by the French Minister for Algeria, who would play a similar role in relation to the Executive to that of the President of the Republic in relation to the Council of Ministers in France and the French Government reserves substantial powers to itself.
6. The Law set out a very long itemised list of reserved powers. Joxe thought it would have been wiser to confine these to Foreign Affairs and Defence and add some general formula of reservation.
7. Morice and his supporters are very reluctant to accept the proposed status of the Executive and its relations with the Federal Assembly, arguing (probably with reason) that Algeria would very soon do everything possible to whittle away the reserved powers.

Stirling.

A/MIN & DEPT EA
P.M.'s

16th September, 1957

SECRET

SEC A/SS LA UN ER PAC&AM AM/SP S&SEA EAF&ME E
V&E INF DL MT C&P



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *The Economist*

File No. *25/2/11*

Published at

Date *2/1/14 - 1957*

THE ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 14, 1957

THE WORLD

feeling for the settlers and fears of their reactions. Given the slowness of parliamentary procedures and the need to fix the Algerian regions, the law cannot be applied for months. It could, after the UN debate, become simply another liberal alibi for another year's inaction. Nevertheless, the direction of French thinking is gradually changing to a more realistic view. The economic situation, if it worsens, could be an added complication; already a stormy opening of Parliament on Tuesday is expected. So far, the trade crisis and Algeria have lived curiously apart in the French mind, but now that inflation is beginning to hurt the individual as well as the balance of payments, they may draw together. (The ECE has just estimated the war's real cost at £700 million a year, about twice the military figures; this represents a whole year's growth of output even at recent boom rates.) Inflation can be more potent for change than any outline law.

Janus's Law for Algeria

FROM OUR PARIS CORRESPONDENT

THE technique of the "outline law," drawn up in general terms which the government is left to apply, is becoming fashionable in France. It circumvents legislative traffic-jams in an Assembly which normally exercises its rights in fussy detail in face of the growing complexity of government. The method is useful for long-term economic policies, and was notably successful last year in bringing local home rule to the African territories. The very term "outline law" now has the liberal overtones of that reform. What could be more tempting than to improve the unpalatable dish of Algeria with the piquant sauce of an "outline law"? The French are now cooking one up; they are trying to create a semi-autonomous Algeria without awaiting a cease-fire, and to avoid the clearcut choice between "pacification," which has failed, and acceptance of Algeria's "vocation of independence," which would be an admission of defeat.

With rebels everywhere, this is a gamble which must be wholehearted to have hopes of success. But, inevitably, the outline law already looks like a Janus, with a liberal face wooing the United Nations for the October debate and a diabolic visage assuring the settlers all is well. Knowing the UN is still wavier than it was last spring, M. Pineau and the innumerable other travelling salesmen of France's case, who are plying their charm in Asia and Latin America, are saying: "We want to talk, not to impose solutions." But M. Lacoste says Algeria must always be part of France, and M. Bourges-Maunoury this weekend added that it is "a non-existent nation." The contradictions of M. Mollet's policy, caused by accepting Algeria's separate "personality"

OVERSEAS

THE ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 14, 1957

without its dominant trait, the rebellion, look like being prolonged.

The law improves on M. Mollet's logic in one respect: it admits that if the rebels are unacceptable negotiators on present terms, other representative Moslems must be created. As the Catholic leader, M. Pflimlin, has rightly said, the test of the law is whether or not it can achieve this in a short time. It tries to encourage them to come forward. First, Algeria would, as soon as possible, be divided in regions which elect assemblies and governments to administer local affairs. Two years later, these assemblies could delegate their powers and representatives to a common assembly and executive in Algiers. Two years later still, the Algerian representatives and the French could negotiate a new statute for Algeria. Diehards like M. Lacoste or M. Morice, the minister of defence, jib at having any effective Algerian executive, however limited, even in the intermediate stage, because it could be a seed of independence; some Catholics and Socialists, however, want to give it real powers. As for the last stage, though the whole law supposes Paris would control foreign affairs, currency, defence and even justice and secondary education, the terms in which the offer is couched are so vague that it is obviously meant to hint at possible independence as a carrot for the Moslems.

But will they be ready to wait four or more years? The promises are equivocal, and France's record of promises is poor. The reform law passed in 1947 would have made rebellion unnecessary had it been applied. Last year, M. Mollet came to make peace and left M. Lacoste to wage war. Above all, the first step, the regionalising of Algeria, is retrograde. It may be understandable in some areas—Kabylia or the two centres of heavy European settlement, Algiers and Oran—but the most ardent French regionalists are the recent converts, champions of French supremacy who must now divide the Moslems in order to safeguard settler interests. In practice, in the rebel shadow, few elections to regional assemblies will be possible. The law, tacitly conceding this, apparently then provides that members should be designated by the local and municipal councils, which are strongholds of the settlers. The Moslems will not see their reflection in these mirrors. Even assuming they are war-weary, as the French claim, and potential new leaders exist who do not fear assassination, the law's attractions seem weak.

In Paris, however, a law that restores some movement to paralysed policies is a relief to the politicians. Most of them probably only half believe in it—as *Le Monde* suggested, the Decalogue, too, is an outline law. But it has already divided the independent conservatives, who till now held out for all the settler privileges, and has made some accept the appearances, if no more, of Algerian autonomy. It is also significant that M. Pflimlin, a prudent liberal, has been to Morocco to enlarge his view of the law; the Moroccans could not mediate on the present French terms, but the effort to keep contact with them and Tunisia is no longer the monopoly of M. Mendès-France or minority socialists. The angry reactions of the settler representatives to the law, in response above all to the mood in Paris, show they feel they are losing support.

All this may mean little. The will to a settlement still centres on hopes of persuading the rebels to accept federal links, instead of independence, and is still held up by fellow-

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

MG:ABK.

I.12542.

Dated: 4th September, 1957.

1830.

FROM:

Rec'd: 5th September, 1957.

0900.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

303. SECRET.

218.
25/2/11

I went this morning, 3rd September, to see the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. He talked at length about Algeria. The Government have made little progress during the last fortnight with their "basic law" and it is unlikely they will have got the concurrence of the leaders of Parliamentary groups before Pineau meets Dulles in Washington at the end of the week. (Pineau left for South American tour before the details of the basic law had been worked out).
2. Joxe reiterated that it was impossible to give Algeria independence. Their present plan aimed at a gradual solution:
 - (a) They would divide Algeria into territories probably six. Each would have its own Legislature (one Chamber) elected by Universal suffrage and Executive with a Lieutenant Governor on the model of the Canadian provinces. These units would deal only with local affairs. In only two out of the six would there be European majorities?
 - (b) These local Assemblies would elect a central Parliament in Algiers. There would be a Central Executive headed by a member of French Cabinet, the Minister for Algeria. I understand this point is at present a stumbling block with French Parliamentary groups - some want to make this senior Executive Officer (whether European or Moslem) in effect Prime Minister of Algeria deriving his authority from the Federal Assembly in Algiers rather than from the President of the Republic. This course would in any event mean a greater degree of independence.
3. Joxe said the Government also contemplated an arrangement for close economic co-operation between France, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and French West Africa. This would cover developments in the Sahara in which Morocco and Tunisia would be favoured partners. In his personal views this economic arrangement would also have to be accompanied by a defence arrangement.
4. Meanwhile Joxe continued since French military units had been withdrawn from Tunisia, fomenting the rebellion in Algeria was going on in Tunisia unchecked. President Bourguiba on one hand promised co-operation in settlement of the Algerian problem and on the other hand allowed rebel activity. (Morocco at the present time was behaving better). It was essential that Bourguiba should be forced to make a choice. Joxe said he had been wading through masses of evidence supplied by the Military of rebel activity in Tunisia. The Government had now decided it must exercise the "right of pursuit" and this will provoke a "crisis". Bourguiba is still in Switzerland where Mendes-France recently visited him.
5. I also asked Joxe about the U.S.S.R. and Germany in both of which he recently served as Ambassador. As regards the U.S.S.R. and Syria he thought the situation very serious (my telegram 207). The U.S.S.R. did not "believe in" the Eisenhower doctrine. There was also a danger that instead of only one base in the Mediterranean

SECRET

..2..

MG-ABK.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

2.

"Albanian" the Russians would soon have three (Egypt and Syria). There was also a serious threat to Lebanon which had appealed to France. He felt it was essential that the United States should oppose a "barrier" and not merely rely on the Eisenhower doctrine. He felt Lebanon must be given only things that the Russians would understand, i.e. a guarantee and arms.

6. He emphasised the delicacy of the position of the United Kingdom and France who must not appear to divide the Arab states. The United States must also make greater use of Saudi Arabia.

7. He said Pineau and he would strongly urge this point of view in Washington. Joxe leaves for Washington on 5th September.

8. On Germany he said he felt pretty sure that Adenauer would be at the head of the Government after the elections not of course with an absolute majority but either with support of small parties or in coalition.

(with Mr. Stirling)

Stirling.

A/MIN. & DEPT. W.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

6th September, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AP&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT
G.
UN. NEW YORK LONDON WASHINGTON.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM UNCLASSIFIED

HD:VA

I. 11904

Sent: 23rd August, 1957
1305
Rec'd: 24th August, 1957
0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

290. UNCLASSIFIED.

Algeria.

Draft statute was considered by Cabinet yesterday 21st August. Prime Minister has now begun discussions with party leaders. General line appears to be as follows:-

- (1) Algeria would be divided into several territories each with an autonomous Assembly.
- (2) Elections to each would be based on single electoral roll.
- (3) Control over Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defence would be retained by French Government.
- (4) A Federal Co-ordinating Assembly at Algiers would derive its power from regional Assemblies by delegation.
- (5) Algeria would have wide representation in French Parliament.

Agreement on many points has not yet been reached within the Government, but a time table has been hoped to submit proposals to National Assembly 24th September. It is Pineau leaves today for South America and Washington to present French case.

..... Deschamps.

group apparently omitted.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

24th August, 1957.

SEC A/Ss LAT(DIV.5) UN CR P.C&M AMASP S&SEA SA EAP&ME
E AP&ME INF DL MT C&P

G

TEL AVIV U.N. NEW YORK LONDON WASHINGTON OTTAWA

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

BGH:VA

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I. 11806

Sent: 21st August, 1957
1535
Rec'd: 22nd August, 1957
1030

FROM:

(Transmitted through
leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

1018. CONFIDENTIAL.

File
25/2 1/1

Repeated Washington for information, London for
External Savingram 212, Ottawa Savingram 252, Paris Savingram 10.

Algeria.

Your 458.

We discussed the position yesterday with
Ordonneau who said nothing was fixed yet (apart from not wanting
the item early in the Session) and that the French Government would
only next week begin considering tactics for the Assembly. Pineau
was at present touring Latin America to drum up support for France.
Meanwhile Ordonneau thought it likely that France would not oppose
inscription. He also thought there was no need to be too pessimistic
about this year's outcome and that France could again avoid being
compromised, in the Assembly's resolution, on the substance of the
problem. He said he would report our enquiry and suggest that French
views be communicated to us as soon as available, both through Sivan
and in New York.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

22nd August, 1957.

SEC A/Ss I&T(DIV.5) UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA FAR&ME E AF&ME
IND DL MT C&P

G

WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION

972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700



SPEECHES AND PRESS CONFERENCES - No. 96

June 13, 1957

25/2/11

PREMIER BOURGES-MAUNOURY OUTLINES HIS GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM

Following are the main excerpts of the policy statement made by Premier Designate Maurice Bourges-Maunoury before the French National Assembly on June 12, 1957. The new Premier obtained investiture by a vote of 240 to 194.

The Algerian Question

"The Algerian drama is my first concern. Let us, first of all, do away with a false dilemma. We do not have the choice today between two courses, one being the continuation at all costs of an unending and absurd struggle, and the other leading suddenly, as by a miracle, to peace and prosperity.

"We must wage the struggle as long as it is forced upon us, and at the same time, we must help millions of men to build together a new Algeria.

"The officers of our army, the soldiers of France, have a right to our gratitude. This army has watched, day and night, over the security of millions of men and women whose very lives and property are in danger. It has paid heavily. I should like to pay tribute to the victims of terrorism and their families, as well as to those who fall on the field of battle.

"These sacrifices will not be in vain. The rebels know now that they will never win by force of arms. For a while they had hoped to have us condemned by the United Nations. They failed in this attempt. After all the acts of terrorism, whatever their origin, after the monstrous massacre of the 300 male inhabitants of Melouza, world public opinion knows what they are capable of.

"Our weariness is their last hope. In that, too, they are mistaken. I say this solemnly to all the people of Algeria: our country will continue in its effort as long as necessary. It can and wants to do this.

"We hereby make another solemn commitment: to undertake--without waiting any longer for our adversaries to show their willingness--to undertake the building of a new Algeria. For that is the problem now confronting us. Confident in the future which we can guarantee to it, and tired of being criticized by the rebellion, the population must isolate this rebellion and work with us for its final elimination.

"The previous Government set an end goal: to maintain and strengthen the indissoluble union between Metropolitan France and Algeria; and at the same time, to recognize and respect Algeria's individual character, while providing political equality for all its inhabitants.

"By our uninterrupted determination and action, we shall prove to Algerian public opinion, and to world opinion as well, that our promise to establish a new state of things in Algeria is not a short-lived statement of intentions.

"The strategy of the rebels is quite clear. They reject the cease-fire. Thus, they avoid holding free elections, hence discussing the statute. At the same time they turn to world opinion to say that no progress has been made and that France's promises have not been kept. The assassinations, the bloody events of the last few days make a tragic thing of this hypocrisy. We shall not let ourselves be overwhelmed by such a maneuver. We shall not let ourselves be hindered in the construction of a new Algeria.

A "Loi-Cadre" for Algeria - "That is why, while retaining all the objectives which Premier Guy Mollet had defined in his declaration of investiture, and while the appeal for a cease-fire remains valid, I have decided to introduce as soon as possible a draft 'loi-cadre' to serve as a basis for the gradual establishment of new political structures. They will be set up first on the local level, then in the Departments, and lastly on a regional level. Each region will become a provincial political unit.

"The provinces and their special political organs will be the starting point for elaborating the structure of the Algerian entity. When it becomes possible to hold elections, the elected representatives of the population will be called upon to study this 'loi-cadre' in order to adopt it or to suggest the changes which they would consider desirable. It will thus be put into effect with the support of all men of good will.

"This political reform will be preceded by a far-reaching administrative reform for which the groundwork has already been laid and which will result essentially in bringing closer together the administrative organs and the populations for which they are responsible. These reforms will lead to the gradual elimination of the General Government of Algeria and to the transfer of powers from the central to the regional level....

"I do not think that outbreaks of whipped-up nationalism are inevitable in the evolution of the peoples of the French Union. In a country like Algeria which derives its unity solely from the French presence, such a phase could only be one of confusion, marked by a series of disastrous upheavals. It is this which, properly speaking, would be retrogression.

"The truth is that the Europeans and Moslems of Algeria have a great task to perform together and that this country, which belongs to both groups alike, must be able to ensure in the future equality of living conditions and status for all. The truth is that the maintenance of the French presence there will prevent decades of groping and mistakes for the greatest good of the population."

The Financial Situation

"We cannot escape the necessity of asking the Bank of France for a new advance. Nor can we any longer avoid drawing on the gold reserves of the Bank at the end of June in order to meet our external obligations."

"We are thus obviously passing through a very difficult period. The study which I have made of the accidental and underlying causes of this situation has convinced me that the remedies were not beyond our reach. They presuppose at one and the same time very drastic immediate action and patient longer term action. The program presented by my Government will be guided by this twofold requirement.

"It is fallacious to single out one budgetary item among others as responsible for the deficit. In this respect, the inflationary effect of our military expenditures in Algeria has often been overestimated.

"Our military budget today, including operations in Algeria, is about \$3.7 billion. It accounts for a smaller share of the over-all public expenditures than it did five years ago--a time when, it is true, we were engaged in operations in Indochina, but a time also when the national income was far from its present level. If the operations in Algeria were to stop, the savings that might gradually be anticipated could not exceed that figure. In addition the return of peace in Algeria should not lead us to make that budgetary economy.

"The funds released should for the most part be devoted to economic development and to improving the standard of living of the populations of North Africa.

"A second guiding principle is that the rapid pace of our economic expansion is a cause of financial difficulties only because it is accompanied, not by a sufficient development of our exports but, on the contrary, by an excessive development of domestic consumption. As a matter of fact it is possible, and even necessary, to increase our exports within the framework of a broad expansion of our production.

"Finally--and this will be one of the essential principles of my action--I think that the development of production presupposes the continuation of a policy to improve the standard of living of the workers, whose betterment is both the aim of all economic activity and the incentive for any lasting expansion.

Austerity Measures - "The program of austerity which consumers will be asked to observe will thus chiefly concern the increase in production which will be achieved. Part of this increase will have to be set aside for export.

"Before asking for the help of the Bank of France in the form of both a permanent advance in francs and a withdrawal from its gold reserves, my Government considers it indispensable to have Parliament approve a certain number of immediate financial measures.

"If you vote today to endorse my Government, I ask you to pledge yourselves to approve, before the end of June, \$428 million in new taxes for the year 1957. These resources will have to be carried over into the 1958 budget, giving it a surplus of \$857 million in receipts for the full fiscal year.

"Aware that no tax is good in itself, my Government will try to choose those which will not be detrimental to economic expansion and which will not affect the price of common consumer products or the standard of living of the workers. By granting your confidence you would be pledging yourselves to approve these sums.

"I shall, moreover, maintain the cut of \$714 million on public expenditures made by the preceding Government. A substantial reduction in expenditures must also be made in next year's budget.

Economic Expansion and Social Progress - "The long-range program will be studied thoroughly.

"By the end of the first 12-month period, or if possible at the end of a year, France must recover a hard currency and a sufficiently competitive economy in order to enter upon the initial phase of the European Common Market, without danger and without reservation.

"The second stage of our plan will be devoted to taking advantage of all the economic possibilities which are currently open to our country. These possibilities are not confined solely to Metropolitan France. They are also part of the broad prospects in North Africa, the Sahara and our overseas territories.

"Continued expansion, which is a national necessity, does not require merely the development of our industrial production. In Europe France has an outstanding role to play in the agricultural field. Vast markets are available to our products within the European community.

"I repeat that the implementation of our plan of reforms must not cause us to halt our efforts toward social progress. The Government must see to it that the rights of labor are guaranteed. That is why the idea of marking time in the field of social advancement--an idea which it has never been possible, in practice, to reconcile for long with expansion--must be set aside.

"In this spirit, my Government will ask that the debate on social projects now being studied be resumed and concluded. After the debate on educational reform, the bill concerning the relations between the medical profession and the social security organization must be placed on the agenda."

Institutional Reform

Referring to the problems of France's governmental institutions, M. Bourges-Maunoury pointed out that, in the light of ten years' experience, the strengthening of the Executive is a pressing need. It must come about as a result of a revision of the Constitution. The Committee on Universal Suffrage has done a sizable job, but owing to lack of agreement on several important points, their work threatens to bog down.

"At this point, it is the Government's duty to intervene in an attempt to reconcile the various points of view. The State's authority must be reinforced and the institutions of the French Union adapted....

M. Bourges-Maunoury added that his Government would have no intention of putting pressure on the Assembly to adopt this or that system of voting, but that it did seem necessary to him to remove an obstacle by a clear vote on principles and to dispel a source of conflict between closely related groups which are often in agreement on other important questions.

"We must not wait for the end of Parliament's term of office for that body to discuss, in the last minute rush, the manner in which the country will be called upon to vote."

Prompt Implementation of the "Loi-Cadre" in Black Africa

Turning to the question of France Overseas, M. Bourges-Maunoury announced his determination to continue to apply the 'loi-cadre' "in the most liberal spirit." The civil service cadres, in particular, must be Africanized.

With regard to the legislative texts drawn up in pursuance of the 'loi-cadre,' not all of which have been passed by Parliament, he said that this task must be completed....

"In the economic field, public investments in the overseas territories will not be affected by budgetary economies."

Foreign Policy

Building Europe - "My Government is determined to further this task. It will first ask the Parliament to ratify, before the summer recess, the treaties concerning the Common Market and Euratom, the broad lines of which it had approved in the course of two long debates.

"It intends actively to carry on the negotiation of a free exchange zone encompassing Great Britain and the other OEEC countries, while seeing to it that, in accordance with the wishes of the Assembly, it obtains guarantees similar to those of the Treaty of Rome. Finally, it will look into the problem of the European political institutions, taking into account the proposals already put forward by Great Britain, Italy and France during recent international conferences.

Disarmament - "On the other hand, it will continue to take part in the work of the Disarmament Conference. But it cannot afford to neglect--as long as a general and controlled disarmament is not effected in the field of nuclear and conventional weapons--the imperatives of European security. It considers it indispensable to maintain, in these fields, close political and technical collaboration with our Allies."

Middle East - Then the Premier Designate asserted that, in the Middle East where the fate of peace is hanging in the balance, France has never had other designs than opposition to imperialist ventures....

"While it is resolved to reestablish our traditional ties with Islam, the Government will know how to maintain and reaffirm its friendship with a people that is both very old and very young. It considers that this people has the right to live and to work."

Atlantic Alliance - M. Bourges-Maunoury declared himself "a resolute partisan of friendly cooperation between Europe and the United States" and stated that he would do his utmost to strengthen the Atlantic Pact. "But," he added, "the common defense of the free peoples must not be limited to a too narrow geographic frame nor to the military field alone. Only the assertion of a real Western solidarity can help to put an end to the subversive ventures that are spreading throughout the world."

Morocco and Tunisia - "In our relations with Morocco and Tunisia, my Government will strive to bolster up the independence of these two countries. But it finds it unthinkable and cannot allow our army not to be treated as an ally and in the spirit of common defense. We shall once again propose to Tunis and Rabat that we engage in general negotiations on military questions, which, if successful, would happily dispel present clouds."

"Within this framework, we are determined to continue our assistance with the unalterable purpose that it result in progress for these states along the lines of economic and social modernization."

"We are indeed aware that our fellow citizens, with whose lot we are deeply concerned, will be able to remain there, only if close cooperation develops between our countries. Their juridical and political status will soon be determined by conventions, which Parliament will be called upon to ratify without delay. The example of Morocco has already shown their usefulness."

"Stable relations with our new partners will be established through mutual respect and active solidarity. We must understand their reactions when they imagine that their sovereignty has been infringed. But we cannot tolerate their interference in Algerian affairs."

"For those of our fellow citizens from Morocco and Tunisia who have returned to Metropolitan France, I shall reorganize all the reception and reemployment services and shall speed up the application of the various assistance measures taken for their benefit."

Economic Development of the Sahara

"All the concerns and hopes that have just been expressed lead to what constitutes, today the hope, and tomorrow the cement of the whole French Union: I mean the Sahara. The creation of the Ministry of the Sahara shows the extreme importance which the Government attaches to the exploitation and development of this territory."

"France prides herself on the fact that during several decades she alone believed in these desert regions, she alone explored and prospected there. It should be known that the moment her efforts met with success, France decided to ask any neighboring and friendly countries, which expressed a desire to cooperate faithfully with her, to participate in the task."

"The task to be undertaken is characterized by the large amount of capital to be invested and the necessity of genuine cooperation between Metropolitan France, the Sahara and the surrounding territories. It is my intention that the savings of all Frenchmen contribute to the necessary effort...."

"There is no question of Metropolitan France keeping all the profits of this development for herself. The Saharan populations must find in them a means toward the social development and economic progress that the Parliament has been anxious to guarantee them. Algeria will be the first to benefit from the sources of energy released which will enable her to ensure the industrialization that is indispensable for her. The territories of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, to which the Saharan organization is wide open will also derive important advantages from it. Our firm hope for Morocco and Tunisia is to see them intimately associated in this vast enterprise."

M. Bourges-Maunoury specified that the powers exercised at the present time by the Governor General of Algeria and the High Commissioners of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa in the Saharan regions, will be delegated, as provided for by the law, to the Minister of the Sahara.

"I do not believe in the fatality of history. On the other hand I have a stubborn confidence, a passionate confidence in the future of our country. My confidence is justified not only by the opportunities offered France today. These opportunities are a high birth rate and therefore the certainty of rejuvenation; they are the growth of the spirit of expansion; they are also / natural gas at / Lacq, / petroleum at / Parentis and uranium in Metropolitan France; finally they are the Sahara, the mineral and hydroelectric resources of Africa.

"My confidence also springs from the **very** ordeal through which our country is passing and the manner in which we are facing it. Our generation will not give succeeding ones, France will not give the world the spectacle of a country which, through lack of energy, at the decisive moment, allowed to fall from its hand the cards that destiny had placed there.

"We know already that, fifteen years hence, ours will be the youngest country in Europe; it depends on our courage whether or not it is also the most prosperous."

Name of Paper *The Times*File No. *25/2/11*Published at *London*Date *August 7 1957*

SEVERE FRENCH LOSSES IN ALGERIA BATTLE

SUCCESSFUL REBEL RUSE

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, AUG. 6

One of the more important military operations of the Algerian campaign has been going forward over the last few days in the mountainous region some 40 miles south of Algiers. Here, on Sunday night, 21 French soldiers were killed, and 20 more injured, in a clash with a rebel band. The rebels lost 16 killed and four prisoners. The French immediately brought up heavy reinforcements, supported by reconnaissance aircraft, and it seems that the hunt for the rebels concerned is still going on. This is the third time in eight days that French forces have suffered serious losses in or about this mountainous area.

In the battle on Sunday night, which cost the French so dear, it seems that the rebels were wearing exactly the same uniform, even to the steel helmet, as the French soldiers themselves, and as a result, serious confusion occurred. Some French soldiers, taking the rebels for friends, allowed themselves to be attacked at close range with machine-guns and grenades. In the city of Algiers the lights of the artillery and aircraft shells over the battle area could be seen plainly in the sky.

DELIBERATE POLICY

Some observers interpret this intensification of rebel military activity as a deliberate policy on the part of the nationalists in preparation for the opening next month of the United Nations General Assembly at which the Algerian question is virtually certain to be discussed.

The latest statement from the rebel leaders offers little hope that they are ready to make any effort at compromise in meeting essential French requirements. Two of the F.L.N. leaders, Dr. Ahmed Francis and Me. Abderrahman

Kioang, are now touring the Scandinavian countries, and in a statement to the correspondent of *Le Monde* at Stockholm have said that their aim is independence, and their territorial claims extend to the present boundaries of Algeria, the Sahara included.

If the French Government wants to negotiate, they say, it has only to approach the "national council of the Algerian revolution." The Algerian Republic at whose establishment they are aiming will be, they say, "a modern State and not a theocratic one." Independent Algeria will welcome international cooperation which is in conformity with its interests, "but we do not want to yield an ounce of our freedom and run the risk of foreign aid becoming a means of political pressure, as we see it has become in Tunisia or in Morocco."

N. AFRICAN UNITY

Asked whether they approved the idea of a North African federation, the two F.L.N. representatives said that the aim was the constitution of a North African federation which would one day achieve North African unity. They refused to be drawn by a question about the possible obstacle to such a vision in the shape of the Moroccan monarchy. Asked what they intended to do about the French European settlers in Algeria, they replied that there would be two choices: either the French could choose Algerian citizenship, which would give them total equality of rights, or they could choose a French status, with the rights and duties that that status implied.

Finally, asked what they would do if the United Nations vote went against the rebel cause, they replied that the struggle would be continued, for "the Algerian people can support the war for several years yet."

COPY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

AUSTRALIAN-EMBASSY.

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS

File No. 201/2/8/4

The Massacre at Mechta Kasbah.

On June 23 I went with other diplomatic representatives, at the invitation of the French authorities, by helicopter from Algiers to Ain Hamiah. This village, which is situated near the edge of the Hodna Plain in the south west of the Department of Sétif, is the nearest point of access to Mechta Kasbah. The distance between the two villages is only about 4 kms. as the crow flies, but Mechta Kasbah is perched on the very crest of a precipitous mountain, and the journey takes two hours on foot under normal conditions.

2. On our arrival we were greeted by General Giraud, commanding the Sétif Region, and by the Sub-Préfet of Bordj bou Arréridj. General Giraud said that he had a total of 22,000 men in his whole region, which went from the edge of the Sahara in the south to the sea-coast in the north. Because the density of the population was greater in the north, their efforts were concentrated in the Petite Kabylie and Soummam Valley, which are heavily populated areas and important routes of communication. In the south, he frankly admitted that he had not sufficient troops to afford protection to all the local population, although he had known that "a certain number" of the latter had asked for French protection.

3. In the M'Sila district, in which Mechta Kasbah lies, he had only three infantry battalions and one regiment of cavalry, comprising altogether 3,500 troops to guard 300,000 inhabitants, spread out over an area measuring roughly 100 kms. square. In the actual district covering Mechta Kasbah and the surrounding villages, with a population of some 70-80,000 people, there had been only 150 troops before the massacre, although these had now been reinforced to 300. In order to cope with this situation, the French used air reconnaissance backed up by mechanised Spahi patrols.

4. General Giraud went on to give a detailed chronological account of the events on the day of the massacre. At about 6 a.m. on May 28th, he said, a first group of strangers arrived and began telling the inhabitants of surrounding villages to assemble in Mechta Kasbah. Their suspicions were not aroused, because it was a fairly common occurrence for members of local rebel bands to get the villagers together for a political harangue, frequently followed by a collection for revolutionary funds. The peasants continued to assemble in Mechta Kasbah until about mid-day. Meanwhile another 20 rebels had arrived, this time in uniform, while others stood around the village to prevent the inhabitants escaping. In the course of the afternoon a French military aeroplane passed overhead, and the population were told to lie down, in order not to attract attention. The women and children had by now been sent off, and the men were then put into houses in the village, 30 to 40 to each house, while 90 were pushed

/inside.....

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN-EMBASSY
PARIS

inside the diemas (village assembly hall). There they stayed until about 7.30 p.m. The men were then told to come out, in groups of 4 to 5 at a time. As they emerged they were killed by machine guns or axes. The killing continued for about three hours, by which time 303 men had been finished off.

5. Meanwhile on the same afternoon, a French captain had been patrolling in the region. He knew Ain Hamian well, and had lunched only a few days previously with the local Moslem garde champetre. At 14.00 hrs., while still some distance away from Ain Hamian itself, he received a wireless message from the aeroplane which had already passed over Mechta Kasbah, saying that a certain amount of agitation had been observed in the village, but that no men in uniform had been seen. (Survivors were afterwards stated to have confirmed that these rebels who were in uniform covered themselves during the passage of the aircraft in burnous or djellaba). The French captain decided to investigate, and arrived in Ain Hamain at about 18.30 hrs. The normal patrol consists of two armoured cars, with a half-track and sometimes a jeep. The tracks leading up from Ain Hamain to Mechta Kasbah are quite impracticable for wheeled vehicles, and the patrol commander was not in sufficient strength both to leave a guard on his cars and to do the two-hour journey on foot up to Mechta Kasbah, with a possibility of finding a heavily armed rebel band awaiting him at the top. He therefore passed the night of May 28/29 about 10 kms. to the west of the village, since he anticipated that the band would escape in this direction, and he hoped to intercept them.

6. At the same time he sent a message for reinforcements, and on the following day another patrol arrived. These were followed up by a platoon of infantry the same evening, but it was considered they were still not strong enough to mount to the village, which is in fact protected by a precipitous approach. They therefore patrolled during the night of May 29/30, hoping to intercept the band, and it was not until the morning of May 30 that it was possible to reach the village and report the massacre.

7. Throughout this recital General Giraud had evidently been at great pains to defend the French authorities against accusations that they had been unable to protect the local population against the rebels, and at the same time to answer press charges against the delay in taking effective action. "If anyone was responsible", he told us, "it was I. And I regret the massacre infinitely. But the delay of 40 hours was perfectly normal under military conditions and in fact the difficulties were enhanced by bad weather which was raging at the time and which had rained out the local tracks".

8. Going on to speak of the causes of the massacre, General Giraud gave explanations which have already been published in the press. The local population is a mixed one, with Arab villages separated by only a short distance from Kabyle settlements; in fact, Mechta Kasbah was Arab, whereas Melouza which is situated nearby is Kabyle. Melouza had always been known, said the General, as a "mauvais douar", and was known to contain elements favourable to the F.L.N. In the second place, bands owing allegiance to the Mouvement National Algérien (M.N.A.) had penetrated into the region, fleeing southwards under pressure from the Front de Libération National (F.L.N.). The district thus contained many M.N.A. sympathisers, and there had been a tendency for some villages to request French protection.

9. After our talk with General Giraud, we were confronted

/with.....

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

9. with a man who was stated to be a survivor of the massacre. He told us how he had been left for dead under a heap of corpses in the djemâa of Mechta Kasbah, and indicated with great frequency a wound, which, he said, he had received on his arm. This witness had however evidently told his story repeatedly to journalists and other delegations, and his testimony, while there was no outward reason to doubt it, had by now become somewhat parrot-like. We were then taken by helicopter to Mechta Kasbah itself, landing in a steeply sloping field just below the village. The deserted houses are now guarded by harki (Moslem levies) formed from the group of some 200 Moslem workers, natives of the district, who had been flown back from France at their own request. We were taken into many of the houses, and into the djemâa itself; although the bodies had been removed some time previously, shoes and odd pieces of clothing still lay in the streets, and in the djemâa the smell of blood was still overpowering. Here the bodies had been piled up to a height of 2½ metres. One of the harki insisted on my coming into his house, where he pointed out with a certain gloomy pride the congealed blood of his father, two brothers and two uncles who had been hacked to death there.

10. Following the massacre many of the local villages have "rallied", making their formal submission to France and requesting French military protection. A harka has been formed and arms distributed, among the men of Beni Ilman, another local douar. Of the 200 volunteers from Nanterre, all of whom are Arabs, some 50 have been formed into a harka, while the remainder are in local village defence units or working as labourers for the reconstruction of the district. The French authorities have had to be careful not to arm all the Nanterre volunteers, who otherwise would almost certainly have gone straight off to Melouza and wreaked indiscriminate vengeance on their personal enemies. About 30 men from Melouza itself are believed to have taken part in the massacre; many of these are known to be still in hiding in the village, and the formal submission of Melouza is not being accepted by the French until these suspects have been handed over. Meanwhile, the village of Mechta Kasbah stands deserted on its mountain peak; a completely new village is to be erected nearby.

11. The French civil authorities have insisted in their explanation that the massacre was a deliberately planned military operation by the F.L.N., designed to give a sharp lesson to any Algerian villagers who might be tempted to seek French protection. I do not think that this is the complete explanation. It is true that a similar incident took place in the Soummam Valley a year ago, when some 150 villagers who had "rallied to France" were massacred. But the present operation appears to have been precipitated by the arrival of a band of full-time F.L.N. rebels, probably taking the by now well-worn route from the Tunisian frontier, north of the Chott el Hodna, through the M'Sila up to the Soummam Valley; in Melouza and some of the surrounding villages they found adherents of the F.L.N., who decided that it was a good moment to pay off old scores both political, racial and, no doubt, personal. On the other hand the French failure to intervene is a further demonstration of their powerlessness to ensure adequate protection to villagers in outlying districts, and this may have a serious effect on the waverers.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

JERC:AS

I.10657.

Dated: 31st July, 1957,
1040.

FROM:

Rec'd: 1st August, 1957,
0830

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

255. SECRET (and in confidence).

Algeria.

The United Kingdom Ambassador told me that he had seen Secretary-General Joxe briefly last week, but got very little out of him on his visit to Washington. Joxe told Jebb he did not want him to do any more than he had done in the past over Algeria as it might now be embarrassing. Jebb has in fact made no further "informal" suggestions to French personalities. He had, however, already suggested to Lloyd that he might see the French Ambassador in London and also urge "progress" over Algeria before the Assembly.

2. Parliament has now adjourned for the Summer recess, resuming for a special Algerian session on 23rd September and ordinary session on 1st October. The Prime Minister will visit Algeria in mid-August and the Minister of Defence, Morice, is already touring all operational sectors and showing considerable energy. The Army are trying to seal off the whole Tunisian frontier "to stop infiltration of Czech and other arms sent from Egypt".

..Stirling

MIN&DEPT E.A.
P.M'S

(Ø Corrupt Group)

1st August, 1957.

SEC	A/Ss	UN	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA
E,AF&ME	E	AF&ME	INF	DL	MT	
G						

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

..MC

L.10573.

Dated: 23rd July, 1957.

Rec'd: 30th July, 1957.
1530.

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

File
25/2/11

Savingram No. Ex.282. CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated to Washington Ex.218, Paris Ex.38,
and New York Ex.83.

Algeria

Following is text of a savingram of 19th July
from the Foreign Office to the United Kingdom Embassy at
Paris.

The French Ambassador, who has just returned
from seeing M. Pineau, spoke to me today of the
mounting sense of anxiety in Paris about the Algerian
position. M. Pineau told him that a statute for
Algeria would be promulgated within a month. Its
nature was not yet settled, and there was serious
division within the French cabinet about it.

The French Government had been relieved to
learn from the Secretary General of the United
Nations that Algeria would not come up before 1st
November, which gave the French Government some
time. Mr. Hammarskjöld had also said that Afro-
Asians seemed not to be really anxious to inter-
nationalize the problem.

M. Chauvel agreed with my observation that
the Algerian problem was really a tragedy for France
because it was eating away her position in Tunisia
and Morocco. He said that the same point had been
made by Mr. Dulles and others in Washington to
M. Joxe. Mr. Dulles had assured him that the
Administration's official line, as stated in public
by himself and the President, still stood; but had
pointed out that Senator Kennedy reflected a lot
of thoughtful opinion. Mr. Dulles had urged on
M. Joxe that the French Government should try to
come to the United Nations with some agreement with
Tunisia and Morocco about Algeria.

M. Chauvel also mentioned the French
Government's concern about a recent TV broadcast on
Algeria by the BBC and about some photographs in
the 'Illustrated London News'."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

- 2 -

I.10573.

MIN & DEPT E.A.

31st July, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(Div.5) UN ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAP&ME
E EAP&ME INF DL MT C&P

G

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED.

DW:CM

I.10487

Dated: 27th July, 1957.

1556

Rec'd: 28th July, 1957.
0830

AMENDED COPY.

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
P A R I S.

250. UNCLASSIFIED.

Algeria.

Senate on 25th July approved emergency powers by 269 to 25. Official figures of victims of North African rebel activity in France are as follows:-

* 223 killed, 1246 injured between January and June 1957. 41 killed, 239 injured during the first 19 days of July.

* AMENDMENT

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

28th July, 1957.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.A.P&ME E AP&ME
INF DL MT C&P

G



file 25/2/11

memo 562 from Paris dated
1-8-57 has an account
of Algeria - economy, agriculture
mines, energy, and industry. Capital
town etc and is filed
Africa section 167/2/2.

Name of Paper *The Economist*File No. *25/2/11*

Published at

Date *July 27 1957*

THE WEEK

297

TUNISIA

European
A Monarchy Goes

THERE are more hereditary rulers in the Arab lands than in all the rest of the world put together. Even so, the removal of one star from the cluster dims the outlook for the rest. The last casualty was King Farouk. Now comes the turn of the Bey of Tunis, for whose rule (lately somewhat nominal) the Tunisian Assembly resolved on Thursday to substitute a republic. M. Bourguiba's election as president was expected; he had as good as announced the change of regime in advance. The decision taken, the assembly will no doubt move faster than it has been doing with the drafting of a constitution.

The dynasty that is fading out has lasted since 1705, but for most of that time it has been subservient to a foreign authority—first the Turks, then the French. Beys of note have therefore been few and far between; one of them was Moncef, who in the last war resisted both Italian and French pressure and, for that display of character, was deported. The last of the line, Sidi Lamine, will make no mark on history. He has always accepted with complacency the role of an archaic ornament—relegated since the acquisition of independence in 1955 to a place on the shelf behind M. Bourguiba.

Abroad, not at home, is where he will be missed. To republican subjects of the King of Libya and the Sultan of Morocco his deposition to make way for a president will be suggestive. Maybe it is with this possibility in mind that the Sultan of Morocco has this week spoken up in firm and popular vein on the future of Algeria. Hitherto he had used cautious phraseology designed to keep French sponsors and investors on his side; now he is asking for "recognition" of Algerian independence.

FRANCE

European
Not so Machiavellian

WHISPERS of negotiation with the Algerian rebels are heard from time to time in Paris; but, in a curious way, they become concrete only when the reported attempts at talks have broken down. Thus in October the rulers of Morocco and Tunisia were trying to prepare the ground with their Algerian colleagues for a settlement with France, when M. Ben Bella and four other rebel leaders, flying to Tunis to pursue the talks, were diverted to Algiers and there arrested; they are still in a Paris prison. This masterstroke of police enterprise put paid to negotiation. The arrest on July 11th at Orly of a prominent Tunisian lawyer, M. Chaker, is in the same blundering tradition.

According to reliable French sources, M. Goeau-Brissonniere, a young assistant to the French foreign minister, was sent to Tunis at the beginning of this month, with his prime minister's approval, to get in touch with Algerian rebel leaders and assess the chances of negotiations at a higher level. M. Goeau-Brissonniere apparently made good progress in his preliminary talks and decided to go back to Paris to seek further instructions. The Algerian spokesmen also wanted to consult more of their leading members, and in particular M. Ben Bella, who remains important even in jail. At this point the Tunisians, for whom the settlement of this conflict is so vital, once again offered their good

25/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
UNCLASSIFIED
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

DW:CM

I.10487

Dated: 27th July, 1 957
1556
Rec'd: 0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS

250. UNCLASSIFIED

Algeria.

Senate on 25th July approved emergency powers
by 269 to 25. Official figures of victims of North African rebel
activity in France are as follows.

MIN & DEPT E A
P.M'S

28th July, 1957

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME I. AF&ME
INF DL MT C&P
G.

File *R/S 31/7*
gx.
inope

25/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
UNCLASSIFIED
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

POH:VA

I. 10414

Sent: 26th July, 1957
1759
Rec'd: 27th July, 1957
0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

349. UNCLASSIFIED.

Algerian Bloodshed.

Your memorandum 310 of 5th July.

See, please, my telegram number 226 of 4th
July.

2. I am trying to get the substance of United
Kingdom, Canadian and Indian reports.

... Stirling.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

27th July, 1957.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL
MT

G

25/2/11

Name of Paper

The Times

File No.

25/2/11

Published at

London

Date

July 24 1957

NO SETTLEMENT BY MAGIC IN ALGERIA *E.*

FRENCH APPEAL TO ALLIES

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT
PARIS, JULY 23

M. Bourges-Maunoury, who was the guest at luncheon to-day of the Anglo-American Press Association, appealed to those countries who had so often been France's allies in the struggle for freedom "not to be blinded to reality by over-simplified formulae or miraculous drugs." The Algerian problem was much too serious for "certain hastily conceived or ill-informed suggestions" to be accepted. Among the solutions that had been proposed, he continued (the text of his speech was distributed at the luncheon though not actually delivered by him), there were some which, far from resolving the matter, would create "inextricable or disastrous situations."

The Europeans of Algeria, M. Bourges-Maunoury emphasized, were not "a handful of exploiters" but 1,500,000 ordinary people who had nothing in common with colonial magnates and whose departure, which was unthinkable in any case, would lead to an "unbelievable retrogression." If the right to independence meant the right to massacre, anarchy and misery, it could only be refused.

MUSLIMS IN FRANCE

Here, the Prime Minister reiterated the point that he made during the recent special powers debate, and that is now frequently heard among his close followers. Independence for Algeria, he said, would mean that the 350,000 Algerians who now had jobs in France by virtue of their French citizenship would lose those jobs to more skilled foreign labour, and thus be unable to support the two million Muslims in Algeria whom they helped to support now with the money they sent home.

There was no magic formula for Algeria, he declared. The answer lay in a state of coexistence and confident cooperation between the two communities, both in North Africa and in France, with the guarantee of permanent arbitration by the French Republic. The Government would be presenting to Parliament after the recess an "outline law" that would allow such a scheme to be carried out, and that would satisfy the desire of the local population to manage their own affairs democratically.

Asked about the recent contacts between a representative of the Quai d'Orsay and Algerian nationalist leaders in Tunis, M. Bourges-Maunoury said, somewhat cryptically, that there were permanent contacts with the Muslim population and that these contacts would continue.

FEDERATION PROPOSAL

The Prime Minister was also asked for his views on a proposal that M. Mendès-France is placing before the National Assembly, inviting the Government "to open negotiations with Morocco and Tunisia to study how best to settle all the conflicts and disputes that exist between France and the countries of North Africa, and to lay the foundations of a Franco-North African community."

M. Mendès-France urges the development of a federal structure in North Africa, so that all the countries can join in developing the resources of the Sahara. He states that a solution in North Africa—and this is presumably a reference to Algeria—cannot be imposed or decreed, but must be freely worked out between the nations concerned. Even if the political future of Algeria is still uncertain, it is not too soon, he says, to set her statute within a wider framework. He speaks of a "vast human community of a new type" which would set an example to the whole world and would give the Algerians new ground for trusting France and a new motive for rapprochement and conciliation.

DIFFERENCE IN STATUS

M. Mendès-France has also emphasized the difference in status between the French and the Algerians.

Name of Paper

The Times

File No.

25/2/11

Published at

London

Date

July 22 1957

Imperial and Foreign

SOCIALIST SPLIT
ON ALGERIA
WIDENSFRENCH "REBELS"
RESIGN

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, JULY 21

The vote of confidence in the National Assembly on Friday on the Government's special powers Bill has caused considerable upheaval among the "rebels"—those who do not agree with M. Lacoste's policy in Algeria—of the Socialist Party. In spite of the strong tradition within the party of loyalty and obedience to the party whip, and in spite of the party decision to vote for the Bill, nearly 20 deputies abstained because of their opposition to the Bill. M. Verdier, who is one of the rebels, has resigned his post as president of the parliamentary party, and M. Depreux, a former Minister, has resigned from the directing committee of the party.

BITTER FEELINGS

The split within the Socialist Party over Algeria has been apparent for some time, and was emphasized again by the recent Toulouse congress. Indeed Mr. Bevan, who was present at Toulouse, did not consider the rebels had their heart in their work, and was said to have urged them on to more spectacular resistance. But the French Socialists have their own way of doing things, and the resignations this week-end are none the less effective for having been held up for so long.

This is by no means the first time the party has been split into two, or even three, groups, but the bitterness of feeling which marks the two approaches to the Algerian question, and the immense distance which now separates the "Mollet Socialists" from the "rebels," may be gauged from a remark by the Socialist Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, M. Thomas, when he spoke on Friday at the funeral of a policeman who had been killed as he was trying to arrest an Algerian terrorist. "People will pass suitable judgment," M. Thomas said, "upon those parliamentarians who, by refusing the Government the means of breaking the bloody offensive of the assassins, are making themselves the accomplices of the latter."

TREATY RATIFICATION

This week should see, unless something entirely unexpected happens, the end of the process of ratifying the common market and Euratom treaties. The treaties are now before the Council of the Republic, the Upper House of the French parliament, where they are expected to get a comfortable majority.

They have, for all that, been subjected to some powerful criticism there: one senator from eastern France claimed that Germany would benefit the most from the common market treaty; and another—the influential president of the foreign affairs committee—described the Euratom treaty as a capitulation in which France would be handing over her research workers and their work for the benefit of Germany.



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *The Times*

File No. *25/2/11*

Published at *London*

Date *July 20 1957*

From
**ITALIAN ATTITUDE TO
FRANCE**

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

ROME, JULY 19

The Italian Government is showing signs of growing anxiety at the French handling of the situation in Algeria. This was indicated this morning by Signor Pella, the Foreign Minister, in a report to the Foreign affairs committee of the Senate.

He is understood to have said that the Italian aim in the past had been solidarity with the French on this problem. He did not wish to imply that this solidarity ought now to cease or that it ought to be maintained; he wished to make clear, however, that it would become closer and more effective the more France succeeded in moving away from colonialism.

Name of Paper

The Times

File No.

25/2/11

Published at

London

Date

July 11 1957

FRANCE UPHOLDS M. COTY

PLEDGE ON FUTURE OF ALGERIA

EFFECT ON MUSLIMS

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, JULY 10

Comment on a speech by a President of the Republic is naturally relatively restrained, and it is therefore not surprising that M. Coty's speech at Mulhouse yesterday, when he proclaimed French determination to retain Algeria, has had a good Press.

It is noticeable, however, that the more liberal sections of the Press concentrate on his reference to a "liberal and equitable solution," while elsewhere the emphasis is on the vigour of his language which, according to a Bordeaux newspaper, will make people forget "Senator Kennedy's vulgar outburst and Mr. Aneurin Bevan's malicious excesses, which dishonour the Labour Party."

A CERTAIN UNEASINESS

All commentators agree, however, that it was a major pronouncement which will be heard far beyond the borders of France. But private conversation with officials and others in Paris discloses some uneasiness. Some feel that pledges of a permanent nature tend to be dangerous and unfortunate, for before now such pledges have had to be set aside under the pressure of circumstances. The course of events might cause a categorical statement such as that made at Mulhouse by the head of the state to have embarrassing consequences one day.

On the other hand officers and others returning from Algeria are quick to emphasize that part of the difficulty of rallying the Muslim masses arises from the uncertainty that exists in their minds about French intentions; and, if this is true, M. Coty's speech may have a favourable effect.

The restraint that governs comment on speeches by the President does not extend to speeches by M. Lacoste, and there is a good deal of unfavourable comment going the rounds in Paris about the Resident Minister's speech in Algiers on Sunday, when he announced in vigorous and challenging terms his determination to remain at his post and to see that there was no Algerian independence and no federal solution for Algeria.

SETTLERS' HOSTILITY

Le Monde suggested next day that this speech might strengthen the intransigence of the settlers' hostility to any conciliatory solution.

M. Lacoste also condemned the idea of a Franco-North African community, on the ground that it would be nothing but a federal dream covering the reality of an independent Algeria. In any case M. Lacoste's views would seem to be somewhat at variance with the recent Socialist Party resolution which included an explicit reference to "a North African ensemble."

M. Lacoste's speech, and the prospect of the Government's being granted special powers to deal with Algerians in France, are causing misgivings in the M.R.P. and the minority in the Socialist Party. The special powers Bill will probably come before the Assembly later this week, and it seems probable that M. Bourges-Maunoury will have to "put the question of confidence" to push it through, though the Government's original proposals have now been toned down. This afternoon, however, the Socialist parliamentary group approved the new draft of the special powers Bill by a big majority.

F

A.B.C. NEWS SUMMARY. MONDAY 1st JULY, 1957.

12.40 P.M.

ASSIGNMENT FOR I.G.Y. SCIENTISTS

A major explosion on the sun's surface which interrupted radio communications and caused electrical storms in many countries has given scientists their first problem of the International Geophysical Year. More than 10,000 scientists throughout the world are taking part in activities connected with the I.G.Y. which officially came into being a little more than two hours ago.

Immediately the sunspots were observed scientists were alerted to study the effects of the eruptions. The sunspots were first noticed by scientists in Moscow.

U.N. NUCLEAR CONFERENCE NEXT YEAR

The U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld, announced today that he was calling a world conference of scientists to be held in Geneva next year to discuss the problem of developing hydrogen power for peaceful purposes. In addition, he said, the scientists would consider the future of nuclear energy for purposes other than for producing electricity. Progress in the use of isotopes for medicine and industry and the health and safety aspects of nuclear power would also be discussed.

Mr. Hammarskjöld said formal invitations had been sent to 88 governments, including all 81 members of the U.N. Conference officers would be appointed by him and each government would be asked to send five representatives plus their advisers. The conference would be held during the first two weeks of September next year. It would be the second nuclear power conference called by the U.N. The first was held in August, 1955.

FRENCH SOCIALIST VOTE ON ALGERIA

The Congress of the French Socialist Party yesterday reaffirmed its demand for indissoluble linking of France and Algeria. A resolution supported by the former French Premier M. Molle was overwhelmingly accepted by the Congress. It said that the link with Algeria was imperative for French and Algerian development because of the inter-penetration of the two economies and because Algeria was a natural gateway for France to the Sahara and Africa.

WOOL INCOME INCREASES BY £137 MILLION

The Commonwealth Statistician reported today that about £445 million worth of wool left Australia for other countries in the first 11 months of the financial year that ended yesterday. This exceeded the exports return of the corresponding period of the previous year by more than £137 million. Nearly £108 million worth of wool went to Australia's best customer, the United Kingdom. Nearly £99 million worth went to Japan. The new Australian wool season officially opens today. Spokesmen for the industry say that world demand for wool is likely to expand and that another record wool cheque will depend only upon production.

*Avec les compliments
de l'Ambassade de France*

76
→ Mr
Cooper
25/2/11.

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION

972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700

French Affairs - No. 47

June 3, 1957

PRESIDENT COTY'S MESSAGE TO THE WORLD

ON THE ALGERIAN MASSACRE OF MAY 31, 1957

Full text of the message broadcast by M. René Coty, President of the Republic of France, on the night of May 31-June 1, 1957, immediately following reports of the slaughtering by the rebels of the entire male population in the village of Melouza-Kasbah, south of Algiers.

"There is not a single Frenchman, there is not a man with a heart in the world who was not overwhelmed with pity and horror on learning of the massive atrocities which, in a few hours, have just taken the lives of several hundred of our Moslem compatriots in Algeria.

"These abominations are not merely the work of a few bandits. The killers continue to execute the orders of their leaders -- the same leaders who, even yesterday over a foreign radio station, gloried and prided themselves on having ordered the treacherous assassination in Paris of one more Moslem, guilty only of loving France, as they have already been responsible for the assassination of 5,000 defenseless Moslems, men and women, old people and children.

"I appeal to all civilized peoples and I ask them if they do not feel that the time has come for them to show that they will refuse to listen to the agitators and the agents of this horrible terrorism, which tramples on all the laws of God and man in contempt of the universal conscience.

"As for us, in paying homage to the memory of our Algerian brothers, we will find a way, I am sure, of giving all the help within our power, along with our deepest sympathy, to their grief-stricken families.

"And now, confronted by those who, by terrorism, are engaged in sowing agitation and confusion in people's minds, I call once again for that cool-headedness which is the first form of courage.

"To the families of Melouza who hastened to place themselves under our protection, as to all our Moslem compatriots of Algeria, I give the solemn assurance that France which wants to guarantee them security and justice, will never abandon them."

Actualités d'Afrique Noire

MENSUEL — MARS 1957 — N° 3
Prix : 60 francs — Abonnement d'un an : 600 francs
FIG. 64-72 — C.C.P. 13.246-20
Editions S.E.B.O.M., 56, rue Saint-Lazare, Paris (9°)

Éditorial

ARTISANS DU BONHEUR AFRICAIN AU TRAVAIL...

L'indépendance est-elle une garantie de liberté ?

LES Nationalismes contemporains présentent généralement la particularité d'être nés et de se développer sans que, semble-t-il, leurs promoteurs aient tenu compte des réalités du moment, et notamment des réalités économiques. Plusieurs leaders semblent méconnaître les difficultés politiques (qui ne sont pourtant pas minces, lorsqu'on songe à l'U.R.S.S., ou au pan-arabisme). Beaucoup croiraient-on, méprisent les conditions économiques qui sont cependant défavorables, pour se laisser prendre au mirage d'une gloire hypothétique. Cette gloire consisterait pour eux à se trouver placés demain aux leviers de commande des mécanismes compliqués qu'implique le fonctionnement d'un Etat indépendant moderne.

Peu importe que l'indépendance envisagée doive entraîner inéluctablement une régression spectaculaire dans tous les domaines, les plus évolués comptent sur la bienveillante sympathie de nombreux Européens ou Américains, qui pour en avoir usé avec bonheur autrefois, se trouvent aujourd'hui engagés à respecter « le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes ».

Actuellement la prise de conscience nationale chez les élites africaines et l'aspiration vers l'indépendance — ou si l'on veut vers « plus d'indépendance » — sont des sentiments à la mode. Ces sentiments ont été provoqués ou exacerbés par divers facteurs : l'émancipation récente du Togo devenu république autonome, la propagande pan-arabe des étudiants musulmans qui reviennent endoctrinés de la faculté égyptienne d'El Azar ; les prises de position de l'O.N.U. ; enfin tout récemment, l'accession de la Gold-Coast à l'indépendance : le Docteur Nkrumah, président du nouvel Etat de GHANA, jouit en effet d'un prestige considérable sur un certain nombre d'hommes politiques de l'Afrique Noire française, qui ne dédaigneraient pas de jouer au besoin les « interlocuteurs valables ».



M. Mitterrand, Garde des Sceaux, représentait la France aux Fêtes de l'Indépendance de Ghana. On le voit ici avec le Président Nkrumah

L'INDEPENDANCE DE GHANA

On sait que le 6 mars, le Ghana devenait officiellement le 93^e Etat indépendant du monde. Quoi qu'il fasse partie du Commonwealth britannique, les observateurs étrangers n'ont pas manqué de remarquer déjà les signes précurseurs d'une rivalité certaine entre les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne, en ce qui concerne l'influence occidentale au Ghana. De son côté Nkrumah n'a pas manqué de souligner « la fin de la domination étrangère et de l'impérialisme », pour inviter ses frères africains à « se libérer » également. M. Balafrej, ministre marocain des Affaires étrangères a d'ailleurs exprimé sa conviction que l'exemple du Ghana pouvait être effectivement un instrument de libération pour les autres peuples dépendant de l'Afrique Noire.

Evidemment, comme l'a dit M. Houphouët-Boigny, à Abidjan, « l'indépendance absolue d'un territoire hier encore sous tutelle britannique » est très différente de la « gestion autonome de leurs propres affaires dans le cadre de l'Union française par les territoires africains de culture française... ».

LA METHODE FRANCAISE

Interrogé également sur les raisons profondes qui ont incité la France à choisir pour l'Afrique Noire française un mode d'évolution autre que l'indépendance totale et immédiate concédée par la Grande-Bretagne au Ghana, le Ministre de la France d'Outre-Mer, M. Defferre, a récemment déclaré à notre confrère « L'Express » (1).

« L'indépendance totale et immédiate pose pour l'Afrique Noire des problèmes qu'il faut aborder sans préjugés colonialistes, mais aussi sans fausse honte, et en toute franchise. »

(Suite page 16)

(1) N° du 22 mars 1957.

TROIS GRANDS MOUVEMENTS POLITIQUES EN 1957

A propos de la loi cadre...

A la veille des élections des Conseillers aux Assemblées Territoriales dont doivent sortir les Conseils de Gouvernement de l'Afrique Noire Française, il paraissait indispensable d'exposer au lecteur une synthèse des questions concernant la Loi - Cadre. Mais, « Actualités d'Afrique Noire » a estimé qu'il fallait d'abord, en toute logique, faire le point de la situation politique telle qu'elle se présentait en Afrique avant ces élections.

N'oublions pas non plus que la façon dont les décrets d'application de la Loi-Cadre ont été discutés par l'Assemblée Nationale et la nature des amendements intervenus sont, en grande partie, fonction de l'attitude adoptée par les leaders politiques africains au cours des congrès de janvier et février 1957.

D'autre part, les textes d'application de la Loi-Cadre — qui ont suscité au début de février de très abondants commentaires dans la presse — ne sont pas encore définitifs. Bien qu'arrêtés dans leurs grandes lignes et dans l'essentiel de leurs détails, ces textes font actuellement la navette entre l'Assemblée Nationale et le Conseil de la République... Le mécanisme est lent, mais sûr...

Nous consacrerons l'essentiel de notre prochain bulletin à cette Loi-Cadre auquel le Ministre de la F.O.M., M. Defferre a définitivement attaché son nom.

« Les Africains ne sont pas divisés, voyez-les au village. Ce sont les hommes politiques qui les divisent par le mensonge, la surenchère et la démagogie. A cette étape décisive de notre histoire, il faut que chacun descende en lui-même pour y réveiller l'Africain authentique, non composé, franc et loyal. N'est-ce pas là une condition pour s'affronter sans complexe et se regrouper sans autre ambition que d'aider les plus aptes aux plus hautes responsabilités ? »

Ce n'est pas nous qui le disons. C'est Ouezzin Coulibaly, député de Côte d'Ivoire, secrétaire général du R.D.A., qui l'a affirmé à Dakar au nom de la délégation R.D.A., lors du congrès du regroupement des partis Africains dont devait sortir la « Convention Africaine » (1).

Cette affirmation courageuse a-t-elle frappé le public à un moment où se tenaient simultanément d'autres congrès : celui du Mouvement Socialiste Africain (M.S.A.) à Conakry, et la conférence intersyndicale de Cotonou dont les leitmotiv étaient parallèles à ceux des congrès proprement politique : à savoir : le regroupement des forces éparpillées et la scission d'avec la Métropole ? Ce n'est pas sûr. Quoi qu'il en soit, à la veille des élections territoriales du 31 mars dont doivent sortir ces assemblées qui fourniront les prochains conseils de gouvernement prévus par la Loi-Cadre, les électeurs ont le choix, outre les partis spécifiquement locaux ne se réclamant pas encore d'un parrainage quelconque, entre trois grands mouvements : le R.D.A., la Convention Africaine et le M.S.A.

L'opinion publique africaine va être ainsi sollicitée par trois formations de constitution semblable à tendance « générale », au moment même où l'autonomie interne accordée aux territoires va provoquer un morcellement de l'action politique.

Cela implique que les élites ont le sentiment que « l'Afrique bouge » et qu'elle est avide — du moins à en croire l'activité de ses élus — de voir confier les leviers de commande à ses leaders politiques.

Entraînée dans ce mouvement qui anime les peuples dépendants à la recherche du droit de disposer d'eux-mêmes, l'Afrique noire qui possède sur le plan de la politique, des dispositions naturelles indiscutables, est ainsi organisée en partis plus ou moins puissants.

Ces partis qui cherchent à fusionner et, comme le dit Ouezzin Coulibaly, à « aider les plus aptes aux plus hautes responsabilités », ont eu conscience de la nécessité d'une meilleure organisation. Ils ont estimé que dans leur intérêt, et dans l'intérêt de leurs leaders, il convenait de prendre position à l'égard de la loi-cadre. Points de vue sincères ? Démagogie ? C'est ce que nous essaierons de rechercher au cours de l'étude qui va suivre.

(1) M. Ouezzin Coulibaly n'assistait au congrès de Dakar qu'en qualité d'observateur.

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L'éparpillement de leurs organisations a été longtemps caractéristique essentiellement des mouvements syndicaux et

Mais, en janvier 1957, se tenaient internationaux, mouvements de propagande doctrinaires, les principaux leaders estimèrent se tenir à Dakar et à Cotonou. Leur importance, que se tenait à Cotonou Les uns et les autres visaient à une réorganisation générale à cette sorte d'anarchie de même conscience.

Regroupement pour les autres sont les tenants de ces congrès. Mais buts essentiels ? C'est à la fois contraire que les assises de Dakar ou celles des social plûtôt l'échec des tentatives dans le sens du regroupement des africains.

En tout cas ces congrès politiques qui envisagent des jours apparemment o

— Le Mouvement Social nakry rejette la conception comme « une porte ouverte

— La « Convention Africaine » est essentiellement a des partis africains...

On pourrait se demander si la « Convention Africaine » ne doit pas être le R.D.A., (Rassemblement la tendance essentielle sem son titre. Les leaders de l comme ceux du Mouvement — semblent bien, en dépit sions de foi habiles, décidés les uns contre les autres, en son compte, à l'expansion

Que la similitude des projets de ces mouvements une thèse commune minimale importants, tels que la gaise ou la nature de la pro territoires, il ne faut pas des cas, les détails d'ordre l Que peuvent y faire les form leurs promoteurs à l'univers

REGROUPEMENT ET RÉORGANISATION

L n'y a pas très longtemps encore les formations politiques de l'Afrique Noire — comme les formations syndicales — apparaissaient, vues dans leur ensemble, comme des forces éparpillées, plus ou moins efficaces aux mains des élites locales qui leur avaient donné naissance. Donés parfois de plus d'ambition que d'idées claires, les leaders locaux ont semblé très longtemps n'avoir d'autres buts que la réussite de projets immédiats, tels que la représentation de la défense d'intérêts régionaux limités, rarement envisagés en fonction d'un ensemble politique ou même géographique.

L'éparpillement de leurs forces, l'anarchie des diverses organisations a été longtemps, pourrait-on dire, une des caractéristiques essentielles des partis politiques et des mouvements syndicaux en Afrique Noire.

Mais, en janvier 1957, sous la pression peut-être des événements internationaux, et sous l'influence des mouvements de propagande doctrinale en face desquels les principaux leaders estimèrent nécessaire de prendre position, se tinrent à Dakar et à Conakry deux grands congrès politiques. Leur importance paraît décisive. A la même époque se tenait à Cotonou une conférence intersyndicale. Les uns et les autres visaient au regroupement des forces et à une réorganisation générale, afin de mettre un terme à cette sorte d'anarchie dont les militants avaient tout de même conscience.

Regroupement pour les uns, réorganisation générale pour les autres sont les tendances avouées des organisateurs de ces congrès. Mais ont-ils vraiment atteint leurs buts essentiels ? C'est à voir... Quelques-uns pensent au contraire que les assises des Indépendants d'Outre-Mer à Dakar ou celles des socialistes à Conakry, consacraient plutôt l'échec des tentatives diverses effectuées depuis un an dans le sens du regroupement des mouvements politiques africains.

En tout cas ces congrès ont permis de définir deux thèmes politiques qui envisagent les problèmes africains sous des jours apparemment opposés :

— Le Mouvement Socialiste Africain (M.S.A.) né à Conakry rejette la conception du « Parti unique » considéré comme « une porte ouverte au fascisme ».

— La « Convention Africaine », née à Dakar, vise au contraire essentiellement au regroupement et à la fusion des partis africains...

On pourrait se demander à première vue si cette « Convention Africaine » ne doit pas faire double emploi avec le R.D.A., (Rassemblement démocratique africain), dont la tendance essentielle semble précisément contenue dans son titre. Les leaders de la « Convention Africaine » — comme ceux du Mouvement Socialiste Africain, d'ailleurs — semblent bien, en dépit des apparences et des professions de foi habiles, décidés en fait d'abord à s'organiser les uns contre les autres, ensuite à s'opposer, chacun pour son compte, à l'expansion du R.D.A...

Que la similitude des programmes ne trompe pas trop : si chacun de ces mouvements semblerait pouvoir adopter une thèse commune minima à l'égard de certains problèmes importants, tels que la constitution de l'Union française ou la nature de la prochaine autonomie interne des territoires, il ne faut pas oublier que, dans la majorité des cas, les détails d'ordre local compteront avant tout... Que peuvent y faire les formations en question vouées par leurs promoteurs à l'universalisme ? Elles constituent des

mouvements plutôt que des partis politiques proprement dits. Il n'est pas interdit de penser que ce sont les diverses sections locales qui constitueront en fait les véritables partis politiques...

La rivalité Senghor-Houphouët

Pour l'instant, par exemple, M. Senghor, leader du Bloc Populaire Sénégalais, (qui est section de la nouvelle « Convention Africaine ») ne semble pas du tout prêt, à titre individuel, à vouloir fusionner avec le R.D.A. que patronne M. Houphouët-Boigny, actuellement ministre délégué à la Présidence du Conseil du gouvernement socialiste Guy Mollet.

Quel intérêt y trouverait-il d'ailleurs, maintenant ? La participation effective du groupe R.D.A. à l'actuel gouvernement l'oblige à tempérer sa propre propagande ; tandis que les adversaires — ou plus exactement les rivaux — du R.D.A. peuvent s'engager sans sourciller dans la voie des surenchères démagogiques. Pourquoi, surtout à la veille des élections territoriales, iraient-ils s'allier à un parti qu'ils rêvent de « doubler », mais qui est puissant — et gouvernemental, pour l'instant — ce qui les obligerait à réfréner leurs ardeurs, en matière de campagne électorale ?

D'ailleurs même si, comme nous le verrons plus loin, plusieurs terrains d'entente paraissent possibles, notamment entre ces deux grands mouvements que sont le R.D.A. et la « Convention Africaine », il ne faut pas perdre de vue le rôle personnel qu'entendent jouer leurs leaders. Leurs personnalités sont bien distinctes.

Il existe donc entre le R.D.A. et la « Convention Africaine » une rivalité certaine : celle qui oppose M. Senghor à M. Houphouët, et qui oppose du même coup le Sénégal, vieux pays aux traditions démocratiques déjà anciennes, à la Côte d'Ivoire, territoire riche de la fédération d'A.O.F., jeune et en plein essor. La rivalité du Sénégal avec la Côte d'Ivoire n'est d'ailleurs qu'un exemple. En réalité, les Sénégalais ont toujours manifesté une certaine tendance pour ce qu'on a quelque scrupule à appeler « paternalisme » : un paternalisme politique — au moins — à l'égard des originaires des autres territoires... Tout cela est assez complexe, mais pour comprendre un peu l'essence de cette rivalité, il faut considérer que le fédéralisme est cher à Senghor, et que Dakar, capitale fédérale, se trouve au Sénégal.

Il faut considérer que, dans la vie d'une fédération, tous les territoires fédérés contribuent financièrement, dans la mesure de leurs moyens, au fonctionnement des services fédéraux. Le Sénégal, par prédestination géographique — et historique — entend être le « territoire-pilote », même si sa part contributive au budget fédéral n'est pas la plus importante. La Côte d'Ivoire au contraire se passerait volontiers d'être intégrée à un système fédéral quel qu'il soit : ses moyens économiques le lui permettent. Elle a conscience de faire vivre, dans la proportion des 4/5 l'ensemble de l'A.O.F.. Elle en tirerait volontiers argument pour assurer justement ce rôle de territoire-pilote...

Enfin, à part cela, dans la mesure où les dirigeants ont encore plus d'importance que leurs troupes, il y a peut-être la rivalité naturelle qui oppose l'universitaire au Tri-bun ; le philosophe-poète, apôtre occidentaliste d'un grand

mouvement pan-nègre, au chef coutumier, réaliste ayant bien les pieds sur terre...
Cette digression sur l'existence parallèle de deux mouvements prétendant l'un et l'autre au regroupement poli-

tique des masses africaines n'est intervenu que pour souligner la présence en Afrique des trois grands partis : R.D.A., - Convention Africaine - et M.S.A.; ces deux derniers étant nés en janvier 1957 à Dakar et à Conakry.

LE RASSEMBLEMENT DÉMOCRATIQUE AFRICAIN

A tout seigneur, tout honneur :
Le Rassemblement Démocratique Africain est à l'heure actuelle le plus important numériquement, c'est du moins ce

qui ressort des apparentements de petits partis locaux : la plupart de ceux qui ont triomphé lors des élections municipales, en novembre 1956, se réclament de l'appartenance au R.D.A.

que même en 1952, il n'était pas impossible de rêver déjà d'une alliance entre ces deux grands partis!

Quoiqu'il en soit, après des fortunes diverses (2) le R.D.A. a su canaliser les diverses tendances de territoires aussi opposés, géographiquement, climatiquement, ethniquement, que le Tchad et la Basse-Côte d'Ivoire.

Comptant actuellement une dizaine de députés, le R.D.A., sous la conduite d'Houphouët-Boigny, ministre délégué à la Présidence du Conseil, et Ouezzin Coulibaly, secrétaire général, vient de réintégrer, dans un souci d'unification, un de ses anciens leaders, M. Gabriel d'Arboussier (ce dernier avait été écarté du parti dès 1950, en raison de ses tendances progressistes compromettantes).

On sait que depuis le R.D.A. a évolué vers le centre, reniant l'appareillement communiste, pour se rattacher politiquement à l'U.D.S.R.

Organisation et orientation

D'ailleurs, le R.D.A. est sans doute, de loin, le mieux organisé avec ses services de presse, de relations publiques, ses sections de porte-à-porte, etc. Dans ce pays où le « papier officiel » est roi, où le « cachet » administratif ou non semble doué de vertus quasi magiques, le R.D.A. a su recourir à des procédés para-administratifs de recrutement, dont les résultats sont spectaculaires.

Ainsi, par exemple, en plusieurs régions de Côte d'Ivoire, il y a quelques années, il était pratiquement très difficile de rien faire, dans la vie courante, sans présenter à tout bout de champ, la carte du parti.

Les sections locales avaient su miser en outre sur l'influence et le rôle des femmes : celles-ci aveuglément dévouées à « Fofouët », qui est demeuré à leurs yeux le champion de la liberté et de la suppression du travail forcé (1) exigeaient la présentation de la carte R.D.A. en maintes circonstances.

D'ailleurs dans les secteurs où existaient des partis concurrents (le parti S.F.I.O., notamment, en pays Bété, du temps où Socialistes et R.D.A. étaient d'irréductibles adversaires),

(1) Il est à remarquer que tous les grands leaders politiques doivent aux réformes spontanées de la République notamment celles de 1946, l'essentiel de leur popularité à leurs débuts : ils venaient à peine de devenir députés, portés au pouvoir par un collège électoral restreint encore très mal éduqué politiquement, que les électeurs mettaient volontiers à leur compte les moindres réformes — et les plus grandes — que l'Administration élaborait et commençait à mettre en place, bien avant les élections. C'est un fait que des personnages comme Douala Bell ou Houphouët doivent leur succès au départ à la suppression du travail forcé, à la hausse des cours des produits, au rehaussement des salaires intervenu en application des nouvelles lois sociales, etc...

les gens qui n'avaient pas d'idées bien arrêtées ou très exclusives en faveur du R.D.A., payaient leurs cotisations aux deux partis concurrents.

Combien n'avons-nous pas vu de ces braves villageois dérouler leur coin de pagne pour en extraire, au milieu d'un ensemble hétéroclite de chiques de tabac, d'amulettes, de pièces de monnaie, de lames de rasoir, et de tickets d'impôt, la carte rouge R.D.A. et la carte S.F.I.O. aux trois flèches, soigneusement pliées en 4 ou en 8.

... Ce qui prouve bien, n'est-ce pas,

La « surface » du R.D.A.



M. Houphouët-Boigny

Le grand fief du parti R.D.A. demeure, bien entendu, la CÔTE D'IVOIRE, dont les leaders, Houphouët Boigny et Ouezzin Coulibaly siègent au Parlement.

Mais ailleurs, l'influence R.D.A. est allée s'accroissant, sous l'impulsion de fortes personnalités.

AU TCHAD, notamment, Gabriel Lisette, noir antillais, administrateur de la F.O.M., député-maire de Fort-Lamy, a su grouper autour de lui la plupart des partis qui constituaient l'opposition, pour les ranger sous la bannière du R.D.A.

EN GUINÉE, Sekou Touré, Maire de Conakry, fondateur d'une centrale syndicale se réclamant de la doctrine R.D.A., est regardé comme le principal élément de gauche au sein du parti. Diallo Saïfoulaye, maire de Mamou, également en Guinée, a réussi à l'em-

porter sur les chefs traditionnels du Fouta-Djallon.

AU SOUDAN, la section locale R.D.A. sous le nom de « D'union soudanaise » compte deux députés sur les quatre du territoire.

EN HAUTE-VOLTA la section locale a pris le nom de « Parti Démocratique Unifié », après avoir absorbé le « Parti Social pour l'Éducation des Masses Africaines ».

Cette absorption s'appelle d'ailleurs officiellement « fusion ». Et les fusions, dans les divers territoires sont multiples.

AU DAHOMEY, c'est par exemple l'U.D.D. (Union démocratique Dahoméenne), l'adversaire permanent du député Apithy. Son leader, Adandé, catalogué R.D.A., participait au congrès constitutif de la « Convention Africaine » à Dakar... en même temps que M. Maga, député du Dahomey, qui a été élu contre les listes R.D.A. locales...

AU SENEGAL, la section locale du R.D.A. a constitué d'abord « l'Union Démocratique Sénégalaise », pour devenir aujourd'hui le « Mouvement Populaire Sénégalais » (M.P.S.)

(2) Voir l'article d'Yves Claisse dans « Actualités d'Afrique Noire » n° 2 (février) page 14.

Ce dernier parti a envahissement avec le Bloc Populaire négalais (B.P.S.) de M. — qui est lui-même un issu de la « Convention ne ».

AU CAMEROUN, la cale du R.D.A. n'était à gine (1948) que l'U.P.C. Populations du Cameroun.

Le congrès inter- regroupement africains réuni décidé de créer un no fédéral, qui prendra nation de Convention

Les partis locaux leur appellation propre adhèrent au nouveau ils devront y ajouter

Le point

L'unité africaine

« Le premier but que teurs ont voulu donner est un but précisément caine, d'unité dans la territoires. Le problème grave actualité au moment crets d'application de veulent balkaniser l'Afrique. Comme si, avant la franco-africaine, que nous dions pas, il n'y avait d'humanité africaine! Il faut, en d'autres circons nous étions des Martiens, de constater que les crets maintiennent bien tés politique, administrative et culturelle entre les te O.F. et d'A.E.F., mais ex Hauts-Commissaires et la métropole, non par d'Afrique Noire à leur La communauté africaine motion des fédérations d re exigent que les territoires maintenant et renforçant nomies locales, et ceci pas cela, unissent leurs sur le double plan du te l'Afrique Noire. Ces fois savez, ce sont les syndic vailleurs, surtout les parti C'est le second but de c

Un congrès interte

« Ce Congrès n'est pas des indépendants d'Outre

Ce dernier parti a envisagé de fusionner avec le Bloc Populaire Sénégalais (B.P.S.) de M. Senghor, — qui est lui-même un parti local issu de la « Convention Africaine ».

AU CAMEROUN, la section locale du R.D.A. n'était autre, à l'origine (1948) que l'U.P.C., l'Union des Populations du Cameroun, dont le

leader Um Nyobé, exclu en 1955, est actuellement en fuite, depuis que son mouvement — légalement dissous — est entré en lutte ouverte avec l'Administration.

Comme on le voit, le pavillon R.D.A. couvre ou a couvert en réalité des marchandises assez diverses. La liberté de fusion des sections locales a été une nécessité tactique, sans dou-

te. Mais si de l'extérieur, le Parti du R.D.A. semble bien un parti unique, il est difficile de ne pas admettre que, pour les militants locaux, c'est la section — fusionnée, remaniée, rebaptisée — qui demeure « le parti politique ». L'étiquette R.D.A. est quelque chose alors comme une doctrine, une toile de fond — qui, à l'échelon fédéral, apparaîtrait dès lors plutôt comme un syndicat de partis...

LA CONVENTION AFRICAINE

Le congrès inter-territorial de regroupement des partis africains réuni à Dakar a décidé de créer un nouveau parti fédéral, qui prendra la dénomination de *Convention africaine*.

Les partis locaux conserveront leur appellation propre, mais s'ils adhèrent au nouveau mouvement ils devront y ajouter la mention :

Le point de vue du leader

L'unité africaine

« Le premier but que ses organisateurs ont voulu donner à ce Congrès est un but précisément d'unité africaine, d'unité dans la diversité des territoires. Le problème est d'une grave actualité au moment où les décrets d'application de la loi-cadre veulent balkaniser l'Afrique Noire. Comme si, avant la communauté franco-africaine, que nous ne répudions pas, il n'y avait d'abord la communauté africaine ! Il serait amusant, en d'autres circonstances, si nous étions des Martiens, par exemple, de constater que les fameux décrets maintiennent bien des solidarités politiques, administratives, sociales et culturelles entre les territoires d'A.O.F. et d'A.E.F., mais exercées par les Hauts-Commissaires et au profit de la métropole, non par les peuples d'Afrique Noire à leur profit.

La communauté africaine, la promotion des fédérations d'Afrique Noire exigent que les territoires, tout en maintenant et renforçant leurs autonomies locales, et ceci ne contredit pas cela, unissent leurs forces vives sur le double plan du territoire et de l'Afrique Noire. Ces forces, vous le savez, ce sont les syndicats des travailleurs, surtout les partis politiques. C'est le second but de ce Congrès. »

Un congrès interterritorial

« Ce Congrès n'est pas un congrès des indépendants d'Outre-Mer, affir-

section territoriale de la Convention africaine.

Comment résumer les travaux de ce congrès ? De quelle façon définir la politique nouvelle qui en est sorti ?

Laissons d'abord à M. Leopold Senghor, député du Sénégal, véritable leader du mouvement, le soin de nous expliquer lui-même ce dont il s'agit :

me M. Senghor, mais un congrès interterritorial de regroupement des partis africains. Pourquoi, nous demandera-t-on, l'unité dans la diversité et pourquoi le regroupement des partis politiques d'Afrique Noire ? Vous devinez la réponse. La politique est définie comme l'art de gouverner la Cité, l'art de rendre les hommes heureux, plus précisément l'art de rendre les hommes plus hommes. Mais rendre les hommes plus hommes et même rendre les hommes plus heureux exige qu'ils soient rendus à eux-mêmes, et d'abord à leur liberté. Toute politique digne de ce nom doit donc poser, comme condition préalable, aux hommes et aux peuples, « la liberté de s'administrer eux-mêmes et de gérer démocratiquement leurs propres affaires ». Ce préalable signifie l'accession à l'autonomie politique et le droit à l'auto-détermination dans les meilleurs délais.

Autonomie de la pensée negro-africaine

Mais comment exercer une autonomie politique et une auto-détermination sans autonomie de la pensée negro-africaine ? On a trop négligé cet aspect du problème pour que je n'y insiste pas. Loin de moi l'idée que nous puissions nous enfermer dans une autarcie intellectuelle qui ne pourrait engendrer que stérilité, en tout cas que stagnation. Nous avons beaucoup à apprendre de l'Europe,

sans parler de l'Asie, sur le plan de la pensée et de l'action politique. Il ne saurait être question de proscrire « toute idéologie métropolitaine » comme on le dit vulgairement. Il s'agit plutôt, pour nous, d'assimiler les idéologies métropolitaines — non d'être assimilés — pour n'en retenir que les éléments féconds. Il s'agit, pour prendre un exemple pertinent, non pas de réciter le catéchisme socialiste — et je prends l'épithète dans son sens premier — à l'usage du Français moyen, mais, remontant aux sources, de repenser le socialisme par des cerveaux negro-africains et à la lumière des réalités negro-africaines du XX^e siècle, hic et nunc. »

Une entreprise difficile

M. Senghor a conscience qu'une telle entreprise n'est pas facile : « Je ne cacherai pas la difficulté de notre entreprise. Nous sommes une Assemblée de pauvres, et nous n'avons pas les faveurs de l'Administration, encore moins du gouvernement. Nous avons organisé notre Congrès tout seuls, sans l'aide d'aucun parti métropolitain, avec nos mains nues d'hommes. Ici, il n'y a point d'état-major métropolitain pour nous souffler ce que nous devons penser et dire. Le contraire eût été inquiétant. Mais c'est une raison d'espérer si j'en juge par l'essor prodigieux de mon propre parti sénégalais, créé pourtant dans les pires difficultés financières et administratives. Notre richesse sera à la mesure des aspirations populaires que nous saurons traduire ; notre richesse, c'est notre pauvreté et la haine que nous vouent les colonialistes ; notre richesse, c'est l'espoir que suscite ce Congrès dans les masses populaires d'Afrique Noire. »

Aussi, conclut-il en affirmant qu'il ne faut pas tomber dans l'erreur de constituer un parti fermé : « Au contraire, dit-il, ouvrons-le, ce nouveau parti, sur l'avenir. Veillons à mettre, dans nos statuts, une clause qui disposera que notre parti se sabordera, lorsque les deux grands autres partis

africains, R.D.A. et M.S.A., acceptent enfin de constituer, avec nous, un seul grand parti africain.

« Il n'y aura pas de riz en herbe, donc pas de moisson, si le grain n'est

d'abord enjoui dans la terre et ne pourrit ; il n'y aura pas d'unité africaine ni de conquête de notre autonomie, de notre auto-détermination, si le grain ne meurt ».

La convention africaine sera-t-elle un parti de masse ?

Ce discours de M. Senghor paraît bien un peu ambitieux. Certes, le nouveau parti a quelques chances d'attirer à lui une fraction notable de la jeunesse intellectuelle et syndicale, séduite par la netteté de ses intentions, alors qu'elle aurait tendance à reprocher au M.S.A. (Mouvement Socialiste Africain) un programme insuffisamment précis et une association trop étroite à la S.F.I.O.

Mais, en dehors de ce que la nouvelle formation demeure essentiellement un regroupement des élus indépendants d'Outre-Mer, laissant la vedette à la section locale dite « Bloc populaire Sénégalais », la Convention Africaine peut-elle vraiment prétendre devenir, à l'instar du R.D.A., un véritable parti de masse ?

Sans doute certaines déclarations de M. Mamadou Dia, qui réclama la révision du titre VIII de la Constitution et se prononça pour un système fédéral sur le modèle du Commonwealth, étaient bien faites pour séduire les masses :

« Ce qu'attendent les territoires d'Outre-Mer, dit-il c'est — étant réservé leur droit à l'indépendance — la possibilité de jouir dans l'immédiat d'une autonomie interne la plus large possible. »

Il est moins sûr que M. Mamadou Dia ait été unanimement suivi lorsque, dans son rapport de politique économique, il a réclamé une économie socialiste avec une « organisation collectiviste des moyens de production ». Le public n'a pu avoir non plus de réactions très précises lorsqu'à propos du *Marché commun*, Mamadou Dia déclara : « Il n'y aura de *Marché commun* sans dupe que dans la perspective d'une économie socialiste où la solidarité jouera réellement en faveur des pays déshérités. »

En somme, MM. Senghor et Mamadou Dia ont fait beaucoup d'efforts

pour convaincre les masses — et il n'est pas douteux qu'au Sénégal, lors des élections du 31 mars, ces efforts n'aient pas été inutiles. Mais, finalement, en dépit des arguments brillants qu'ils ont déployés et que peut apprécier à leur juste valeur une catégorie restreinte d'intellectuels, on se demande si la masse — c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des gens de la brousse — ne conservera pas pour quelques temps encore ses préférences pour les partis locaux et les programmes limités mais concrets, ne se laissant subjuger au besoin que par des étiquettes déjà prestigieuses, comme celle du R.D.A., ou bien laissant à leurs élus le soin de se regrouper si bon leur chante sous la bannière de la Convention Africaine...

Il faut considérer, comme nous le disions au début de cette étude, que la nouvelle formation apparaît davantage comme un « Mouvement » que comme un « parti politique » proprement dit, bien que ses instigateurs l'aient désignée comme un « parti de masse ». Si ce congrès est bien dû à l'initiative des Indépendants d'Outre-Mer, on ne peut négliger que jusqu'alors les I.O.M. étaient considérés comme un groupe parlementaire plutôt que comme un mouvement de masse. Les militants R.D.A., en dépit des déclarations de leurs propres observateurs, à ce congrès, volent volontiers dans la « Convention Africaine », préconisant le « parti unique », une concurrence inutile au Rassemblement Démocratique Africain. C'est ce que nous avons déjà souligné plus haut. Les militants socialistes du M.S.A. (Mouvement Socialiste Africain), de leur côté, déplorent précisément cette tendance à l'unicité, encore que M. Lamine Gueye, leader du M.S.A., se soit défendu d'avoir voulu ériger en principe son opposition au système du parti unique. (En sens inverse, il convient d'ailleurs de remarquer que, de leur côté, certains partisans d'un mouvement unique, adhérents à la « Convention Africaine », ont fait campagne pour le régime électoral de la *représentation proportionnelle* : ce qui suppose une représentation de toutes les nuances de l'opinion, de la majorité à l'opposition.)

Les personnalités



L.-S. Senghor



Mamadou Dia



M. Maga



Jean Aubame

de la conven

Mais revenons à la « C. Africaine » qui se définit beaucoup de partis en Afrique, par la personnalité des leaders que par les masses auxquelles elle s'appuie.

A vrai dire, le seul parti de masse adhérent à la C. Africaine qui soit véritablement celui du B.L. LAIRE SENEGALAIS dont le chef est M. Lamine Gueye, député de Dakar, agrégé, membre du P.S.F.

Le B.P.S. a d'ailleurs assises, au cours du mois de janvier 1957 : nous examinons ses positions afin de permettre de définir, concret, le contenu et les conséquences de la doctrine de la création de la Convention Africaine.

En dehors de ce par l'audience débordante d'élus qui peu les frontières de la Convention Africaine prend d'autres personnes ou plus exactement des personnalités locales souvent qu'en fonction de leurs positions : ces personnes sont parfois assez nombreuses à voir rassemblées sous la bannière... Citons par exemple MOYEN CONGO, l'abbé Youlou (1), maire de Cayenne, vainqueur du député caya, qu'il attaqua dans son évêché, l'abbé Y.

(1) L'abbé Youlou : en personne au congrès, avait délégué deux r

LE BLO

Quoi qu'il en soit, la « C. Africaine » n'était qu'un acte de la parole et les actes désormais laissés aux sections. La section du Sénégal a la vedette : le B.L. LAIRE SENEGALAIS en effet a ses, fin février 1957, à Dakar, y a laché, au nouveau congrès, quelques personnes qui ont fait couler pas. Doit-on rappeler que : « Le Bloc populaire S

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Imprimerie du « Courrier du Commerce »
60, rue René-Boulanger - Paris-10*

de la convention africaine

Mais revenons à la « Convention Africaine » qui se définit, comme beaucoup de partis en Afrique, davantage par la personnalité de ses leaders que par les masses sur lesquelles elle s'appuie.

A vrai dire, le seul mouvement de masse adhérent à la Convention Africaine qui soit vraiment important est celui du BLOC POPULAIRE SÉNÉGALAIS (B. P. S.) dont le chef est M. Léopold Senghor, député de Dakar, professeur agrégé, membre du Conseil de l'Europe.

Le B.P.S. a d'ailleurs tenu ses assises, au cours du mois de février 1957 : nous examinerons plus loin ses positions actuelles, qui permettent de définir sur le plan concret, le contenu et les conséquences de la doctrine affirmée lors de la création de la Convention Africaine.

En dehors de ce parti local dont l'audience débordait d'ailleurs quelque peu les frontières du Sénégal, la Convention Africaine comprend d'autres partis locaux, ou plus exactement certaines personnalités correspondant à des partis locaux qui n'existent souvent qu'en fonction de leurs leaders : ces personnalités sont fort diverses les unes des autres et il est parfois assez surprenant de les voir rassemblées sous la même bannière... Citons par exemple, au MOYEN CONGO, l'abbé Fulbert Youlou (1), maire de Brazzaville, vainqueur du député Félix Tchicaya, qu'il attaqua dans son propre fief : ecclésiastique interdit par son évêque, l'abbé Youlou tire sa

(1) L'abbé Youlou n'assistait pas en personne au congrès, mais y avait délégué deux représentants.

puissance du soutien des tribus Lari ; celles-ci lui ont fourni des supporters communistes ou communistes, alors qu'il s'appuie lui-même, pour s'opposer à la S.F.I.O., sur des européens d'extrême-droite...

En OUBANGUI, l'ex-abbé Boganda, qui s'est fait remarquer récemment par des déclarations assez excessives quant à l'indépendance de son territoire, est également une des personnalités en vue de la convention africaine. De même M. Aubame, député (I.O.M.) du GABON, M. Aujoulat du CAMEROUN, M. Maga, député (M.D.D.) du DAHOMEY, comptent

parmi les leaders de la Convention Africaine. (Notons que M. Maga est considéré dans son pays comme plus à droite que le député Apithy, lui-même classé comme plus à droite également que la liste de l'U.D.D. (Union Démocratique Dahoméenne). Cependant le leader de l'U.D.D., M. Adande, qui a été nommé secrétaire général de la Convention Africaine, portait l'étiquette R.D.A.)

On voit que c'est assez compliqué et plutôt fluctuant, surtout si l'on considère que le Congrès de Dakar, indépendamment des positions personnelles antérieures assez peu homogènes de ses membres, a vu la Convention Africaine manifester des positions qui la placent désormais nettement à gauche de la S.F.I.O., et du leader R.D.A., M. Houphouët-Boigny.

Les objectifs essentiels

Pour s'en convaincre, il suffit de considérer quelques-uns des objectifs définis au congrès de Dakar : droit à l'indépendance de l'Algérie au sein d'un Maghreb librement associé à la France par les liens confédéraux — évolution du Cameroun vers un statut indépendant librement associé à la France — autonomie des territoires d'A.O.F. et d'A.E.F., dans le cadre de deux fédérations appelées à se constituer ultérieurement en Etats membres d'une vaste république fédérale, etc., etc...

Les personnalités les plus marquantes de la Convention Africaine sont finalement sénégalaises : MM. Senghor, et Dia Mamadou. C'est cela qui, croyons-nous, donne assez bien quand même sa couleur, à ce mouvement auquel se rattache fortement — au point d'amener une certaine confusion dans les esprits — le Bloc Populaire Sénégalais. Signalons que deux sénateurs, MM. Legros et Ibbou Diallo, et un conseiller de l'Union

Française, M. Guignebert, comptent parmi les élus de ce puissant parti local, dont le but essentiel semble bien être, dans la pratique, de supplanter la S.F.I.O. dans tout le Sénégal, sans oublier la mairie de Dakar où il détient 16 sièges contre 23 occupés par des socialistes amis de M. Lamine Gueye.

Sans doute, M. Senghor avait-il déclaré, dans son discours d'ouverture du Congrès de Dakar :

« Si le Sénégal a revendiqué l'honneur de préparer ce congrès, ce n'est pas par orgueil. Nous ne nous croyons pas le nombril de l'Afrique, ni la tête. »

Mais il avait affirmé aussi au début du même discours :

« Au demeurant, Dakar n'est pas tout à fait le Sénégal. Plusieurs dizaines de milliers de non Sénégalais y vivent. C'est la capitale de la Fédération de l'A.O.F. On l'oublie trop souvent, fédérer n'est pas assujettir, encore moins diviser, mais lier, associer sur un pied d'égalité. »

UNE SECTION DE LA CONVENTION AFRICAINE

LE BLOC POPULAIRE SÉNÉGALAIS

Quoi qu'il en soit, la « Convention Africaine » n'était qu'un préalable ; la parole et les actes concrets sont désormais laissés aux sections locales. La section du Sénégal tient évidemment la vedette : le Bloc Populaire Sénégalais en effet a tenu ses assises, fin février 1957, à Dakar. M. Senghor y a laché, au cours de ce nouveau congrès, quelques « bombes » qui ont fait couler pas mal d'encre... Doit-on rappeler que :

« Le Bloc populaire Sénégalais » est

né de la fusion proposée par l'ancien Bloc démocratique Sénégalais, de plusieurs partis locaux ou tendances. C'est ainsi que M. Assane Seck chargé de présenter le rapport sur la politique économique, aux côtés de MM. Senghor et Mamadou Dia provient lui-même du « Mouvement autonome Casamançais » ?

Le B.P.S. symbolise d'ailleurs assez bien dans la mesure où il a succédé au Bloc démocratique, la réaction de la brousse contre les citoyens « des 4

communes » constituant en quelque sorte la « bourgeoisie sénégalaise ».

Sur le plan économique : Ce congrès du B.P.S. s'est prononcé en faveur de la création d'une direction territoriale de l'économie de la collectivisation de l'agriculture, de la création d'un office des archides, d'un système de fiscalité à longue durée et de l'établissement d'industries de transformation.

(Suite page 10.)



Deux Congrès. Celui du B.P.S. à Dakar et la salle du Congrès M.S.A. à Conakry

Générale de la Convention Africaine

LE PREMIER CONGRES de la Convention Africaine, réuni à Dakar, les 11, 12 et 13 janvier 1957,

Considérant que, dans le tournant historique où sont engagés les peuples d'Afrique Noire liés à la France, l'action politique ne peut avoir d'autre but naturel que de conduire ces peuples à « s'administrer eux-mêmes » et à « gérer démocratiquement leurs propres affaires »,

Considérant que ce but est celui qui a été défini par la Charte de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et le Préambule de la Constitution du 27 octobre 1946,

Considérant que, pour atteindre ce but, le titre VIII de la Constitution de la République Française doit être révisé dans le sens d'une République Fédérale et d'une Union Confédérale de peuples libres et égaux en droits,

Considérant que cette révision doit permettre, aux Départements d'Outre-Mer, T.O.M. et Territoires sous tutelle, d'accéder au statut de leur choix — statut d'autonomie interne ou statut d'Etat associé à la France.

Considérant que cette révision et ces lois ne peuvent être votées que sous l'effet d'une action commune des partis africains,

Considérant que cette action ne peut avoir son plein effet que par le regroupement et la fusion des partis africains en un grand Parti unifié, qui, s'inspirant du Socialisme, intègre l'autonomie de la pensée négro-africaine et intègre les valeurs culturelles de l'Afrique Noire.

a) Fusion des partis africains

Demande, au Bureau de la Convention Africaine, de poursuivre l'effort des organisateurs du Congrès en vue du regroupement et de la fusion des partis africains, et partant, de répondre positivement à toute invitation qui leur sera adressée dans ce sens.

Demande aux parlementaires de la Convention Africaine de travailler à constituer un groupe parlementaire autonome, en faisant appel aux autres parlementaires des Territoires d'Outre-Mer, des Départements d'Outre-Mer et des Territoires sous tutelle.

b) Révision de la Constitution et Unité de l'Afrique Noire

Demande à tous les parlementaires des Territoires d'Outre-Mer, des Départements d'Outre-Mer et des Territoires sous tutelle, de lutter pour la révision de la Constitution dans le sens défini ci-dessus, en veillant à ce que l'autonomie de chaque territoire d'A.O.F. soit assurée, mais

dans le cadre des deux fédérations, qui seront dotées de services communs et qui constitueront deux Etats susceptibles d'être intégrés dans la République Fédérale.

c) Cameroun et Togo

Demande aux parlementaires de la Convention Africaine, des Territoires d'Outre-Mer, des Départements d'Outre-Mer et des Territoires sous tutelle, de lutter pour obtenir aux peuples du Cameroun et du Togo, un statut conforme à leurs aspirations, à la Charte de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et aux accords de tutelle, c'est-à-dire réalisé dans les meilleurs délais, un statut d'Etat indépendant, librement associé à la France ;

d) Algérie

Demande, aux parlementaires de la Convention Africaine des Territoires d'Outre-Mer, des Départements d'Outre-Mer et des Territoires sous tutelle, de lutter pour qu'intervienne le plus tôt possible, un cessez-le-feu en Algérie, conformément au programme du Front Republicain aujourd'hui au pouvoir,

Demande qu'immédiatement après ce cessez-le-feu, une libre discussion soit engagée entre le Gouvernement français et les représentants authentiques du Peuple algérien en vue d'établir un statut de l'Algérie, fondé sur l'autonomie interne et le droit à l'indépendance au sein d'un Maghreb librement associé à la France par des liens confédéraux.

e) Amitié et solidarité entre le peuple de France et les peuples d'Outre-Mer

Le premier Congrès de la Convention Africaine assure le peuple de France de sa confiance et de son indéfectible amitié ;

Il déclare que le peuple de France, qui a fait les révolutions de 1789, 1794, 1848, et qui, par son héroïque résistance de 1940 à 1945, a contribué à vaincre le nazisme raciste, n'a pas achevé sa mission de libérateur des peuples ;

Il lui demande de faire confiance à son tour aux peuples d'Outre-Mer qui entendent, après qu'ils auront obtenu un statut conforme à leurs aspirations légitimes, nouer librement avec la France des liens politiques, économiques et culturels, fondés sur la valeur irremplaçable de la personne humaine, telle qu'elle a été enseignée par la France au cours de sa longue et glorieuse histoire.

LEURS

PROFI

LES DEUX
MOUVEMENTS
RIVAUX

A CONAKRY

Le M

A DAKAR

La Résolution

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populations d'Outre-M
ciper à l'instauration
nouveau, après avoir pris
libération commune.

Leurs élus socialistes,
camarades du Parti Social
efficacité à l'élaboration d
République Française.

D IX ans se sont écoulés
ments qui nous oblig
problèmes politiques,
dans les pays d'Outre-M
Noire.

L'actuel Gouvernement
voulu attendre que l'Afri
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franco-africaine.

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torales élues au suffrag
de faire assurer par l
gestion de leurs intérêts
Gouvernement.

Conscients de toutes ce
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1956, des journées d'étu
les bases d'un Mouve

Pour mieux marquer
famille socialiste démoc
camarades du Comité
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Après un large échan
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L 'ACCORD entre les
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Ce Mouvement se pro
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Il s'attachera en pren
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des citoyens choisis sui
responsables devant les

RS PROFESSIONS DE FOI :

A CONAKRY

Le Manifeste du M.S.A.

AU lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale, les populations d'Outre-Mer ont été conviées à participer à l'instauration d'un Etat social et politique nouveau, après avoir pris une large part dans l'œuvre de libération commune.

Leurs élus socialistes, fraternellement unis à leurs camarades du Parti Socialiste S.F.I.O., ont travaillé avec efficacité à l'élaboration de l'actuelle Constitution de la République Française.

DIX ans se sont écoulés depuis, marqués par des événements qui nous obligent à repenser l'ensemble des problèmes politiques, économiques et sociaux posés dans les pays d'Outre-Mer et spécialement en Afrique Noire.

L'actuel Gouvernement à direction socialiste n'a pas voulu attendre que l'Afrique Noire soit devenue le théâtre d'événements sanglants pour se préoccuper des mesures d'ordre politique indispensables au maintien dans l'amitié et la confiance mutuelles d'une communauté franco-africaine.

Dans cette voie, un événement décisif est constitué par la loi-cadre du 23 juin 1956 qui a notamment pour objet, avec l'élargissement des pouvoirs des Assemblées Territoriales élues au suffrage universel et au collège unique, de faire assurer par les populations d'Outre-Mer, la gestion de leurs intérêts propres au sein de Conseils de Gouvernement.

Conscients de toutes ces nécessités, des élus et des militants socialistes de l'Afrique Noire Française ont pris l'initiative d'organiser à Paris, en septembre et octobre 1956, des journées d'études, en vue de jeter en Afrique les bases d'un Mouvement Socialiste Autonome.

Pour mieux marquer la solidarité qui unit la grande famille socialiste démocratique, ils ont demandé à leurs camarades du Comité Directeur du Parti Socialiste S.F.I.O., de se joindre à eux pour l'examen des problèmes que pose la création de ce Mouvement.

Après un large échange de vues, il a été décidé qu'un Congrès constitutif du Mouvement se tiendrait à Conakry, les 11, 12 et 13 janvier 1957.

L'ACCORD entre les initiateurs du Mouvement s'est réalisé sur la création d'un Mouvement Socialiste Africain. Cet accord a été ratifié par le congrès constitutif de Conakry.

Ce Mouvement se propose de réaliser en Afrique Noire Française une démocratie politique, culturelle, économique et sociale, assurant à chaque individu une indépendance complète et le plein épanouissement de sa personnalité, conduisant à une véritable indépendance des peuples.

Il s'attachera en premier lieu à définir et à créer une libre association entre la France métropolitaine et les territoires d'Outre-Mer. Dès maintenant, le Gouvernement de ces territoires doit être effectivement assuré par des citoyens choisis suivant des règles démocratiques et responsables devant les Assemblées élues.

Ainsi, les populations d'Afrique Noire Française seront amenées à se gouverner elles-mêmes et à gérer démocratiquement leurs propres affaires.

Le M.S.A. luttera pour :

1. UNE DEMOCRATIE POLITIQUE assurant :

- la libération de la personne humaine de toutes les servitudes qui l'oppriment, sans considération d'origine, de sexe, de statut, de race ou de religion;
- le libre exercice des droits de l'homme et du citoyen ainsi que le plein épanouissement de ses facultés naturelles;
- l'abolition des sujétions politiques, économiques, sociales et autres, fondées sur l'existence prétendue de nations ou de races supérieures et inférieures, de citoyens majeurs et de citoyens mineurs, et par voie de conséquence, toutes formes de ségrégation ou de discrimination raciale;
- la démocratie impliquant l'existence de plusieurs partis et le droit à l'opposition, le Mouvement Socialiste Africain se prononce contre la constitution d'un parti unique, quel qu'il soit;
- le M.S.A. demande que des mesures soient prises en vue de l'assainissement et de la réorganisation rationnelle des services de presse et d'information, et de la radio d'Outre-Mer.

2. UNE DEMOCRATIE CULTURELLE :

- Etablissement de l'instruction primaire obligatoire gratuite pour les deux sexes;
- établissement de l'enseignement post-scolaire, de l'enseignement technique agricole et de la formation professionnelle;
- création d'écoles, d'instituts et de facultés spécialisés, en vue de l'accélération de l'africanisation des cadres;
- développement de l'enseignement secondaire et supérieur;
- soutien des aspirations et organisation de la jeunesse et de la femme africaine.

3. UNE DEMOCRATIE ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE :

- Organisation de l'évolution économique et rationnelle des pays d'Outre-Mer et de l'Afrique Noire en particulier;
 - mise en œuvre des moyens garantissant la prééminence des intérêts des autochtones, et surtout de ceux de la grande masse des paysans noirs;
 - établissement d'un plan d'orientation de la production agricole et d'implantation d'industries de transformation;
 - réalisation de l'assistance sociale et médicale et de la sécurité économique pour l'ensemble des populations sans discrimination;
 - garantie du droit au travail, de la liberté syndicale, de la défense des travailleurs.
- En outre, le Mouvement Socialiste Africain affirme son accord avec la déclaration de l'Internationale Socialiste fixant les buts et les tâches du Socialisme Démocratique.

(Suite de la page 7.)

Sur la question du « Marché Commun » : le B.P.S. s'est déclaré résolument hostile, estimant « que les puissances étrangères n'auront pas les mêmes raisons que la France de ne pas user de la puissance de leurs capitaux ». Le B.P.S. y voit le danger d'une « nouvelle forme d'esclavage » engendré par le poids d'un capital étranger trop lourd.

Sur le plan politique, l'essentiel pour le Congrès B.P.S. est de parvenir à « la conquête légale de l'autonomie sous toutes ses formes ». L'administration des autochtones par eux-mêmes, dont le principe n'est plus discuté, devra être une administration de travail, d'ordre, de discipline hiérarchique et de rigueur financière.

La « résistance légale »

Au congrès, le député du Sénégal avait déclaré notamment :

« Camarades, je vous convie à vous considérer désormais comme étant en état de résistance légale. Nous devons, nous Sénégalais, être désormais à la pointe du combat, tout en étant prêt à sacrifier nos places sur l'autel de la patrie africaine. »

Questionné sur ce qu'il entendait par « résistance légale », M. Senghor a déclaré :

1) A l'hebdomadaire « **AFRIQUE NOUVELLE** » : (n° 499 du 26-2-57) (1).

« Devant les actes d'arbitraire du gouvernement à direction socialiste qui poursuit un double but : isoler le Sénégal et briser le B.P.S. qui est le parti du peuple sénégalais comme les élections l'ont prouvé, notre devoir est de résister. »

Cependant, je ne crois ni à l'illégalité, ni à la violence. La non-violence répond mieux à la dignité de l'homme. Elle est également plus efficace. La loi met à notre disposition mille moyens de s'opposer à l'arbitraire. Nous saurons les utiliser. »

2) Au Journal « **LE MONDE** » (du 26-2-57) (2).

« Le gouvernement à direction socialiste a été furieux de constater que les députés du Sénégal ne se laissent pas prendre au mirage de la loi-cadre et que l'opinion africaine commençait d'y voir clair. D'où une violente réaction qui s'est concrétisée dans les faits irréfutables :

« 1) Le ministre de la France d'outre-mer s'est servi de la R.T.F. pour lancer une attaque personnelle contre un député du Sénégal ;

« 2) Un membre du gouvernement est actuellement en tournée pré-électorale pour persuader les bonnes gens d'Afrique que la loi-cadre est une œuvre révolutionnaire ;

Le B.P.S. groupant des intellectuels, des syndicalistes et comptant 160.000 cotisants environ entend présenter ses listes avec quelques chances de succès aux élections du 31 mars.

Bien que partisan du fédéralisme, champion de l'entité A.O.F., préconisant la révision du titre VIII de la Constitution, et surtout adversaire de la loi-cadre, le B.P.S. entend bien constituer prochainement le premier gouvernement du Sénégal.

Cependant M. Senghor a déclaré qu'il ne serait pas candidat à la vice-présidence du futur conseil de gouvernement.

... Mais M. Senghor, interviewé de tous les côtés, a dit beaucoup de choses... Citons-en cependant quelques-unes, qui ont le mérite de définir, mieux que le congrès n'a su le faire, la pensée de M. Senghor.

« 3) Le ministre de la France d'outre-mer, lui-même, se propose de prendre à son tour le bâton de pèlerin à la fin de février. Enfin, le gouvernement en vue d'impressionner les électeurs des deux territoires-pilotes de la Côte-d'Ivoire et du Sénégal vient de procéder à une brutale mutation de gouverneurs : cela rappelle très exactement les méthodes du Second Empire. On veut par ces moyens empêcher les peuples d'Afrique noire d'exprimer leur volonté aux élections du 31 mars. Devant cette agression, le bureau du Bloc populaire sénégalais a décidé que tous les militants du parti devaient se considérer en état de résistance légale. En effet la résistance à l'oppression est le devoir le plus sacré en démocratie. Nous entendons rester dans la voie de la légalité ; si le gouvernement devait avoir recours à la violence, il porterait seul les responsabilités des graves conséquences qui pourraient en résulter. »

Fédéralisme contre balkanisation

Après avoir souligné, notamment à l'égard du R.D.A. que :

« L'aboutissement des revendications communes des peuples d'outre-mer » exige que les diverses forma-

(1) Interview de MM. J. de Benoist et Alain des Mazery.

(2) Interview de M. Milcent.

tions politiques se fondent « non pas en un parti unique, mais en un parti unifié » M. Senghor précisa ensuite la position du Bloc populaire sénégalais en face des nouvelles institutions prévues par la loi-cadre.

« Nous estimons que préconiser l'autonomie des territoires, c'est ne pas vouloir cette autonomie. En effet les « européens » pensent que 43 millions de Français ne peuvent résoudre les grands problèmes politiques et économiques qui se posent en 1957. Comment trois millions de Soudanais ou simplement six cent mille Mauritanais le pourraient-ils ? Si l'on veut l'autonomie réelle des territoires d'outre-mer, il faut les grouper en fédérations. Dans le cadre d'une république fédérale française, une A.O.F. de vingt millions d'habitants, en face de la métropole, peut constituer un ensemble équilibré et faire éprouver sa personnalité. Une Côte d'Ivoire ou un Sénégal de deux millions d'habitants ne le peuvent pas. C'est pourquoi nous considérons que la loi-cadre est une régression dans la mesure où elle balkanise les fédérations d'Afrique noire. Cependant cette loi-cadre peut être un instrument d'émancipation si les Africains le veulent. Nous pouvons, grâce à l'institution des conseils de gouvernement, faire des « joujoux et des sucettes »... des tracteurs et des bulldozers. »

M. Senghor donna également son avis sur le « Marché Commun » en affirmant : « Nous refusons d'être le cadeau de noces du mariage européens. »

La place des européens dans l'Afrique senghorienne

Enfin il répondit aux journalistes de « **L'AFRIQUE NOUVELLE** » qui lui posaient la question suivante :

« — Pensez-vous que des Européens sont prêts à travailler avec désintéressement à l'avenir de l'Afrique ? Etes-vous disposés à leur confier éventuellement des responsabilités ? »

« — Certainement, je pense qu'il y a des Européens prêts à aider les Africains à gérer leurs propres affaires. Je pourrais vous en citer. Il y en a d'autres qui veulent nous aider sans pour cela renoncer aux profits que leur procurent leurs entreprises. J'ai été frappé de voir que les industriels et même certains commerçants ont compris que l'autonomie des Territoires de l'Afrique Noire n'était pas contraire à leurs intérêts. Malheureusement trop de fonctionnaires ont des réactions de panique que je ne com-

prends pas. Ils parlent valise des que nous parlons de l'autonomie. Mais l'autonomie ne réveille pas de liens avec le, ni même forcément République. Cela ne veut dire racisme ou sentimentais. Je crois qu'après

Les déclarations de M. du congrès, ses mises à jour, ses contradictions appa- raissent dans divers interviews d'une certaine sévérité d'journalistes. C'est ainsi DE écrit, à la suite d M. Milcent :

« Les violentes d M. Senghor devant bloc populaire séné- gais, celles qu'il a réité- rées contrastent avec les rés tenues par M. Di- gressions contradicto- raires. Con- struire avec le « démocratique africa- » parti unifié » en- sonnement le che- mation, M. Houphou- affirmer que la loi- cadre aux Africains que des sucettes » dans- où on dit en atten- teurs et des bulldo- zers. »

Il est certain que tre les deux prin- cipaux et la com- mune et politique d'Ivoire sont à l'a- déclaration de l'o- de M. Edgar Faure, justement M. Ho- accompli en Afri- tournée destinée à collaboration au- Guy Mollet qu'a ex- pulations la portée dre. La compétition déjà ouverte. Mais peut ignorer que verbales peu dangu- climat métropolitain- bles de retentiss dans une Afrique core peu familiari- ritable portée des raux. »

Enfin, toujours à pr- rations de M. Seng- mentin, dans l'INFO pose plusieurs questio- paru intéressant d'en- sentiel.

Cet article condense des principaux griefs journalistes ont repro- ghor : c'est d'ailleurs

prends... Ils parlent de faire leur valise dès que nous parlons d'autonomie... Mais autonomie ne veut pas dire rupture des liens avec la Métropole, ni même forcément sortie de la République. Cela ne veut surtout pas dire racisme ou sentiments anti-français. Je crois qu'après l'autonomie,

nous aurons encore beaucoup plus besoin de l'aide des techniciens métropolitains. Mais ce seront des techniciens de haute classe, choisis par nous, et non pas des « petits blancs ». Je vais même plus loin : tous les Européens, qui, tout en étant Français, se considèrent comme Africains d'adoption,

seront les bienvenus. Notre volonté de réaliser un socialisme qui intégrera les valeurs culturelles et spirituelles de l'Afrique Noire exige que nous fassions avec les Métropolitains de bonne volonté l'expérience d'une communauté fraternelle où Blancs et Noirs vivront « différents mais ensemble ».

Le point de vue des journalistes

Les déclarations de M. Senghor, lors du congrès, ses mises au point, quelques contradictions apparentes lors des divers interviews ont provoqué une certaine sévérité de la part des journalistes. C'est ainsi que LE MONDE écrit, à la suite de l'article de M. Milcent :

« Les violentes déclarations de M. Senghor devant le congrès du bloc populaire sénégalais, comme celles qu'il a répétées au Monde, contrastent avec les propos mesurés tenus par M. Dia. Elles sont au surplus contradictoires sur plusieurs points. Comment vouloir construire avec le Rassemblement démocratique africain (R.D.A.) un « parti unifié » en attaquant personnellement le chef de cette formation, M. Houphouët ? Comment affirmer que la loi-cadre n'apporte aux Africains que « des joujoux et des sucettes » dans le même temps où on dit en attendre « des tracteurs et des bulldozers » ?

Il est certain que la rivalité entre les deux principaux leaders africains et la concurrence économique et politique Sénégal-Côte d'Ivoire sont à l'arrière-plan des déclarations de l'ancien ministre de M. Edgar Faure, au moment où justement M. Houphouët-Boigny accomplit en Afrique Noire une tournée destinée tant à justifier sa collaboration au gouvernement Guy Mollet qu'à expliquer aux populations la portée de la Loi-Cadre. La compétition électorale est déjà ouverte. Mais M. Senghor ne peut ignorer que des explosions verbales peu dangereuses dans le climat métropolitain sont susceptibles de retentissements graves dans une Afrique passionnée, encore peu familiarisée avec la véridique portée des propos électoraux. »

Enfin, toujours à propos des déclarations de M. Senghor, Pierre Fromentin, dans l'INFORMATION se pose plusieurs questions. Il nous a paru intéressant d'en reproduire l'essentiel.

Cet article condense quelques-uns des principaux griefs que plusieurs journalistes ont reprochés à M. Senghor : c'est d'ailleurs, notons-le, da-

vantage la portée de certains propos à l'emporte-pièce qui est généralement mise en cause, plutôt que la

nature des sentiments profonds de M. Senghor à l'égard de la France et du régime.

Que veut donc M. Senghor ?

« De la nostalgie du leadership du Sénégal à la tendance d'un néo-colonialisme. »

Ce serait un travail bien instructif que celui qui mettrait, en regard, les propos sur l'Algérie et l'Union Française, que tenait M. Senghor lorsqu'il était ministre du Cabinet de M. Edgar Faure, et ceux qu'il tient maintenant, comme leader du Bloc Populaire Sénégalais, et surtout, semble-t-il, comme aspirant au titre de « premier résistant légal » de l'Afrique Noire.

Une telle étude montrerait sans doute que le comportement politique n'est pas une constante, mais une inconnue qui varie en fonction des majorités parlementaires et des compétitions électorales.

Depuis un an, M. Senghor s'efforçait de s'isoler politiquement, il semble avoir réussi à satisfaire son désir depuis le récent débat de l'Assemblée Nationale sur les décrets d'application de la loi-cadre. Et aujourd'hui, le député du Sénégal semble agir comme s'il souhaitait que correspondît à sa propre solitude agressive une sorte d'isolement politique et territorial du Sénégal.

C'est que le cas de M. Senghor est aussi, par bien des aspects, celui du Sénégal.

Pendant longtemps, fils aîné des pays d'outre-mer, le Sénégal, flatté par une métropole qui ne comprenait l'Afrique qu'au travers du prisme dakarois, a joué le rôle de vedette et s'est comporté comme le représentant exclusif de l'Afrique Noire. Ce faisant, les intellec-

tuels sénégalais n'ont pas su comprendre que leur « fraternalisme » noir était devenu aussi désuet que le paternalisme européen, à une époque où tous les territoires accédaient à une majorité politique.

Ainsi, le duel Senghor-Houphouët-Boigny, qui s'est engagé il y a un an, n'est pas seulement l'expression de la lutte de deux hommes, ou de conceptions politiques différentes, mais encore, celle d'une opposition latente entre le Sénégal et les sept autres territoires d'A.O.F.

Récemment, à Abidjan, une personnalité de Côte d'Ivoire me résumait ainsi ce problème : « Depuis 1946, nous avons compris que les conseillers sénégalais n'étaient pas les payeurs ! ».

Est-ce parce qu'il pressent des temps difficiles pour lui et le Sénégal, que M. Senghor durcit sans cesse son attitude à l'égard du R.D.A. et du gouvernement français ? Il semble, en tout cas, agir comme s'il voulait, à partir d'événements sénégalais, troubler toutes les relations entre l'Afrique Noire et la France. Certes, il ne manque jamais de se retrancher derrière la légalité, mais il sait fort bien que les appels à une « résistance légale » qu'il lance à une population émotive et susceptible, risquent d'engendrer des incidents.

M. Senghor et ses amis sénégalais seraient-ils donc pour leurs frères des autres territoires, « des colonialistes » ?

La conclusion appartient-elle quand même à M. Senghor qui, à l'issue des travaux du congrès constitutif de la Convention africaine, évoqua la Ré-

volution de 89 et la fidélité à la France, avant de s'écrier : « C'est dans la mesure où nous serons tous unis en face de la Métropole qu'il n'y aura plus de démagogie et de surenchère ? »



AU CONGRES DE CONAKRY : De gauche à droite : MM. Cazelles, Conseiller de l'Union Française ; Fily Dabo Sissoko, député ; M. Lamine Gueye, maire de Dakar ; M. Seye Babacar ; MM. Sadega Samba et Moussa Sall.

LE MOUVEMENT SOCIALISTE AFRICAIN

LE « Mouvement Socialiste Africain » est né à Conakry, lors d'un congrès qui s'y est tenu du 11 au 13 janvier 1957.

Le principe en avait été décidé depuis le 13 octobre dernier.

Y assistaient non seulement les leaders socialistes africains, comme M. Lamine Gueye, maire de Dakar ou Hamadou Dieko, député du Soudan, sous-secrétaire d'Etat à la Présidence du Conseil, mais aussi certaines personnalités S.F.I.O. de la Métropole : M. Charles Lussy, M. Kléber Lousteau, M. Pierre Commin, secrétaire général adjoint du parti.

A l'instar des syndicats africains qui devaient à Cotonou proclamer leur autonomie et affirmer leur scission d'avec les Centrales Métropolitaines, le mouvement Socialiste d'Afrique Noire Française a pris la décision de se séparer en fait de la S.F.I.O., et d'affirmer lui aussi son autonomie.

Est-ce pour se ménager des rapprochements ultérieurs avec le R.D.A. ou la Convention Africaine ? C'est possible.

Ce qui est certain, c'est qu'en dépit des messages de fidélité adressés à MM. Guy Mollet et Defferre, ministre de la F.O.M., le nouveau parti prétend contribuer avec ses seules forces à l'accélération de l'évolution politique de l'Afrique.

La « surface » du M.S.A.

Alors que le fief du R.D.A. est la Côte d'Ivoire, et que celui du B.P.S. est le Sénégal rural, le fief du Mouvement Socialiste Africain est constitué surtout par les chefs-lieux des « QUATRE COMMUNES » AU SENEGAL.

Au SOUDAN où deux députés sur quatre sont socialistes, les supporters du mouvement sont Fily Dabo Sissoko, ancien ministre, et Ya Dombia, vice-président de l'Assemblée de l'Union Française. Dans le reste de l'A.O.F. et en A.E.F., le M.S.A. compte également

un certain nombre de sympathisants. Les sections territoriales du M.S.A. existent au Sénégal, en GUINEE, au Soudan, en COTE D'IVOIRE, au NIGER, au TCHAD et au MOYEN-CONGO et enfin au CAMEROUN.

Au NIGER, le M.S.A. compte remporter une très solide majorité au sein de l'Assemblée Territoriale qui doit être élue le 31 mars.

Au CAMEROUN, il est curieux d'observer que le M.S.A. s'appuyait sur des formations telles que l'Union sociale dirigée par M. Sop-

Le mouvement

Le tableau général des conditions dans lesquelles la population d'Afrique Noire française a été préparée à recevoir les grandes réformes introduites par la Loi-Cadre serait incomplet s'il ne comportait une note succincte sur le mouvement syndical.

Sans doute convient-il de ne pas s'en exagérer l'importance : le nombre des salariés syndiqués, en Afrique Noire, ne dépasse pas 350.000, ce qui est peu évidemment pour une population globale voisine de 23 millions et demi d'individus.

Mais il faut tenir compte de ce que les syndicats africains ont à leur tête les éléments les plus évolués, et en tout cas les plus combattifs de l'Afrique noire. En outre, les préoccupations d'ordre purement syndical ne sont guère concevables à l'échelon des comités directeurs : la politique y est mêlée et occupe généralement une place prépondérante.

AVANT COTONOU : UNE ORGANISATION MULTIPLE

Nous reparlerons en détail, dans un autre bulletin, des problèmes syndicalistes qui se présentent en Afrique Noire. Contentons-nous aujourd'hui de schématiser l'organisation générale, à la veille de la Conférence de Cotonou :

— La C.G.T. était organisée en deux fédérations : celle d'A.O.F. Togo et celle d'A.E.F. Cameroun.

— La C.F.T.C. est devenue depuis juillet 1956 la C.A.T.C. (Confédération africaine des Travailleurs croyants).

— Elle s'est déclarée à Pointe Noire autonome à l'égard de la C.F.T.C. Métropolitaine et la Confédération internationale des Travailleurs croyants a proclamé que les fédérations syndicales d'Afrique étaient désormais INDEPENDANTES.

— La C.G.T.-F.O. est coiffée par la section « Afrique » de la C.I.S.L. (Confédération internationale des Syndicats libres) qui a tenu du 10 au 18 janvier à Accra (Gold-Coast) une « Conférence régionale africaine ».

— La C.G.T.A. (Confédération générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique) était à l'origine une fraction dissidente de la C.G.T. (qu'on dénomme habituellement, pour s'y reconnaître : C.G.T.-K.). La naissance de la C.G.T.A. a beaucoup affaibli la C.G.T.-K.

M. Sekou Touré, maire de Conakry, élément de gauche au sein du Mouvement R.D.A., en est le leader.

— Enfin, un certain nombre de syndicats autonomes groupent les Cheminots ; les Médecins africains, Pharmaciens, Vétérinaires, Sages-femmes ; les Enseignants, etc. : leurs préoccupations restent davantage du domaine professionnel.

— 12 —



MM. Diawar Sarr ; Ota Balla,

po Priso, ex-président de l'Assemblée territoriale, opposé à l'U. et que celui-ci vient de refuser éclat, ainsi que sept autres gués camerounais, de parti aux travaux relatifs à l'appr au statut camerounais senté par le ministre Defer nom du gouvernement soc Guy Mollet (M. Soppo Pri leader du « groupe d'action nale du Cameroun » qui pr un « Etat souverain du roun » entièrement indépen

Doctrines

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Du 16 au 19 janvier, sou vaste conférence intersyndicale

Son but était, à l'instar fusion des diverses centrales

C.G.T. — C.A.T.C. — C.I

La centrale unique a pris

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MM. Diawar Sarr; Ota Balla; Farah Touré; Diagne Guirandou, Conseiller de l'Union Française; Hamadoun Dicko, Secrétaire d'Etat à la Présidence du Conseil.

po Priso, ex-président de l'Assemblée territoriale, opposé à l'U.P.C., et que celui-ci vient de refuser avec éclat, ainsi que sept autres délégués camerounais, de participer aux travaux relatifs à l'approbation du statut camerounais présenté par le ministre Deferre au nom du gouvernement socialiste Guy Mollet (M. Soppo Priso est leader du « groupe d'action nationale du Cameroun » qui préconise un « Etat souverain du Cameroun » entièrement indépendant).

C'est M. Okala, ex-sénateur battu, qui, nouveau délégué à l'Assemblée camerounaise — et peut-être soucieux de son avenir politique — a accepté d'être élu vice-président du M.S.A.

Signalons enfin que M. Diop Obeye, secrétaire général de la Fédération socialiste du Sénégal, qui comptait parmi les leaders du M.S.A., a, depuis, démissionné pour rallier le B.P.S., parti de M. Senkhor.

Sans doute, ce nouveau parti a-t-il des points communs avec ceux dont nous avons parlé précédemment : libre association entre la France métropolitaine et les T.O.M. — auto-détermination et capacité des peuples africains à gérer eux-mêmes, démocratiquement, leurs propres affaires — nécessité de modifier le titre VIII de la Constitution. Egalité des droits et des devoirs avec la Métropole, etc...

La pluralité des partis

Mais, sur le plan immédiat, l'essentiel aura été peut-être la prise de position formelle du M.S.A. en faveur de la pluralité des partis : « L'unification de forces démocratiques que nous voulons, a déclaré M. Lamine Gueye, doit réaliser une unité dans la diversité. Elle est à l'inverse du système du parti unique. Sans une confrontation des opinions, pas de démocratie ».

C'est sans doute cette condamnation du parti unique qui a cristallisé l'essentiel des oppositions des militants du R.D.A. ou de la Convention africaine. Il n'a été agréable pour aucun de savoir que les orateurs du M.S.A. avaient affirmé ceci : « Le parti unique fut la gloire et l'instrument de Franco, Hitler ou Staline; nous n'en voulons pas!... »

D'ailleurs, M. Lamine Gueye et ses amis, soucieux de ne pas couper quand même les ponts avec le R.D.A. ou la Convention Africaine, ont dû ajouter que « refuser le parti unique, ne signifiait pas refuser l'unité d'action ». Au contraire, le M.S.A. a affirmé sa volonté de tout faire pour qu'une unité d'action puisse se réaliser avec les partis démocratiques d'Afrique Noire sur des objectifs communs.

« Certains commentaires faits à la suite du congrès M.S.A., ont été un peu schématiques. Ainsi, a-t-on pu voir dans notre opposition au « parti unique » une attitude dogmatique ou une affirmation érigée en principe, a déclaré M. Lamine Gueye.

« Nous avons dit à Conakry qu'une pluralité de partis nous semblait préférable à un seul mouvement, car dans aucune démocratie nous ne trouvons de parti unique. Par contre, nous en avons vu dans l'Allemagne de Hitler, l'Italie de Mussolini, l'Espagne de Franco, dans les démocraties populaires, etc. Nous ne pensons pas que ces

Doctrines et objectifs immédiats

Beaucoup plus modéré dans ses revendications, le nouveau parti africain entend demeurer, semble-t-il, dans la ligne de l'orthodoxie socialiste et redoute, apparemment, de se cou-

per de la Métropole : « Nous devons, disait un leader, nous appuyer sur un groupe fort, sur des hommes qui pensent comme nous, sur des hommes qui sont des frères... »

syndical

LA CONFERENCE DE COTONOU

Du 16 au 19 janvier, sous l'égide de la C.G.T., s'est tenue à Cotonou (Dahomey) une vaste conférence intersyndicale.

Son but était, à l'instar de la Convention africaine sur le plan strictement politique, la fusion des diverses centrales africaines :

C.G.T. — C.A.T.C. — C.G.T.A. — Syndicats autonomes.

La centrale unique a pris le nom de U.G.T.A.N. (Union générale des travailleurs d'Afrique Noire).

Son programme peut se résumer ainsi :

- Emancipation des travailleurs africains.
- Union et organisation des travailleurs.
- Mise en valeur économique rapide à l'aide d'une industrialisation intensive.
- Normalisation de l'enseignement démocratique.
- Accélération de la mise en place d'une infrastructure sanitaire.
- Extension à l'Afrique du système complet de sécurité sociale.

Ses inquiétudes se dirigent surtout du côté de la Loi-Cadre et de ses conséquences.

Sa ligne politique est, théoriquement, imprécise : Abdoulaye Diallo, délégué du Soudan, a affirmé que la nouvelle centrale « serait indépendante des partis politiques mais en soutenant toute action allant dans le sens des intérêts de l'Afrique Noire »... ce qui, évidemment, peut donner lieu à toutes les interprétations que l'on voudra.

Enfin et surtout, la nouvelle centrale a affirmé se désaffilier de la C.G.T. métropolitaine et de la Fédération syndicale mondiale (exactement à la manière dont les socialistes africains, adhérents du M.S.A., entendent se scinder de la S.F.I.O.). Les divers mouvements syndicaux ont, de même, décidé leur désaffiliation par rapport à leurs anciennes centrales-mères (exception faite momentanément pour la C.A.T.C. qui hésite à rompre avec la C.I.S.C., ou Confédération internationale des Syndicats chrétiens).

Comme on le voit, à la veille des élections territoriales et de la mise en place des Conseils de gouvernement, les Mouvements syndicaux se sont alignés sur l'attitude des grands mouvements politiques : ils visent à reconstituer l'unité syndicale africaine, libre de toute attache avec les centrales métropolitaines en qui ils voient, malgré la nature égalitaire et fraternelle des idéaux qui les animent, un relent de paternalisme insupportable absolument anachronique...

exemples représentent un idéal pour les Africains.

Nous ne voulons d'ailleurs prêter à personne l'intention de s'en inspirer. Si l'on arrive en Afrique à concevoir une forme de regroupement originale et suffisamment souple pour éviter les inconvénients habituels du parti unique, nous ne demanderons pas mieux, au M.S.A., que de l'examiner ».

M. Lamine Gueye a eu la modestie d'ajouter :

« Le mouvement socialiste africain ne prétend pas détenir la vérité à lui tout seul... Mais, il espère que la confrontation des points de vue et la poursuite d'objectifs communs amènera un jour les partis à constater que leurs idées sont rapprochées au point d'être identiques. Autrement dit, les leaders du M.S.A. ne rejettent point

la possibilité de mettre sur pied une forme de groupement unique qui serait non un préalable mais un aboutissement.

En tout cas, le programme du M.S.A., comme on a pu le constater à la lecture du « Manifeste » a semblé, par rapport à ceux des deux autres grands mouvements, plus vague dans ses objectifs. Si ces objectifs sont plus généraux, plus élevés et plus conformes à l'idéal socialiste, il est probable que les moyens pour y parvenir ont appartenu à une certaine partie de l'opinion africaine, comme insuffisamment précis.

Le souci de fidélité à l'égard de la France demeure apparent : cela gêne certains démagogues qui ont peut-être un point de vue analogue mais ne veulent pas qu'on en parle.

Le M.S.A. et la loi-cadre

Enfin, l'attitude du nouveau parti socialiste africain à l'égard de la Loi-Cadre (dont les décrets d'application n'avaient pas encore été discutés à l'Assemblée Nationale) est nettement plus favorable que celle des amis de M. Senghor, au sein de la « Convention africaine ».

Sans doute une certaine méfiance, surtout en ce qui concerne la façon dont on l'appliquera, reste de bon ton : c'est un minimum de démagogie... Écoutons plutôt ce qu'en pense M. Lamine-Gueye :

« Pour l'Afrique, les principes de la Constitution française et de la loi-cadre restent révolutionnaires.

« Notre souci, en ce qui concerne la loi-cadre, c'est quelle peut être torpillée par des fonctionnaires qui l'appliqueraient à contresens, dans un esprit restrictif, en freinant chaque fois qu'ils le pourraient, en profitant de chaque obscurité et de chaque lacune.

Des institutions nouvelles insuffisantes mais acceptables

M. Ya Dombia, vice-président de l'Assemblée de l'Union française, à la suite de la première réunion du Comité directeur du M.S.A., qui s'est tenue à Dakar les 9 et 10 février — c'est-à-dire après la discussion, par la Chambre, des décrets de la loi-cadre, n'a pas tenu un langage tellement différent :

« Parlant des institutions prévues qu'il est toujours de bonne politique de juger encore insuffisantes, M. Ya Dombia a précisé :

« Elles ne fournissent aux territoires qu'une semi-autonomie, elles limitent encore trop l'économie politique. Ces institutions permettront cependant, je l'espère, d'aider les travailleurs et d'harmoniser la situation économique.

La jeunesse d'outre-mer est pressée de mettre à l'épreuve la loi-cadre.

Il faut qu'il soit bien entendu qu'une page est résolument tournée. Nous lutterons pour l'application de la législation actuelle. Car elle tend à instituer un ordre de chose démocratique qu'il a fallu en somme des siècles à la France elle-même pour conquérir.

Nous savons que certains administrateurs éprouvent un sentiment de dépossession. Ils regrettent la « belle époque » où le prestige de la France dépendait uniquement d'eux, où les galons et les broderies passaient pour des moyens de gouvernement. La jeune génération des administrateurs, il me semble, n'est pas dominée par cet état d'esprit. Il faut d'ailleurs savoir comprendre les résistances de la génération précédente. Nous regrettons ces résistances sans être disposés à les pardonner. Mais, du côté des Africains, il faut être convaincus que plus on a la raison pour soi et plus on a le devoir d'être modérés ».

C'est d'ailleurs pour elle une étape qui devrait être franchie très rapidement. De toutes façons, cette étape implique la réforme de la Constitution. En refusant d'aller jusqu'à l'autonomie interne, on a certes fait un compromis qui sauvegarde les intérêts des uns et des autres. Mais en fait, on accorde ce que l'on refuse dans les mots. Car les Conseils de Gouvernement, élus à la majorité absolue et investis en totalité de la confiance de l'Assemblée, seront en mesure d'imposer aux gouverneurs tout ce qu'ils voudront.

Si l'on avait admis l'autonomie interne tout de suite, on aurait ménagé des transitions plus faciles. En effet, un président du Conseil choisi par l'Assemblée, et faisant appel à des ministres responsables devant lui aurait

eu moins de pouvoir immédiat. On n'a pas bien posé ce que devaient donner en pratique le système ».

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'attitude du M.S.A. à l'égard de ces grandes réformes demeure en quelque sorte « gouvernementale ». Le programme d'action adopté le 10 février à Dakar, ne déclare-t-il pas :

« Le Mouvement vise, dans l'indépendance des nations, l'affirmation des grands principes du socialisme démocratique et de la personnalité de l'Afrique Noire dans son unité géographique, économique, comme dans ses impératifs sociaux... Le M.S.A. considère que la promotion politique issue des textes d'application de la loi-cadre ne constitue ni une étape ni l'aboutissement d'une évolution que ces textes consacrent, mais au contraire un acheminement naturel permettant aux Territoires d'Outre-Mer d'affirmer leur personnalité et d'accéder par voie de conséquence à la gestion de leurs propres intérêts, sans pour autant renier leur attachement à la Métropole ni abdiquer les perspectives d'avenir qui leur sont tracées par l'Histoire de tous les peuples dont l'aspiration profonde demeure la liberté. »

A l'égard du danger de « balkanisation » qu'encourent les fédérations d'A.O.F. et d'A.E.F. — problème cher à M. Senghor — le M.S.A. semble avoir adopté des thèses qui ne sont pas tellement éloignées, quoique proferées avec moins de virulence, de celles de la Convention africaine et du B.P.S. : le Comité directeur a décidé de soutenir toute mesure permettant d'augmenter les pouvoirs des « grands Conseils » fédéraux, à la condition toutefois que cet accroissement ne se fasse pas aux dépens des Assemblées territoriales, mais découle d'une diminution des pouvoirs du Ministère de la F.O.M.

Enfin à l'égard de certains grands problèmes comme celui du Marché Commun, l'opinion du M.S.A. est beaucoup plus nuancée que celle de la Convention Africaine, par exemple. Il ne rejette pas le principe, en bloc, en refusant de l'examiner. Il estime seulement que les Africains doivent être consultés et que leurs représentants doivent avoir leur place réservée dans les organismes du Marché Commun.

Égalité des droits et des devoirs

En somme, la position du M.S.A., sans entrer dans les détails, procède avant tout d'un désir, pour les Africains, d'être traités sur un pied d'égalité avec les Métropolitains, tant en ce qui concerne les droits que les devoirs.

L'esprit dans lequel ont travaillé les leaders du M.S.A. semble bien résumé par la déclaration du Ministre souda-

Hamadou Dicko
« Nous voulons bâtir cette
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Les grands mouvements
qu'ils se présentent, en Af
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C'est du moins ce qu'il
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Ne nous faisons do
tion est un problème

nais, Hammadoun Dicko, constatant l'absence d'unanimité de bâtir la communauté franco-africaine :
« Nous voulons bâtir cette communauté et pas une autre. Je constate cependant qu'on doit aller très vite et

qu'il faut confier aux Africains la responsabilité des affaires de leur pays. Le gouvernement y est tout disposé, et c'est cet esprit qui l'a guidé dans l'élaboration de la loi-cadre ». Mais c'est surtout la Convention

Africaine qui parle de « communauté africaine d'abord » et « Communauté franco-africaine ensuite »...
Le M.S.A., lui, aurait tendance à dire tout simplement « Union Française ».

A FIÈVRE POLITIQUE REMÈDES D'ORDRE ÉCONOMIQUE ?

Les grands mouvements politiques et syndicaux tels qu'ils se présentent, en Afrique Noire française, au seuil de l'année 1957, envisagent tous — pour un jour plus ou moins proche — le droit exclusif au pouvoir et l'autonomie la plus large.

C'est du moins ce qu'ils estiment avantageux. Le souci des leaders est évidemment de se présenter sous un jour tel qu'en toutes circonstances ils fassent figure « d'interlocuteurs valables ».

Qu'en pensent les masses au nom de qui les leaders concurrents se traitent de « démagogues » ou de « collaborationnistes »... c'est beaucoup plus difficile à apprécier (1).

La vieille sagesse des électeurs africains permet de penser que les manifestes des congrès politiques dont il vient d'être question n'impliquent pas obligatoirement une adhésion massive et sans discussion de leur part. Qu'il convienne de tenir le plus grand compte des prises de position de MM. Houphouët, Senghor ou Lamine Gueye, c'est incontestable... Mais dans quelle mesure ces prises de position sont-elles définitives et dans quelle mesure surtout seraient-elles capables de susciter des révoltes généralisées, en cas de maladresse métropolitaine, c'est autre chose !...

La conclusion de tout cela nous paraît être contenue dans un article de l'ex-sénateur du Dahomey, Ignacio Pinto (2) intitulé « Comment atteindre une véritable émancipation ». M. Pinto a l'âge de la sagesse. C'est un avocat notoire et il avait la réputation d'un parlementaire habile. Son avis vaut la peine d'être pris en considération :

« Selon la majeure partie des Africains — et moi-même en étais dans le temps, dit-il — c'est « par la politique » que nous arriverons à l'émancipation de nos populations ; de là cette propension de tous les Africains évolués à miser coûte que coûte sur la politique... Eh quoi, me dirait-on, vous êtes l'éternel mécontent et toujours insatisfait : vous venez de voir plusieurs de vos villes érigées en communes de plein exercice, vos Assemblées Territoriales assumeront plus de responsabilités, partant, auront plus d'attributions ; elles seront désormais des Assemblées délibérantes. Vous aurez des Conseils de gouvernement locaux, voire des premiers ministres et ministres ! Le tout dominé par la belle institution « L'Africanisation des cadres ». Et vous n'êtes pas content ?

J'ai des raisons de ne pas être dans le même émerveillement que tout le monde. Je soutiens que le développement politique SEUL nous acculera tôt ou tard à la ruine, car la politique ne nourrit pas son homme, je suis bien placé pour le savoir...

La démocratie telle qu'elle nous est proposée mènera progressivement à la démagogie. Il ne saurait d'ailleurs en être autrement en raison de l'état actuel de nos ressources économiques.

Ne nous faisons donc pas d'illusions : notre émancipation est un problème avant tout économique, nous avons

l'expérience des pays africains précédemment indépendants, tel que le Liberia voire l'Éthiopie, lesquels, faute de développement économique suffisant, se prélassent dans une prétendue indépendance qui n'est qu'un leurre.

Il importe que tous les Africains partisans de la véritable émancipation de leur pays, se rendent à cette évidence première que la Métropole ne saurait toujours être la Providence à l'escarcelle toujours bien gonflée, où nous pourrions aller puiser indéfiniment. »

Certes, il est à souhaiter que lorsque les proclamations politiques les plus explosives auront fait long feu, les Africains s'aperçoivent que les problèmes à résoudre sont avant tout d'ordre économique.

A ce sujet, faut-il rappeler quelques chiffres concernant par exemple l'aide aux pays sous-développés — chiffres qui, sans entrer dans les détails, sont suffisamment éloquentes par eux-mêmes :

— L'assistance technique de l'O.N.U. (à laquelle contribuent 80 États membres (3)) est de l'ordre de 10 milliards de francs par an — pour l'ensemble des pays sous-développés L'Afrique Noire française n'en profite donc que très peu.

— La B.I.R.D. a prêté moins de 500 milliards en 10 ans à l'ensemble des pays sous-développés.

— Les U.S.A., sous forme d'aide bilatérale, ont fourni 1.400 milliards environ pour l'ensemble des pays sous-développés.

— La France, enfin, de 1947 à 1957, a dépensé, rien que sur les fonds publics, 1.200 milliards pour le développement économique et social des pays d'Outre-Mer (encore ne s'agit-il que des investissements publics à fonds perdu en quelque sorte, et non des investissements privés dont le total dépasse certainement ce chiffre, pour la même période).

Autrement dit, pendant que les politiciens — et les autres — font de la politique, la Métropole continue à participer de la façon la plus efficace et la plus désintéressée au développement économique des T.O.M. Veut-on illustrer par un exemple frappant cette assertion ? Considérons alors le cas du Cameroun — pays sous tutelle qui ne reste pas en arrière de l'A.O.F. ou de l'A.E.F. sur le plan de l'émancipation politique, loin de là ! Divers spécialistes ayant examiné la situation de ce territoire, dont l'évolution est suivie avec attention par le Conseil de Tutelle de l'O.N.U., estiment que si, seuls les pays aussi bien équipés sur le plan social que le Cameroun, pouvaient faire partie du Conseil de Tutelle, plus de vingt pays membres de l'O.N.U. devraient être éliminés ! En particulier — sans vouloir les offenser — la Birmanie, l'Inde et le Guatemala qui font partie du Conseil de Tutelle actuel.

(1) Voir à ce sujet l'article « Crise de croissance ou Majorité difficile » dans le bulletin « Actualités d'Afrique Noire » de février 1957.

(2) Afrique Nouvelle, 5-12-56.

(3) La part contributive de la France est, pour la période 1950-55, de \$ 6.135.000.

Suite de l'Éditorial

— Sur le plan de la gestion administrative, les territoires d'outre-mer ont été jusqu'à maintenant administrés par des fonctionnaires français qui disposaient de tous les pouvoirs.

— Sur le plan économique et social, malgré l'effort fait par la France depuis 1946 et les 500 milliards de crédits d'investissements dépensés par la métropole dans les territoires d'outre-mer, l'évolution économique et sociale des peuples d'outre-mer est très en retard sur celle de la France.

Concéder purement et simplement, comme l'a fait la Grande-Bretagne, l'indépendance à ces territoires en en retirant nos fonctionnaires, nos techniciens, et en supprimant les crédits d'investissements, c'est vouer les populations des territoires d'outre-mer à des difficultés (peut-être) insurmontables pour elles et à la régression dans certains domaines.

C'est pourquoi, a précisé le Ministre, le Gouvernement français a choisi un système différent : c'est celui que vient renforcer la loi-Cadre.

« Ce système, dit-il, me paraît plus réaliste, plus sûr, plus conforme à l'intérêt des populations des T.O.M. que le système employé par les Anglais en Gold-Coast ».

A la question suivante :

« — Avez-vous l'impression que les Africains se contentent des avantages politiques de la loi-cadre et qu'ils acceptent de ne pas accéder dans l'immédiat à l'indépendance ? »

M. Gaston Defferre répond notamment :

« Le mot d'indépendance n'a pas pris en Afrique noire le sens quasi-mystique qu'il a acquis en Afrique du Nord. De plus, les leaders africains, à la lumière des expériences tunisienne et marocaine ont pu se convaincre que l'accession à l'indépendance n'impliquait pas une solution quasi magique de tous les problèmes, en particulier des problèmes financiers, économiques et sociaux, sans compter les problèmes de personnel et de technique.

Ils sont conscients du besoin qu'ils ont et continueront à avoir pendant encore de nombreuses années de l'aide de la métropole et des Européens pour assurer à leurs territoires une organisation et un développement économique et social, rapide et harmonieux.

L'avenir tranchera entre le choix qu'a fait la France en Afrique noire et celui qu'a fait l'Angleterre en créant l'Etat indépendant de Ghana.

Cet Etat a d'ailleurs commencé par intégrer le Togo britannique, ce qui a provoqué ces jours derniers des troubles qui ont causé la mort de plusieurs personnes et des arrestations en grand nombre.

Il ne faut pas non plus négliger les risques du retour à une forme de « tribalisme ». Nkrumah, le président de l'Etat de Ghana, est certes devenu sur le plan de l'indépendance nationale un grand homme, mais sa victoire est aussi la victoire d'une tribu sur une autre. L'avenir nous dira quelles en seront les conséquences.

En outre, malgré les amabilités officielles qui ont marqué apparemment les fêtes de l'indépendance, les relations entre les Africains et les Anglais sont beaucoup moins cordiales et moins dépouillées d'esprit raciste que ne le sont les relations entre les Français et les Africains.

D'autre part, la Grande-Bretagne a décidé l'exclusion du Ghana du fonds d'investissement au développement des colonies anglaises.

Je suis donc convaincu que, compte tenu des réalités en présence desquelles nous nous trouvons dans les territoires d'outre-mer français, le système que nous avons adopté donnera de meilleurs résultats. »

...Le Ministre conclut en observant que la façon dont sera appliquée la loi-cadre et l'esprit qui présidera à son application seront déterminants pour le succès ou l'échec des réformes.

PRISES DE POSITION AFRICAINES

C'est en prévision de l'application de ces réformes qui doivent leur apporter l'autonomie et non l'indépendance que les partis africains ont jugé bon de définir leurs positions.

En effet, il est possible qu'en Afrique noire française les élites politiques aient plus ou moins conscience de l'indifférence d'une notable partie des masses rurales à l'égard des problèmes de l'indépendance, ou de la prise de conscience nationaliste.

Mais, honnêtement, elles balancent entre deux points de vue : celui des étudiants africains qui se placent généralement à l'avant-garde du nationalisme, au contact desquels les politiciens ont une naturelle tendance à durcir leur position et le point de vue positif de la population surtout rurale qui se méfierait volontiers des aventures, et chez qui les rivalités ethniques, les oppositions tribales, ont des survivances encore bien vivaces.

Toutefois, lorsqu'il s'agit non plus d'indépendance — au sens constitutionnel où l'entendent généralement les Français de Métropole — mais lorsqu'il s'agit d'autonomie, les leaders africains sont sûrs de pouvoir aller assez loin dans leurs revendications — sans trop encourir le risque de se voir accuser par leurs électeurs de faire de la démagogie. Ils n'encourent pratiquement ce reproche que de la part des leaders des partis concurrents qui en font autant pour leur compte...

Mais, Cameroun mis à part peut-être, on peut dire en gros que les leaders politiques africains « en place » admettent assez volontiers que la Métropole a été plutôt bien avisée de permettre à l'Afrique Noire, grâce à la Loi-Cadre et aux perspectives économiques de l'Eurafrrique, de faire probablement l'économie de l'expérience nationaliste...

Bien entendu, chacun a son mot à dire ; chacun a ses recettes...

Dans la mesure où les positions des hommes politiques en Afrique ne changent pas trop vite, il est intéressant, à la veille des élections territoriales dont sortiront les futurs conseils de gouvernement, de faire le point de la situation politique, telle que l'ont définie les congrès de Dakar et de Conakry, et même la conférence intersyndicale de Cotonou.

Mais, dans ce bulletin consacré à l'aspect politique des problèmes africains, il ne faut pourtant pas perdre de vue ce qu'a souligné récemment le Ministre Houphouët-Boigny, à savoir que « le pari engagé ne peut être gagné que si la gestion autonome peut s'appuyer sur une structure économique forte, prospère et susceptible d'amener dans nos territoires un niveau de vie des populations supérieur à celui des populations africaines qui ont choisi la voie de l'indépendance ».

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper... *France :* File No... *25/2/11*
Published at... *The Algerian Problem* Date... *17th May 1957*

SECRET

SECRET

25/2/11

FRANCE : THE ALGERIAN PROBLEM

On 6th May, Mr. Dulles, disappointed at the lack of progress towards a solution of the Algerian problem, hinted to M. Mollet that unless some progress were made in the meantime United States support for France in the next United Nations Assembly might be less strong.

SECRET

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

DEB:SS

I. 6667

Dated: 10th May, 1957

1731

FROM:

Rec'd: 11th May, 1957
0830Australian Embassy,
P A R I S149. SECRET - PRIORITY

Dulles had an hours talk with Mollet when passing through Paris on 6th May after the Bonn N.A.T.O. meeting. According to the American Embassy he was disappointed at Mollett's lack of progress with a "solution" for Algeria and even hinted to Mollet that if something were not done in the meantime United States support of France over Algeria at the next United Nations Assembly would be less strong than last time.

Ø

2. One of the under Secretaries of the British Embassy has just returned from a tour of Algeria. His general impression was that the French Government should put pressure on large French colonial land holders. If something were done to break up big estates he thought there was "a fair chance that some Moslem support would rally behind the Government and allow reasonable elections being held." However, he did not think (and I agree with him) such measures would be feasible from the aspect of French internal politics particularly in the Assembly.

3. Coty has left for a visit to Italy. Also the Vatican. This is the first visit to the Pope by a head of the French State since Charlemagne and he is being received with every honour. He will undoubtedly ask for Vatican support or continued support over Algeria.

4. The United Kingdom and United States Embassy financial advisers have been in conference on the French financial situation. They do not think the French can go longer than mid-July without breaching their gold reserve of 300 million pounds sterling.

5. There is no sign of any United States loan forthcoming. It is possible that France may turn to Germany for a loan, linking it with the future common market.

6. Notwithstanding its difficulties, the Government's stability does not seem to be threatened as a result of last week's Radical party Congress despite great activities by Mendes - France.

Stirling.

Ø Mutilations

11th May, 1957

MIN & DEPT EA
P.L.'s



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

No. of Paper *The Times*
Published at *London*

File No. *25/2/11*
Date *17/2/57*

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ALGERIA DECISIONS NOW URGENT

IRONY OF M. PINEAU'S U.N. SUCCESS

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, FEB. 17

M. Pineau and his State Secretary, M. Maurice Faure, to-day returned to Paris, the one from New York, the other from Tunis. M. Pineau had won a greater victory in the United Nations debate on Algeria than even the most sanguine had thought possible a few weeks ago. M. Faure, though he had failed to convince Mr. Bourguiba, the Tunisian Prime Minister, of the need to keep French forces in that country until the Algerian problem is solved, had by his three-day visit to Tunis at least restored friendly personal contact with the Tunisian leaders, broken off so brusquely by the capture of ben Bella four months ago.

The Government's position at home has been strengthened by M. Pineau's success, and no excuses are left for further delaying political action in Algeria, though it is still far from clear how such action is to be carried out. M. Reynaud yesterday pointed to one of the ironies of the situation: that France's victory was at the price of virtually committing herself to hold free elections under a single college, which in turn would lose her Algeria far more surely than a hostile United Nations vote would have done.

TUNISIA PROGRESS

In Tunis M. Faure and Mr. Bourguiba have settled the future status of the many Frenchmen still in the Tunisian public service. During this year these employees will either be returned to the French or given new contracts. Progress was also made over judicial problems concerning the two countries, and it was decided that discussions would be continued in Paris on the questions of financial aid and international trade policy.

Mr. Bourguiba, however, is said to have been adamant that the French Army must be withdrawn from all Tunisia except the Bizertia region before the future defence relations between the two countries can be worked out. M. Faure, for his part, is believed to have emphasized that France must keep troops in southern Tunisia to prevent the Tunisians from giving aid to the Algerian rebels.

Heavy rebel losses and several unpleasant incidents have marked the weekend in Algeria. Since Friday the number of rebels killed is reckoned at well over 100. Forty-five were killed when a rebel band was wiped out in the Nemmtcha mountains of eastern Algeria, and another 35 were killed in the Tlemcen mountains.

CONVOY AMBUSHED

At Affreville, near Algiers, a convoy of three military vehicles, three private cars, and a bus fell into a rebel ambush. All the vehicles were burned or hurled into a ravine; the occupants, who included several Europeans, have disappeared. At Tlemcen two European schoolchildren and one Muslim child were killed when a terrorist threw a grenade outside a school just as the children were leaving. One person was killed and 15 persons were injured in a bomb attack in Constantine.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET

CABLEGRAM.

AS:SH

I. 2662

Dated: 15th February, 1957
0201
Rec'd: 16th February, 1957
0900

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK

456. SECRET - PRIORITY

Addressed Canberra 456, repeated London 44, Ottawa
savingram 77 and Washington.

1. We had a meeting this afternoon with Pearson, Dixon and Munro to exchange views on the likelihood of early Assembly action on the Middle East. Pearson thought Egypt had been quite reasonable over Israel's refusal to withdraw, but other Arab's patience was vanishing. A Resolution recommending sanctions against Israel might, he thought, be put in shortly. In Pearson's opinion, the Israelis, by temporising, hope to delay action until the Canal is cleared. His information was that Fawzi had not been given a copy of the United States Aide Memoire to Eban, and he pointed out that it was difficult for Egypt to comment on it. Delay has also helped the Israelis by giving time for public opinion in many countries to develop against the use of sanctions. Dulles' plan had also helped gain time. In reply to a question from Dixon, Pearson said that in the absence of United States initiative, he would either put in or support Resolution authorizing U.N.E.F. to take up position in Sharm El Sheikh Area, it would be easier to get wider support for such a Resolution now, and United States should be able to support Resolution in explicit terms. However, he suggested it would be better to withhold any action until United States intentions became clear. There was general agreement with this view.

2. Subsequently, the United States Delegation told us that the report of General Committee (our 447) will be considered in plenary tomorrow afternoon. United States told us that they have now decided support recommendation of General Committee that Soviet item be not inscribed on agenda. There now seems likely to be a full scale debate on inscription of this item. Munro suggested to us that United States had changed position as means of forestalling debate on the Middle East.

3. Algeria was set down for plenary this afternoon, but President announced negotiations were in train for compromise Resolution, and item was therefore postponed until tomorrow morning. Deineddine (Syria) gave notice that Arabs would seek to reopen Algerian Debate.

MIN & DEPT EA
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

16th February, 1957

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV5) UNO ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
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25/2/11
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED

...:SH

I. 2661

Dated: 15th February, 1957

1728

FROM:

Rec'd: 16th February, 1957
0830

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK

461. UNCLASSIFIED

Algeria.

At beginning of plenary this morning, President read out compromise Resolution sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Italy, Japan, Peru, Philippines, Thailand. Stated Resolution would be voted on forthwith. Explanations of vote being made afterwards. Resolution adopted unanimously.

Following is text:

General Assembly:

Having heard statements made by various Delegations and discussed question of Algeria,

Having regard to situation in Algeria which is causing much suffering and loss of human lives,

Expresses the hope that in a spirit of co-operation a peaceful democratic and just solution will be found through appropriate means in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

MIN & DEPT EA
P.M.'s

17th February, 1957

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV5) UNQ CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SLA
SA SIA AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P

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UNCLASSIFIED

CABLEGRAM.

LME

I.2561

PRESS

Dated: 14th February 1957
0326Rec'd: 15th February 1957
0830

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.25/2/57
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437. UNCLASSIFIED.

1. Algeria.

18 Power Resolution voted on paragraph by paragraph. Preamble paragraphs were adopted but the first two operative paragraphs were rejected by identical votes of 33-34 (Australia)-9 without objection from the sponsors. The remaining paragraph and the resolution as a whole were not put to the vote and the resolution lapsed.

Cuba then moved for priority for the five power draft which was adopted 38(Australia)35-3. After long procedural wrangle concerning admissibility of amendments to this resolution it was adopted unamended by 41(Australia)33-3.

New Zealand motion that the three power draft be not voted on defeated by 24 (Australia)43-10.

The three power resolution then adopted in paragraph by paragraph vote by 37-27(Australia)13.

2. Item is concluded. Next meeting not yet decided upon.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

15th February, 1957.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM. UNCLASSIFIED

...:SH

I. 2435

Dated: 13th February, 1957
0034
Rec'd: 14th February, 1957
0830

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK

421. UNCLASSIFIED

Algeria

General Debate concluded today with eight more statements.

Two more Draft Resolutions were tabled -

- (a) Japan, the Philippines and Thailand Draft:
General Assembly.

Having regard to the situation of unrest in Algeria, which is causing much human suffering and loss of lives.

Believing that the unsatisfactory situation now prevailing in Algeria may be normalized by the joint efforts of France and the Algerian people to find an equitable solution in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Expresses the hope that France and the Algerian people will endeavour through appropriate negotiations to bring about the end of bloodshed and peaceful settlement of present difficulties.

- (b) Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Italy and Peru Draft:
General Assembly.

Having heard statements of the French and other Delegations and discussed the question of Algeria.

Expresses the hope that a peaceful and democratic solution of this question will be found.

2. During discussion on the three Draft Resolutions Australia said Algeria was within the domestic jurisdiction of France and the human rights clauses of the Charter do not confer competence on the Assembly. Pointed out that the implications of argument that Algeria is not constitutionally part of France could rebound on other States. Australia believed it was political absurdity if foreign pressure forces a particular kind of political evolution without consideration of the best interests of the population. Welcomed Pineau's statement of French intentions. France should be left to work out the problem

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
—2. UNCLASSIFIED
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I. 2435

alone with Algeria. Opposed the 18 Power Resolution and regretted inability to support the 3 Power Draft. Expressed support for the 5 Power Resolution.

Menon urged the creation of peaceful conditions suitable for negotiations, which should recognise the territorial freedom of Algeria. Supported the 18 Power Draft.

3. Vote likely tomorrow morning.

MIN & DEPT EA
P.M.'s

14th February, 1957

SEC A/Ss LAT(DIV5) UNO PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA MAP&AT
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

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U N C L A S S I F I E D

...:VA

I. 2283

PRESS

Sent: 9th February, 1957
1610
Rec'd: 10th February, 1957
0900

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

404. UNCLASSIFIED.

Algeria.

Debate continued. Continues Monday.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

10th February, 1957.

SEC/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UN PAC&AM AM&SF S&SEA SA EAF&ME E
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INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

...DM.

L. 2280.

Date sent: 9th February, 1957.

0041

Date rec'd: 10th February, 1957.

0900

PRESS.

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United
Nations,
NEW YORK.

399. UNCLASSIFIED.

First Committee-Algeria.

Debate continued this afternoon with
statements from Iraq, Ecuador, Sudan, Canada, Yeman and
Guatemala.

Debate continues tomorrow.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
PM'S.

10th February, 1957.

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DL MT C&P MR.GOSS.

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INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I. 2248.

...:OA.

PRESS:

FROM:

Sent: 8th February, 1957.
1747.

Recd: 9th February, 1957.
0900

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

391. UNCLASSIFIED.

First Committee.

Algeria.

Egypt refuted the French Argument about Foreign Intervention on the grounds that the "Athos" was not an Egyptian ship nor were arms of Egyptian manufacture. Moreover France itself was acting illegally in siezing "Athos" on the high seas.

Belgium appealed to Article 27 stating the matter was not properly one for the Assembly but for France and Algeria.

Iraq presented the Arab case stating the Assembly had as much right to discuss Algeria as Hungary and should apply the same standards to freedom of all peoples. Denied that Algerian Nationalism Associated with Communism.

Italy maintained 18 Power Resolution was not a positive contribution to settlement of the problem.

MIN & DEPT. E.A.
MIN & DEPT. DEF.
F.M'S.

9th February, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

I. 2230.

...:OA.

Sent: 7th February, 1957.
2349.

PRESS:

FROM:

Recd: 9th February, 1957.
0830

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

386. UNCLASSIFIED.

Algeria.

Tunisia and Saudi Arabia advanced the Arab Case.

Cuba said it was clear from Article 27 that France did not have to submit Algeria to settlement under United Nations. Asked why anti colonialist champions had not taken a strong position on Hungary.

Indonesia urged self determination for Algeria.

General debate continues tomorrow and Saturday with 42 speakers inscribed.

MIN & DEPT. E.A.
F.M'S.

9th February, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UNO CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E
AF&ME INF DL MT C&F

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INWARD CABLEGRAM. ^U N C L A S S I F I E D

...:SH

I. 2160

Dated: 7th February, 1957

0027

Rec'd: 8th February, 1957

0830

FROM: (PRESS)

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK

25/2/11

376. UNCLASSIFIED

Algeria

The United Kingdom said they shared France's view of competence of the Assembly on this question. By unscrupulous and illegal intervention foreign countries were making France's position more difficult but the United Kingdom had the fullest confidence in France.

Morocco examined French Colonial Rule in Algeria in great detail. Called for immediate ceasefire and self determination for Algeria. The legitimate interests of the French minority should be guaranteed in an independent Algeria.

Spain upheld Article 2(7). Soustelle, former Governor General of Algeria, replied to Syrian and Moroccan criticisms.

Lodge said the United States welcomed France's willingness to discuss the question in the United Nations and Pincau's constructive speech. The United States believed two conditions must be fulfilled for beginnings of settlement of the problem -

- (a) Ceasefire and
- (b) The creation of a situation whereby Algeria could elect representatives of a national basis to work out with France future relationship.

The United States opposed adoption of the 18 Power Resolution and deplored foreign intervention and interference in matters essentially within the domestic affairs of a state which, if continued, could destroy the United Nations.

Morocco and Syria exercised the right of reply.

Plenary on Middle East possible tomorrow afternoon.

MIN & DEPT EA
P.M.'s

8th February, 1957

SEC 1/SS LAT(DIV5) UNO CR PAC&AM AMASP S&SEA SA
INF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P MR. GOSS

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **RESTRICTED**
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

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O.1975

Sent: 7th February 1957
1830

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

25/2/11

108. RESTRICTED.

Algeria.

We have informed French Embassy we would
support a resolution along lines of your 343.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

(COST £2.18.0)
8th February, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UNO CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA E.A.F&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

:AEK.

I.2108. 25/2/11

Dated: 6th February, 1957,
1711.
Rec'd: 7th February, 1957.
1055.FROM: Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.PRESS: 370. UNCLASSIFIED.

Algeria.

1. Following is the text of a Draft Resolution tabled today
by 18 Afro-Asians.

General Assembly having regard to the situation of unrest and strike in Algeria, which is causing much human suffering and disturbing harmony between Nations and recognising the right of the people of Algeria to self-determination according to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

- (1) Requests France to respond to the desire of the people of Algeria to exercise their fundamental right of self-determination.
- (2) Invites France and the people of Algeria to enter into immediate negotiations with a view to the cessation of hostilities and the peaceful settlement of their differences in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
- (3) Requests the Secretary-General to assist the parties in conducting such negotiations and report to the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly.

MIN. & DEPT. D.A.
P.M.'S.

7th February, 1957.

SFC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UNO ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SHA SA J. P. M.
E AF&M INF DL NT C&P.
C.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED

...:SH

I. 2077

FROM: (PRESS)

Dated: 6th February, 1957

0044

Rec'd: 7th February, 1957

0830

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK

25/2/11
f

364. UNCLASSIFIEDAlgeria.

Syria concluded statement with examination of French Economic, Social and Political Policy, denying every claim made by Pineau. Urged international investigation of French policy of genocide. Suggested solution could be found on following lines :

- (a) Recognition of right to self determination.
- (b) Formation of Algerian provisional Government which would enter into negotiations with France to arrange for gradual transfer of sovereignty, to negotiate new contractual relations with France and arrange for creation of constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage.
- (c) Bring about cease fire.

Foreshadowed introduction of Draft Resolution.

Burma urged self determination in moderate terms.

Ireland said Algeria was not matter within French domestic jurisdiction. The situation constitutes threat to world peace because it exacerbates relations between West and Arab world and provides opportunity for Communist exploitation. Solution could only be found by negotiation but Assembly could not lay down precise conditions of settlement. Urged France to come to terms with Algerian Nationalists speedily.

MIN & DEPT EA
P.M.'s

7th February, 1957

SEC A/SS I&T(DIV5) UNO CR PACNAM UN&SP S&SEA SA
SEA AF&ME " AF&ME INF DL MT C&P MR. GOSS

E

HP

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.1965

FROM: (PRESS)

Dated: 4th February, 1957.

2143

Rec'd: 6th February, 1957.

9 a.m.

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

25/2/11

352. UNCLASSIFIED.

Algeria.

Opening Debate.

Pineau said France will never accept United Nations competence on Algeria in this Debate. France wishes:

- (a) to reply publicly to campaigns of criticism;
- (b) to stress foreign interference in Algeria; and
- (c) to give all members opportunity to show same respect for Charter as France does.

2. Adduced logical arguments that Charter prevented Assembly from considering question, as Algeria is part of France, any alteration of its status would mean alteration of France's constitution and drew special attention of Latin Americans to this point. Gave warning that France will in no way feel bound to apply any resolution adopted. Traced France's contributions to economic social and political development of Algeria since 1830. Outlined reforms now under way in Algeria, e.g. development of Municipal Government and redistribution of land. There were three main causes for rebellion:

- (i) France's inability since the Second World War to assist Algeria as much as she would have liked;
- (ii) problems of mixed communities, European and Moslem, and
- (iii) the major cause, the action of terrorist groups organised with support and upon instructions of foreign powers.

He then traced the histories of the three main Nationalist movements in Algeria -

- (i) National Algeria Movement which France regards as more Western, more realistic and more independent than others;
- (ii) Algerian Communist Party, and
- (iii) National Liberation Front which is run from Cairo.

Each of these organisations claims to represent the whole of the Nationalist Movement in Algeria and each violently opposes by violence activities of others. Foregoing should be borne in mind by those who call upon France to negotiate with valid representatives of the Algerian people.

Outlined contacts between French Government and National Liberation Front to prove point in answer to criticism that France had never recognised that this organisation

/represented.....

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.1965

represented the whole of the Nationalist Movement and that France had made no commitments to it.

3. At the afternoon meeting, Pineau examined and rejected accusations of brutality by the French Police and soldiers. Defended arrest of five Algerian Nationalist leaders and, in some detail, charged rebels with savage brutality and senseless destruction. Accused Egypt of giving Algerian rebellion the most continuous and effective support, outlining propaganda from Cairo Radio, training of saboteurs and the Athos incident.

Repeated French willingness to enter into direct contact with rebels to arrange general conditions for cease-fire.

Syria advanced classic Arab case on Algeria, charging France with colonialism and imperialism. Denied Algeria was part of France and claimed that Algerian sovereignty had never been taken over by the French and had, since 1830, been dormant. Arab demand is that sovereignty should be gradually transferred to Algerian people with the help of United Nations good offices.

Syria will finish statement tomorrow morning.

Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

6th February, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(Div.5) UNO CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA
E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P MR.GOSS
G

RESTRICTED

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

:ABK.

I.1959.

Dated: 4th February, 1957.
2141.

FROM:

Rec'd: 5th February, 1957.
1630.Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.351. RESTRICTED.Algeria.

The Pakistan Delegation said today the Afro-Asian group have not yet decided on the terms of the Resolution. Arabs led by Syria want Resolution in strong terms while Asians want something moderate. Delegation expects to play minor role in debate.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

5th February, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UNO CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.A.F&M
E AF&M INF DL NT C&P.
G.

25/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. RESTRICTED
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

MMC:AS

I.1968.

Dated: 4th February, 1957.

2143.

FROM:

Rec'd: 5th February, 1957.
1730.

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

25/2/57

343. RESTRICTED.

Algeria.

The French delegation have shown us the following
which they hope will be the type of resolution to emerge from the
First Committee:-

Begins...

Having heard the statements of the French and
other delegations on the question of Algeria and subsequent dis-
cussion;

Expressing the hope that peaceful and democra-
tic solution of this question will be found;

Decides not to consider further this item of
its agenda.

...Ends.

MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

6th February, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.5) UN@ CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P
G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
CABLEGRAM.

DB:HP

I.1848

FROM:

Dated: 2nd February, 1957.

1055

Rec'd: 3rd February, 1957.

0900

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

44. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated to New York 4.

Algeria.

In order to demonstrate French unity and show the world that no alternative Government in France could pursue a different policy towards Algeria thus strengthening the Governments hand in the United Nations Assembly, Mollet on 24th January addressed letters to the leaders of all "national" groups and leading individual politicians inviting their adherence to his declarations of 9th January; reference my telegram 29. All replies have been received with the exception of Mondes-France's Radicals and the M.R.P. Unanimity exists on two points:-

- (a) The unbreakable nature of the links between Algiers and France;
- (b) Denial of the competence of the United Nations in this matter and hostility to any foreign interference.

2. Reservations are however expressed on the future statute largely on the grounds that the Government is going too far and too fast. The Single Electoral College is widely considered incompatible with Mollet's principle of "equal of two communities" in view of numerical predominance of Moslems. The holding of elections so soon (three months) after calm is restored is also criticized although less widely.

3. The week long strike called by F.L.N. in Algeria and France appears to have failed after four days.

....Stirling.

Min. & Dept. E.A. (852/10/52)
P.M.'s.

4th February, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(Div.5) UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA E.AF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.1691

RR:H

Dated: 31st January, 1957.

1750

FROM:

Rec'd: 1st February, 1957.

8.30 a.m.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.41. SECRET.

A member of the American Embassy staff recently saw prominent Socialist Deputy who told him that the French (presumably Social leaders) were having talks with the Algerian F.L.N. rebels as they had done on several occasions already. The main point the Americans made was that the French seemed to have accepted the idea of ultimate independence for Algeria (but this may have been American wishful thinking). However, progress was difficult as the rebels insisted on independence now without any "stages". The Deputy commented that the French Government departure was made harder because -

- (a) the rebels were hoping for a United Nations resolution which would strengthen their cause;
- (b) Faure and other party leaders persisted in making speeches out-bidding the Government.

2. Paris by-election last week end was significant.

- (a) There was a strong swing against the Communists.
- (b) Fouljada who stood as a candidate at the last moment, was badly discredited and may well lose his party.
- (c) Marked swing to the Right will probably stiffen Reynaud and other independent representatives of the Mollet Government on some counts.
- (d) Radicals, Mendes-France in particular, suffered a heavy set-back.

3. The United Kingdom Ambassador who has been in England staying with Butler, told me he "found everyone rather more European" but they were vague as to what form this would take. They were certainly strongly in support of Common Market and Free Area and strong on exclusion of agricultural products.

He thought the swing towards Europe was partly a result of a wave of anti-American feeling and partly a form of compensation for the heavy British set-back over Suez.

....Stirling.Min. & Dept. External Affairs,
P.M.'s.

ø Corrupt groups.

1st February, 1957.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RESTRICTED
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

MMC:AS

0.1429.

Sent: 29th January, 1957.
1725.

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

77. RESTRICTED.

Algeria.

French Embassy to-day notified us that whilst maintaining stand on competence, French delegation will take opportunity to refer to intervention by Egypt (Athos incident) and Russia (Communist intrigue). French hope that there will be no Resolution and have asked generally for support which we have promised.

MIN&DEPT EA
MIN&DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

(Cost 26/18/-)
31st January, 1957.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV5) UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL MT C&P



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 25/2/11 g

Record of Conversation with M. Beguin Billecocq, First Secretary, French Embassy.

on 29th January, 1957

Officers Present: Mr. K.D. Scott

Mr. K.G. Brennan

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

- (a) TOGOLAND
- (b) ALGERIA

Togoland

M. Beguin Billecocq said that he had been instructed to convey the thanks of the French Government for the assistance of the Australian Delegation over the Togoland Item in New York.

I thanked M. Beguin Billecocq.

Algeria

M. Beguin Billecocq said that he had been instructed to inform us of the tactics the French would pursue when the Algerian Item came up. He said that France would first of all deny competence. Secondly, it would allege Foreign intervention by Egypt (Athos incident) and by Russia (Communist activity in Algeria : fomentation of strikes etc.). Thirdly, the French would hope that there would be no Resolution as a result of the debate.

M. Beguin Billecocq said that he had been instructed to ask that the Australian Delegation should work in consultation with the French to bring about a satisfactory outcome.

I thanked M. Beguin Billecocq for the information he gave us which I said was in line with information we had already received from New York and from Paris. In response to his request for our views on the line the French were taking, I said that we entirely agreed on the matter of Article 2 (7) and thought that the French were probably better advised in all the circumstances to proceed as they proposed this year rather than to react as they did last year. Because the French would not be able to command enough votes to carry a favourable Resolution they would be unwise to introduce one which could only have the effect of provoking their opponents into submitting a Resolution condemning the French attitude in Algeria.

I said that the Delegation was under instructions to keep in touch with the French but that I would report the conversation and repeat the French request that the Delegation should keep in touch with the French.

DISTRIBUTION:

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					Sydney Office.

* A/S Div. IV.
FOLLOWING POST(S):

* E. Af. M.E.

* European

* Paris

* New York

Report prepared by K.G. Brennan

ACTION:

6-59/58

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

25/2/11

GJW:AS

I.1450.

Dated: 25th January, 1957.
2300.

FROM:

Rec'd: 27th January, 1957.
0830.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

37. RESTRICTED.

Addressed Canberra 37 repeated New York 1.

Algeria.

Your telegram 22, paragraph 4.

de Menthon told me 24th January that the French
certainly intend to "talk a good deal" about the Athos incident.

...Stirling.

MIN&DEPT EA (852/10/52)
P.M.'S

28th January, 1957.

SEC	A/Se	L&T(DIV5)	UNG	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA
SA	E.AF&ME	E	AF&ME	INF	DL	MT
G					C&P	

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

HMcC

I.1483

Dated: 26th January, 1957.
0236Rec'd: 27th January, 1957.
0900

FROM:-

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

25/2/11

253. CONFIDENTIAL.

Saving

Repeated Washington, Paris Misc./3, London
Saving 41, Ottawa Saving 36.Algeria.

Your 58.

1. French Delegation do not understand why
French Embassy has not given you Mollet's declaration
of 9th January, and will ensure that you get it at once.2. French Delegation says your paragraphs 1 and 2
are correct except that French Delegation, if it withdraws
at all, will probably leave First Committee entirely. French
view of protocol is that presence of third Secretary in seat
would constitute representation of France to precisely the
same extent as presence of Pineau himself, and difference
would simply be less effective presentation of French case.
France will attack intervention (including Athos) in
statement, but will not present resolution. Pineau will
probably hold meeting with France's supporters next week
to concert tactics.MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (852/10/52)
P.M'S.

27th January, 1957.

SEC A/Ss UNO PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAP&ME E
AP&ME INF DL M.T. C&P

G

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I. 1466

HMcC

Dated: 26th January, 1957
1530
Rec'd: 27th January, 1957
0900

FROM:-

Australian Embassy,
P A R I S.

38. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated New York 3.

Algeria.

Reference my telegram 37.

1. Bernard de Menthon told Deschamps on 25th January that the Government has given Pineau a free hand to determine, after arrival in New York, strategy and tactics to be followed in the Assembly debate. He will concert with delegations of friendly powers. France hopes the debate will produce no resolution or, at the worst, an anodyne one. The French delegation will deal extensively with foreign intervention, but de Menthon thinks it is unlikely to submit a resolution. There will be a reference in the Assembly to the Athos incident as a graphic illustration of foreign intervention, but the bulk of the dossier would be reserved for the Security Council item.

2. De Menthon did not hazard any forecast of the outcome of the Assembly discussion, but considered its prospects had improved:

- (1) France and United Kingdom had got a good mark for conforming to the United Nations directive over Suez.
- (11) Afro-Asian group was becoming less cohesive and split three ways over Togoland.
- (111) Following the Kashmir vote in the Security Council, India might be less active in intervening in French Affairs.

Stirling.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (852/10/52)
P.M.'S.

28th January, 1957

SEC A/Ss IAT(DIV.5) UN PAC&M AMRSP SASA SA SEA EAF&ME
E AF&ME INF DL M.T. C&P

G

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

RR:HMCC

O.1263/4/5

Sent: 23rd January, 1957
1820

TO:-

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.....58

(Please pass to Washington..55)

Repeated:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.....22CONFIDENTIAL.

Algeria.

We have not yet received text of Mollet's declaration of 9th January but understand it argues strongly against United Nations competence. France claims to have her own solution for Algeria which she does not want prejudiced by United Nations interference.

2. We have been informed French will maintain stand on Article 2(7) but that they will put their case moderately and that if Assembly proceeds with discussion France will not withdraw entirely but will leave only Third Secretary in seat. We have also been told that they will attack foreign intervention.

3. Glad of any information on possible developments in debate and views of other delegations.

4. We hope that the French will not submit any draft resolution on foreign intervention in Algeria. This could not be successful and would prejudice the chances of a modern outcome to the debate. Do they intend to raise the Athos incident? It is still on the Security Council's agenda.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (852/10/52)
P.M.'s.

(COST 29.16.4)
25th January, 1957

SEC A/Ss UNO PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AP&ME
INF DL C&P M.T.

G

CONFIDENTIAL

From "Le Figaro" 22nd January 1957

P.S. to the Americans

25/2/11
F. de Gaulle 70
of 22/1/57 explains us
25/1/57

Dear American friends,

I did not foresee twelve days ago that I would so soon have occasion to write you again. I could not, however, ignore the thousands of echoes raised in this country by my first letter, the messages received from all parts of France which in the proportion of more than a hundred to one tell me: "You are right".

What formerly I only suspected I now know: that my letter expressed not only my own ideas but - and this was no doubt its sole merit - the thoughts, the anxiety of countless fellow-citizens of mine. The moment of decision is near. In a few days at the United Nations you will have to decide whether you will take sides for or against France. I repeat: for or against France, and not merely for or against a French Government, for or against a French policy. You must have no illusion on this subject. Emotional elements have entered into play because the cup of humiliations and surrenders is full; because the conquest of Algeria - yes! we conquered it, just as, at precisely the same time, you conquered your Western territories - forms part of our national legend just as the epic of your pioneers forms part of yours; because Algeria is now for more than a million Frenchmen the ancestral homeland; because it is the last door open to the promise of the Sahara; because this is a question of a pound of our flesh.

Some among you have written to me to express regret that I should somewhat brutally have questioned, on the eve of your vote on Algeria, the very principle of Franco-American friendship. But the brutality is not of my creation. It is in the situation itself. I did not threaten you. On what basis could I have done so? I have no influence on events. I simply put you on your guard.

If Algeria is lost nothing can prevent not only the principles of our foreign policy but the very foundations of our institutions being called in question.

It is my country that I am defending. I have neither the arrogance nor the naiveté to believe that it is the only pure and just country. But it is mine. Like other countries, it has been responsible, in the course of a history filled with hazards, for intrigues and violence in its struggle for life. The means by which it extended its rule in Africa were not more immoral than those by which Czarist Russia extended its rule in Asia or by which you Americans built up your country.

We have not been a people without faults. There is no people without faults. When a son sees his father or mother in danger he does not delay going to help them until he is sure that they are not faultless. Are our sins worse than yours? Do you hope to convince us that your right to the territories which you have taken is better than our rights in Africa, that your right to the Alaskan wilderness is

continued...

better than our right to the Saharan desert, that your rights at Panama are better than our rights at Suez?

If Africa were lost French Communism would tomorrow exploit the loss of Africa against you. Make no mistake about it. A France roused against you, withdrawn into nationalist resentment or resigned to the worst would wreck for a long time Western solidarity and European hopes.

There is not, there cannot be a European bastion without France. Are you going to sacrifice the concrete possibilities of the European bulwark to the oriental mirage? In defending my country I am also defending yours. Our soldiers who are dying in Algeria are also dying for you.

Do not believe that by making a barbarian fanaticism bolder and more arrogant you will strengthen the defences of Western civilisation. Do not believe that what is taken from France will be preserved for the free world. Do not believe that what weakens us will strengthen you.

(signed) Thierry Maulnier

Published January 9th, 1957
 in LE FIGARO's front page.

DEAR AMERICAN FRIENDS,

SO the Algerian problem is going to be put before the U.N.O., where certain countries who have upheld or admitted that the intervention of Russian tanks in Hungary is an internal Hungarian concern, are going to maintain that the action by French troops in a French territory is an international problem. We are told that your Government is at a loss and that it is quite possible that in this affair it will decide, not unsadly, to take sides against us, being unable to cause the slightest pain to its new pan-Arab friends.

Upon its decision, whatever it may be, this letter will not have much weight. However, against the errors already committed and against any which could well be committed by those responsible for your foreign policy-mystic boatmen of the ark of salvation of the world which they sometimes steer clumsily into dangerous water — two or three of your greatest specialists in international affairs have already put you on your guard; and I entertain no hope of forcing the slightest grain of common sense into the bird-like brain of Miss Margaret Higgins.

My only claim in writing to you is that I number among the French who for ten years have not ceased, are not ceasing and will not cease, to consider American friendship, the American alliance, as the indisputable condition for the survival of France and Western Europe. We will not even talk of gratitude, if you please; it is well known that gratitude is hardly a political value. I am amongst those who are firmly convinced that although your country has a serious responsibility, assumed at Yalta and at Potsdam, in the enslavement of Eastern Europe, yet it is to its determinedness, to its power, to the respect that these two have inspired in the adversary, and to that alone — that we owe the fact that we live in a Paris which does not yet resemble Budapest. Without the Atlantic organisation, or, more simply, without the possibility of atomic retaliation by America to any Soviet attack on the West, a free Europe would have ceased to exist ten years ago; and supposing you give up defending her today, she will cease to exist tomorrow.

All that, which you and I know, many of my fellow-citizens tend to forget in the face of more immediate worries or resentments; neither are you oblivious that powerful parades, well-known political figures, influential journalists, do what they can so that such facts should be forgotten. To the profit of the USSR alone a fierce offensive is being waged in my country, even in certain of its right-

wing circles (whose reasons I would rather not search out) towards a loosening, if not the rupture, of the Atlantic alliance. For years this campaign has kept using not arguments but feelings against everything that can oppose to the powerful Soviet coalition a strength that has the least bit of consistency; their feelings were, against projects for European construction, jingoism and chauvinism and against yourselves, what we must indeed call anti-American feeling.

The Franco-American friendship
 is in danger

Anti-American feeling does exist in France — in England as well. Those who, like me, are inflexible friends and admirers of your country have come up against this feeling more than once in editors' offices, in the ministries and in the street. It has been methodically shouted and extolled by the communists — but also by numerous non-communists. What can you do about it? You are very rich, very powerful, very effective, you play in the world a dominant role — a role which could not be abandoned without bitterness by a nation like ours. We suffer from our weaknesses and, as is only natural, we tend to fall back on those qualities we can still keep. My fellow-citizens sometimes word against you stupid reproaches, such as your not having constructed cathedrals. As though you are not descended from cathedral builders as were are ourselves, and as if we had ourselves built many cathedrals since the voyage of the « Mayflower ». We treat you as 'big babies' and 'barbarians', as our revenge for being less well adapted to the modern world than yourselves. Until now all that was not very serious. I have been hearing and still hear every day what has been said in France for some time — to be precise since the beginning of the Suez crisis. I must tell you that now it is becoming serious. The adversaries of NATO would not so noisily proclaim in writing that « the life of the Atlantic Pact is practically over » if they did not feel their chances growing. *The Franco-American friendship is in danger.*

The Franco-American friendship is in danger, and if tomorrow your Government happened to vote with those who have undertaken to throw us out of Africa, this friendship would receive a blow the recovery from which would last long, very long, perhaps too long. I have no time to discuss here the historical back-ground of your Eastern policy. The part has not been and is not easy for you to play, and it is quite normal that you should put your own interests before ours, if the two are not in agreement. It is not so certain that you have played the right card, or, as you say, « killed the right pig ». It is not so certain that you have acted rightly when you filled the Nasser balloon with air, when you refused him a loan for Assuan and threw him back on Suez, when you paralysed by moves perhaps more hesitant and contradictory than machiavellian the efforts we French and English made to defend our rights and our prestige, and

when finally you filled again the balloon when it had been burst by a pin-prick from Israel and from us.

You wish to stop, at any cost, the Soviet thrust towards the 20 billion tons of oil reserves in the Middle East that will be indispensable to you in ten years' time, and towards the Persian Gulf as well.

Our interests are the same as yours. Our need of oil is even more urgent than yours; it is an immediate need and Suez is nearer to Marseilles than to San Francisco. You wish — this is Miss Margaret Higgins' great policy — to confound in the Soviet propaganda in Arab countries its ready argument of the struggle against 'Western imperialism'. You imagine the Arab states heady with their new-found independence, reconciling themselves with the West and at your side ready to defend the free world against the communist menace. Too bad for France, you say. 300 million Arabs mean more than 40 million Frenchmen.

Beware. 20 million Egyptians in front of 2 million Israelis, that gave rise to a speedy race across the Sinai Peninsula. Imagine a Nasser really won over to your cause, would he resist better against 200 million Russians than against 2 million Israelis? Anyway, Nasser could find nothing more pressing to do than to sell himself to the Russians. So that will not, you think, prevent him from selling himself to you tomorrow? No doubt. Neither to the Russians once again the day after. You try to build in the East, with nations created artificially, a wall of sand, a crumbling barrage that even your grip will not be able to support because the sand will seep between your fingers.

The U.S.S.R. is playing the same card as you

These impudent and ragged nations, ready to curse and ask for alms at the same time, how can they be a trump for the free world? What should disturb you is that the USSR is playing the same card as you. You would like to build a wall with these freed peoples of Asia and Africa, whilst Russia would like to use them as a ram against you. Does national independence immunise against communism? The greatest conquest of communism was China, China who with Sun Yat-sen and Tchang Kai-shek had precisely won its national independence and freed itself from Western sovereignty. Have you forgotten already the great disappointment of General Marshall?

If communism exploits the anti-western nationalism of peoples still under protection or just emancipated, it is because for the moment this is the most effective weapon at its disposal. Do you think that our departure could suffice to appease nationalism? Its victories will only render it prouder and more aggressive and it will turn against you since you will be there. 'U.S. go home'. Do you believe that Moscow will not know how to revive this slogan, against your technicians, your army camps, your air bases and even your charitable missions? And then, there are other worries in the 'Under-developed countries' than the mere presence of foreigners. Economic difficulties will be increased by our departure and multiplied by

the disorder of a newly-born democracy and by the weakness of governments serving an elementary apprenticeship; they will provide the U.S.S.R. with amply sufficient means to overthrow States which are unprepared, strengthless, rootless, or which, like those already existing in the East, are filled with monstrous privileges. A chain composed of Jordans and Yemens, stretching from India to the Atlantic — is that your barrage?

You will never pay enough

I know — you will pay. You will never pay enough. Between the USSR and you, the 'under-developed countries' will put themselves up for auction and, in spite of appearances, the masters of the USSR can offer more than you. Because you will only ever propose your surplus, whereas, if it's worth the risk (which it is) they can be generous at the price of imposing misery on their own people. Because beside you they appear poor and it is the rich who are more hated. Because they are nearer, harder, more wily and less scrupulous, more dangerous; and fear adds to prestige. Because if you can promise our spoils to your new friends, they in turn can promise yours, and that's another cake to cut. Because by their position in the world and by their doctrine itself they can hold up to miserable and fanatic peoples all shining hopes indifferently; peace or conquest, warlike asceticism or comfort, liberty or power, Canaan or the Apocalypse. Because they can promise everything, whilst you can but give.

In the eyes of 300 million Moslems, you have humiliated us in front of Nasser. With the Anglo-French interests in the East you have destroyed the centuries-old prestige of this Western world to which you belong, and then you realise, late as always, that it is before the Russians that you have created a vacuum — for it is a vacuum — which must now be filled. In North Africa as well, in taking sides against us in Algeria you are creating another vacuum in front of the Russians. Maybe you think that, after all, the worst you risk is to have to take our place? Some Frenchmen believe this eventually would not entirely displease you. Take care! It would not be good for you, once again, to appear to justify their thinking.

The attitude that your country will take in the debate on Algeria in the UNO will commit both our countries further than you think. Consider well. Perhaps you would be wrong to trust too much in our need of you. For this is a reciprocal need. We cannot break the Atlantic front, but neither can you. The breaking of ties between Europe and the United States would be the beginning not only of our end, but also of your own.

When one deprives an old and still proud race of what constitutes the only future worthy of its past, one runs the risk of leading it, against its own interest, perhaps, to unforeseeable, impassioned outbursts.

France is defending her last chance in Africa. Between her call in Africa and American friendship, do not force her to choose.

Thierry Maulnier

Thierry MAULNIER

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25/2/11

CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IN ALGERIA



FRENCH AFFAIRS—No. 40

JANUARY 1957

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION
972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

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Area 850,000
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Population 9,800,000

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Geography

Location

Situated between
facing France. The
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and 2,100 miles fro

Regions

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-a Mediterrane
city dwelle
-a zone of ste
-a Saharan zo

Transportation

4 international
3 large ports:
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Budget

The 1956-57 A
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Modernization Plan

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A FEW FACTS ON ALGERIA

Area 850,000 square miles (3 times the size of Texas), of which about 724,000 are in the Saharan zone.

Population 9,800,000 (estimate), against 2,500,000 in 1856.

Algeria's population has quadrupled in the past 100 years.
It comprises about 8,600,000 Moslems (Arabs and Berbers) and 1,200,000 Europeans.

The Moslem active population is distributed as follows:

- 1,850,000 in agriculture (630,000 landowners, 150,000 tenant farmers, 230,000 stock raisers, 190,000 farm laborers, 650,000 seasonal workers);
- 500,000 in industry, trade and handicrafts;
- some 300,000 workers residing in France.

Geography

Location

Situated between Morocco on the west and Tunisia on the east, Algeria has a 620-mile coastline facing France. The Southern Territories extend deep into the Sahara, bordering French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. Algiers is approximately 860 miles from Paris, 480 miles from Marseille, and 2,100 miles from Dakar.

Regions

Algeria is divided by the Atlas Mountains into 3 longitudinal zones:

- a Mediterranean zone: the Tell (53,000 sq. mi.; pop. 8,400,000, more than one fourth of whom are city dwellers);
- a zone of steppes: the High Plateaus (73,000 sq. mi.; pop. 670,000);
- a Saharan zone: the Southern Territories (724,000 sq. mi.; pop. 630,000).

Transportation

4 international airports, 20 large regional airports and 1 naval base at Mers-el-Kebir.
3 large ports: Algiers, Bône and Oran.
49,710 miles of roads; 2,725 miles of railroads.

Budget

The 1956-57 Algerian budget (ordinary and extraordinary) totals \$594.5 million.

Aid furnished by Metropolitan France in public funds totaled \$217 million in 1956:

- \$162 million for equipment (\$114 million in 1955);
- \$ 55 million for balancing Algeria's ordinary budget.

In addition, the French Government is paying directly for various technical or administrative expenditures, including security and defense (about \$190 million in 1953, a normal year).

Modernization Plan

The first four-year equipment plan (1949-53) totaled \$871 million, of which \$714.3 million were furnished by Metropolitan France.

A second four-year plan (1954-57), even more extensive than the first, is under way (76% for economic equipment, mostly rural; 21% for social development). The rate of public and private investment having been judged inadequate as early as 1954, an increase in these investments to \$8.4 billion in ten years is planned in order to raise Algeria's national income by 6% annually (Massetiol Plan).

METHODS OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION

Special Powers of the Minister Residing in Algeria

M. Robert Lacoste was appointed Minister Residing in Algeria on February 9, 1956. A decree of February 15, 1956 charged him with the functions of Governor General.

In accordance with the statements of M. Guy Mollet, President of the Council, and M. Lacoste, Minister Residing in Algeria, the implementation of the governmental program took concrete form through two concurrent series of measures.

- The first are aimed at restoring order and peace in Algeria; they are essentially provisional in nature.
- The second deal with administrative, economic and social problems; they affect the basic structure of the Algerian edifice and reflect a firm determination to raise the people's standard of living by every possible means.

These two series of measures were taken in pursuance of the different articles of the Law of March 16, 1956 granting special powers to the Government, authorizing it to put into effect in Algeria a program of economic expansion, social progress and administrative reform and empowering it to take any extraordinary measures necessary for restoring order, protecting persons and property and safeguarding the territory.

Administrative Methods of Action

Reorganization of the Central Administration of the General Government

Completing the machinery aimed at ensuring rapid and strict implementation of the government's policy, a whole series of reforms now under way are gradually modifying the basic structure of the central administration of the General Government. They include the establishment of a Committee for Inspection and Supervision, of a "Direction Générale" (General Department) of Political Affairs and a "Direction Générale" of Social Action; a reform of the agricultural services; and the establishment in the near future of a "Direction Générale" of Economic Affairs.

The main purpose of these reforms is to give the French-Moslems a greater measure of responsibility and to ensure the maximum effectiveness of the administrative powers, so that all echelons of the administration concerned with implementing governmental policy may be fully aware of the principles underlying that policy.

The regrouping, the changes in methods of work and the coordination of the services as a whole will give new vigor to administrative action, henceforth disciplined and better defined, and will strengthen its authority and its effectiveness.

Committee for Inspection and Supervision - Created by the Order of May 2, 1956, it constitutes one of the central organs especially designed to further the development of a policy of cooperation and pacification.

It centralized, to some extent, all the general inspection services of the central administration, scattered organs which must not exist by or for themselves alone but, on the contrary, to further governmental action by coordinating their efforts both with regard to investigations and to supervision of administrative action. The committee's precise function, therefore, is to draw up a plan for inspection programs, to coordinate the action of the various supervisory bodies and to use the conclusions of their reports to the best advantage.

This newly created body is accompanied by "Joint Missions," each mission consisting of a civilian and a military man. Their purpose is to undertake wide-scale investigations of the relations between the Administration and the administered; of any extortions, abuses, or serious offenses which might be committed by the civil servants or the representatives of the higher authority; of the differences which might arise on the local level between the civil and military authorities.

The New "Direction Générale" gives powers with a primarily political character, established by the Order of July 1, 1956, which were formerly scattered among the various Ministries of the Interior and Legislation.

This regrouping affects:

- the North-African Liaison Service
- the Specialized Administrative Services of Algeria
- the Bureau for Supervision of the War Veterans Bureau
- finally, the bureaux of the various services of Algeria, the organs of the various elections, religious

- 1) Division of the Interior
- 2) Division of the Interior
- 3) Division of the Interior

By the Order of July 1, 1956, of this new and important

Finally, the Order of July 1, 1956, of the Secretary General of the Government

The New "Direction Générale" so that it might keep in touch with the various organs of a social policy of Action basically combining

The new "Directeur

- 1) A Bureau of the Interior
- 2) The functions of the Interior
- the functions of the Interior
- the functions of the Interior

- 3) Finally
- a) the functions of the Interior
- b) the functions of the Interior
- c) the functions of the Interior

We shall examine, in the

The Reform of the Administration at an echelon between the various organs, isolated, and close coordination to play an essential role

Assisting the department

The New "Direction Générale" for Political Affairs and the Civil Service - In order to make the administrative powers with a primarily political character as cohesive as possible, the new "Direction Générale," established by the Order of July 2, 1956, brings together various general or specialized administrative services which were formerly scattered among various authorities, or which constituted separate departments such as, for example, Interior and Legislation.

This regrouping affects:

- the North-African Liaisons Bureau, which is in direct contact with Moslem circles;
- the Specialized Administrative Sections, which constitute the framework for the very important action of the Officers of Algerian Affairs;
- the Bureau for Supervision of the Southern Territories;
- the War Veterans Bureau, which is extremely helpful to the Moslems and enjoys great prestige among them;
- finally, the bureaus concerned with general affairs such as the political and administrative organization of Algeria, the organization of the local collectivities, their supervision, their public works, civil service, elections, religion, etc. - and which are grouped into three "sous-directions" (divisions):
 - 1) Division of General Affairs;
 - 2) Division of Local Affairs;
 - 3) Division of the Civil Service.

By the Order of July 2, 1956, M. Lucien Paye, General Inspector of Public Education, was placed at the head of this new and important "Direction Générale."

Finally, the Order of July 9, 1956 placed the Bureau of Legislation under the direct jurisdiction of the Secretary General of the Government.

The New "Direction Générale" of Social Action - Set up by the Order of July 20, 1956, in a rational manner so that it might keep in touch with Algerian social conditions as a whole, and promote and see to the implementation of a social policy designed to raise the people's standard of living, the "Direction Générale" of Social Action basically combines the attributes of the former Departments of Public Health and of Labor.

The new "Directeur Général" (department head) thus has under his jurisdiction:

- 1) A Bureau for General Studies and Programs, charged with studying and synthesizing demographic, economic and social problems and coordinating the programs for action and development;
- 2) The following agencies for inspection and supervision concerned with social questions:
 - the general Public Health Service;
 - the general supervision of Social Security;
 - the inspectors of the pharmacies, the laboratories for medical analyses, etc...
- 3) Finally, four divisions:
 - a) the Division of General Administration and Development;
 - b) the Division of Public and Social Hygiene, Medical Assistance and Hospitals;
 - c) the Division of Labor.

We shall examine, with reference to social reforms, the political implications of this reorganization.

The Reform of the Department of Agriculture - This has been achieved by a strong concentration of authority at an echelon between the Department and the bureaus, the linking together of various bureaus which were formerly isolated, and close coordination between the various activities of the Department. All these services are destined to play an essential role within the central administration in carrying out the Government's program of reforms.

Assisting the department head, a bureau charged with making general studies, with drawing up plans and pro-

grams for economic action, acts as a liaison among the four major divisions set up within the department:

- 1) the new Administrative and Juridical Division, which has authority over the district bureaux that see to it that social laws are properly applied, and over the attached agricultural agencies;
- 2) the new Division for Agricultural Commodities (methods of production and markets), which brings together all the technical agencies concerned with research, experimentation, popularization, and education as well as with putting a stop to adulteration;
- 3) the Commissariat for the "Paysanat,"* charged with giving impetus to the Agricultural Provident Societies and the Rural Improvement Sectors, in close collaboration with the other central agencies;
- 4) finally, the Bureau of Forests and of Soil Conservation and Restoration, which was formerly a bureau outside the Department of Agriculture.

Attributes of the Algerian Assembly Entrusted to the Governor General

Finally, it must be pointed out that the dissolution of the Algerian Assembly, pronounced by Decree No. 56-379 of April 12, 1956, led to the transfer of its attributes—on a temporary basis—to the Governor General who, as a result, possesses that Assembly's power of decision, as defined by the Organic Statute of September 20, 1947.

*The aim of the "Paysanat," an agricultural advisory service, is to improve the living conditions of the Algerian fellahs and shepherds in the technical, economic, social and cultural fields. Divided for administrative purposes into Rural Improvement Sectors (Secteurs d'Amélioration Rurale), it works through the Agricultural Provident Societies and provides instruction in modern farming and stock-raising methods, furnishes mechanized equipment, teaches the proper use of credit, and constructs new rural housing and country schools.

Civil and Military Measures

Powers of the Governor General
Decree No. 56-274 of March 10, 1956 — powers for the purpose of reestablishing the powers of the Governor General

The Governor General may write placing persons under house arrest, order or authorize search of any person, suspend civil service

By virtue of the Decree of April 10, 1956 — so as to enable the Departments.

Maintenance of Order in

In eastern Algeria, the responsibility for maintaining the civil authority in the

Nevertheless, the Order of the Prefects of Bône and Constantine dissolve associations, groups, assemblies, to institute, in order to set up special delegates

Coordination of the C

In order to ensure close coordination between the Departments, M. Papon, Prefect of Algiers, has been designated as Extraordinary Commissioner for the supervision over the various administrations.

Maintenance of Order

An Order of March 19, 1956, relative to measures for the sojourn of all French and

Besides, the military Order of March 23, 1956, for the reestablishment of the mixed commune of Biskra, Mountains by Order of April

Finally the powers of the Order of May 5, 1956 further the reorganization of troops and the d

MEASURES OF PROTECTION AND SECURITY

Civil and Military Measures

Powers of the Governor General

Decree No. 56-274 of March 17, 1956 authorizes the Governor General of Algeria to exercise extraordinary powers for the purpose of reestablishing order, protecting persons and property, and safeguarding Algerian territory.

The Governor General may forbid circulation, set up zones where sojourns are regulated or forbidden, issue writs placing persons under house arrest, prohibit meetings, order the temporary closing of meeting places of all sorts, order or authorize search, take any measures forbidding or dissolving associations, regulate the sojourn of any person, suspend civil servants or agents of the public services.

By virtue of the Decree of March 17, 1956 mentioned above, the Minister Residing in Algeria has delegated part of his powers to the Algerian Prefects—by the Order of March 19, 1956, supplemented by the Order of July 10, 1956—so as to enable them to take certain measures with a view to maintaining order in their respective Departments.

Maintenance of Order in the Departments of Eastern Algeria

In eastern Algeria, the Order of May 7, 1956, also in pursuance of the Decree of March 17, 1956, entrusted the responsibility for maintaining order to the military authority which exercises all the police powers normally given to the civil authority in these Departments.

Nevertheless, the Order of July 10, 1956, mentioned above, which also modifies that of May 7, 1956, gives the Prefects of Bône and Constantine the power to issue writs placing persons under house arrest, to prohibit or dissolve associations, groups, etc., to transfer or suspend civil servants, to suspend persons elected to the local assemblies, to institute, in place of the local assemblies, administrative commissions or special delegations or to set up special delegates.

Coordination of the Civil and Military Authorities in These Eastern Departments

In order to ensure close and effective coordination between the civil and military authorities in the eastern Departments, M. Papon, Prefect of Constantine, appointed by Decree of May 2, 1956 as Inspector General of Administration on Extraordinary Mission for these Departments, was charged on May 16 with exercising over-all supervision over the various authorities in the name of the Minister Residing in Algeria, and with general coordination.

Maintenance of Order in the Southern Territories

An Order of March 19, 1956 also entrusted the Director of the Southern Territories with the right to sign all decisions relative to measures confining persons to house arrest, or concerning prohibition and regulation of the sojourn of all French and foreign persons in those territories.

Besides, the military commanders of the Southern Territories hold, by delegation from the Governor General in the Order of March 23, 1956, powers practically identical to those devolving on the Prefects of northern Algeria, for the reestablishment of order and the protection of persons in their respective territories, always excepting the mixed commune of Biskra, which is attached to the command of the operational zone of the Aures-Nementcha Mountains by Order of April 12, 1956.

Finally the powers of the General commanding the troops and services of the Southern Territories are, by Order of May 5, 1956 further defined and extended as regards the use of reinforcements, the supervision and utilization of troops and the defensive organization of the territory.

Supervision of Coastal Waters

By Order of May 17, 1956, the area under the jurisdiction of the French Navy which patrols the coastal waters of Algeria is extended to include the roadsteads and surface waters of the commercial ports of Algeria. To this end, the Order sets up a service for policing the seagoing vessels in eight Algerian ports, charged with:

- surveillance of the activities of vessels waiting in the roadstead and controlling their communications with the land or with other vessels;
- control of the entry and departure of all vessels of less than 100 tons and, in a general way, of all embarkations;
- control of traffic in the roadsteads and in the surface waters.

Organization of Military Divisions and Subdivisions in Algeria

The Interministerial Order of March 26, 1956 instituted a reorganization of the Military Divisions and Subdivisions of Algeria, by adapting their territorial boundaries to those of the new civil arrondissements created in 1955; this was to the end of facilitating coordination between civil and military authorities at the local level. The three territorial divisions remain unchanged as regards their outer boundaries; on the other hand, 2 new subdivisions have been created, one in the Division of Algiers, the other in the Division of Oran; finally 2 subdivisions in the Division of Constantine have had their boundaries changed.

Measures of a Judicial Nature

Struggle Against Terrorism

Decree No. 56-269 of March 17, 1956 authorizes the military authorities to order to be arrested without warrant, and brought before a permanent court of the armed forces, persons caught *flagrante delicto* participating in action against persons or goods, when these infractions are committed by perpetrators bearing arms, explosives, munitions, destructive materials or effects of military equipment or clothing.

The court of the armed forces will have immediate jurisdiction over all infractions thus referred to it. No delay is required between the citation of the person charged before the court and the sitting of the court. The judgments rendered under these circumstances by the courts of the armed forces will not be liable to appeal except to the competent military court of appeal.

Measures Against Desertion

Decree No. 56-270 of March 17, 1956 provides that any soldier, sailor or person assimilated to the military who deserts to join an armed band will be punished by imprisonment or, if he is an officer, by deportation. Those guilty will be punished by the death penalty if, in deserting, they have taken arms or ammunition with them.

Attributes of the Military Courts

Decree No. 56-268 of March 17, 1956, amended by Decree No. 56-286 of March 26, 1956, allows the military courts to take cognizance, even during the period of training, of all acts committed since October 30, 1954, when it is a question of one of the following infractions:

- All crimes against the internal security of the State;
- Armed rebellion;
- Instigating or taken part in unlawful assemblies of a criminal nature;
- Conspiracy and aiding or harboring criminals;
- Attempts against the railroads and road traffic;
- Possession of arms or munitions of war;
- Murders, acts of violence, poisonings, infliction of blows and wounds, illegal restraint, rape and indecent exposure accompanied by violence, arson, willful destruction, looting and damage, theft and receiving of stolen goods;

- All crimes or misdemeanors
- All attempts and

Recruitment of Officers

Decree No. 56-271 of March 17, 1956, calls back into service, at the request of the Courts, with a view to completing the ranks of the

These officers or non-commissioned officers will be called back into service for periods of a month and will be placed at the disposal of the Minister of National Defense. Military Courts back into service

Functioning of the Justices of the Peace

Decree No. 56-633 of March 17, 1956, provides that Justices of the Peace in Algeria

It provides, in the first place, that the deputy Justices of the Peace will be determined by the Minister of National Defense. The status of the Justices of the Peace will be determined by the Minister of National Defense. The status of the Justices of the Peace will be determined by the Minister of National Defense.

Miscellaneous Measures

Civilian Protection

From the first outbreak of hostilities, the protection of the civilian population has been carried on in spite of the difficulties and the protection of the civilian population has been carried on in spite of the difficulties.

To this end, a decision has been taken to facilitate the acquisition of this equipment was acquired for the purpose of acquiring this equipment.

A large number of small arms and light weapons have been acquired in the regions most heavily hit by the enemy. This would involve pooling all the resources of the Organization for the purpose of acquiring this equipment.

By virtue of this text, the measures which have been taken for the storing of the crops and the protection of the civilian population, to compulsory production of foodstuffs.

- All crimes or misdemeanors jeopardizing the national defense;
- All attempts and complicity in these same crimes and misdemeanors.

Recruitment of Officers to Serve With Military Courts

Decree No. 56-271 of March 17, 1956 authorizes the Ministry of National Defense and the Armed Forces to call back into service, at their request, reserve officers and special noncombattants of the branch of the Military Courts, with a view to completing the staff of the military courts in Algeria.

These officers or noncombattants will serve under three-month contracts which may be renewed for successive periods of a month and can be terminated by either party upon two weeks' notice. In case of need, the Minister of National Defense may *ex officio* call reserve officers and special noncombattants of the Branch of the Military Courts back into service.

Functioning of the Justices of the Peace in Algeria

Decree No. 56-633 of June 28, 1956 enacts various measures intended to ensure a better functioning of the Justices of the Peace in Algeria.

It provides, in the first place, that until 1960, it will be possible to employ, on a contract basis, salaried deputy Justices of the Peace; the conditions under which these deputies may receive permanent civil service status will be determined subsequently. Besides, it puts an end to the territorial distribution of the posts of salaried deputies over the territory; henceforth they will be attached, as in Metropolitan France, to a given jurisdiction of the Algerian Court of Appeal. And finally, two posts of deputies were created in each of the areas under a Justice of the Peace in Algeria.

Miscellaneous Measures

Civilian Protection of Crops

From the first outbreak of incidents in Algeria, the necessity of enabling all the normal farming activities to be carried on in spite of the acts of terrorism in the countryside was one of the principal concerns of the authorities, and the protection of the crops, in particular, became imperative because these activities could be continued only if this protection were effective. Therefore it was of prime importance to limit the risks of destruction of the crops, whether they were standing in the fields or in the process of being harvested, by speeding up their cutting and storing.

To this end, a decision of the Algerian Assembly set up a system of financial aid in 1955 which was intended to facilitate the acquisition of harvesting and threshing equipment and the appropriate means of transportation; this equipment was acquired on behalf of farmers organized in cooperatives for the purchase and use of such equipment.

A large number of small and average farmers immediately took advantage of this measure. Nevertheless the regions most heavily hit by terrorism needed a more rational organization with an element of compulsion which would involve pooling all means of protection and farm equipment. In this spirit the Decree of May 11, 1956 Concerning the Organization of Civilian Protection of Crops in Algeria was passed under the terms of the Law of March 16, 1956.

By virtue of this text, the Prefects of the Algerian Departments are authorized to determine, by executive order, the measures which seem indispensable to them in order to ensure the protection, cutting, gathering and storing of the crops and to entrust the carrying out of these measures, in areas and at times to be determined by them, to compulsory producers' associations set up for this purpose on a communal and intercommunal basis.

All the farmers in the regions in which these producers' associations are active, and also the various agricultural organizations, were very anxious to accept their authority in order to:

1. ensure the protection properly speaking of the standing crops and also of future crops, from the moment they are planted, with the help of firebreaks in the fields, stationed look-outs, etc.;
2. facilitate and speed up the harvesting of the standing crops, by pooling available equipment, by organizing work crews and if need be, by acquiring additional equipment.

Finally, in order to cover the expenses of the producers' associations, advances of credit, subsidies for the purchase of equipment and the opportunity for the farmers to become stockholders are provided for.

Since the publication of the Decree of May 11, 1956, several dozen producers' associations have been set up in the eastern part of Algeria in pursuance of these provisions, and the success with which they have functioned proves that this organization is exactly what is needed at the moment.

Furthermore, the Order of June 19, 1956 extended the system of financial aid, provided for by Decision No. 55-031 of the Algerian Assembly, to all the agricultural organizations in the regions suffering from terrorism.

Areas of Insecurity

By Order of April 21, 1956, taken in pursuance of Article 2 of the Decree of March 26, 1956 establishing an extra family allowance for servicemen on duty in North Africa, the whole of Algerian territory was declared to be an area of insecurity.

Regulation of the Crossing of the Algerian-Tunisian Border

The Order of March 14, 1956 altered, by including the Annex of El Oued, the frontier zone as defined in Article First of the Order of November 10, 1955, amending the Order of July 12, 1955 regulating the crossing of the Algerian-Tunisian frontier and restricting travel between the Algerian and Tunisian territories.

Regulation of Entry into Algeria

By Order of March 19, 1956, the Minister Residing in Algeria regulated the entry into Algeria of Frenchmen and foreigners.

Thenceforth, any person going to Algeria, whatever his nationality and the purpose of his trip, must at his entry into this territory be provided with an authorization to travel issued in Algeria by the Governor General, the Prefects and Sub-Prefects and valid for variable periods. Derogations to this measure were, however, provided for certain categories of persons.

Regulation of Departure from Algeria

Persons — At the beginning of the summer season, which normally leads to an exodus of Algerians to Metropolitan France, it appeared necessary for a whole series of measures to be adopted in order to avoid certain delays in the functioning of the public services and, in a general way, of all the services necessary to the maintenance of order. To this end:

—A first Order of May 3, 1956 requires all employers to draw up a schedule of the departure on annual paid vacations of their employees for 1956, which cannot be modified without the express authorization of the Bureau of Labor Inspection, which, to this end, must consult beforehand with the military authority each time that a worker assigned to a territorial unit is concerned.

—A second Order of June 14, 1956, amended by an Order of July 13, regulates in a more general manner the departure from Algeria of all male French citizens of over 20 and under 48 years of age, by subjecting such

departure to a prior authorization. The authority certifies that the man has no mobilized parts of a territory. In the latter case, the period of

—In addition, an Administrative Order of the central administration as of days the 1956 leaves of the exercise of governmental the directors and section heads of the Departmental assistants of these official

Furthermore, within each bureau and agents have their normal

Vehicles — It seemed advisable all touring vehicles licensed in Algeria belonging to persons returning from

Regulation of the Importation

The Order of March 22, 1956, whatever, of powder, explosives made only by special authorization

Likewise, five Orders of various categories of side arms

The Requisition of Algeria

Decree No. 56-630 of June 1956, young men of Algeria with

The aim of that requisition exempt students with a view to it is worth noting that, from the provisions have been extensive

Dissolution of the U.F.N.

The extremist group, "U.F.N." 1956.

departure to a prior authorization which may be valid for a year but which is not granted unless the military authority certifies that the man requesting the authorization is not requisitioned, that he does not belong to the mobilized parts of a territorial unit or that his absence is compatible with the needs of these services. In the latter case, the period of absence may be limited to a maximum of a month.

-In addition, an Administrative Circular of June 13, 1956 urges the various directors and section heads of the central administration as well as the Prefects of the Algerian Departments to limit to a maximum of 15 days the 1956 leaves of the civil servants and employees of the public services directly associated with the exercise of governmental responsibilities. This restriction is intended to cover not only the Prefects, the directors and section heads in the central administration, the Sub-Prefects, the directors and section heads of the Departmental and prefectural services, the heads of communes, etc., but also the immediate assistants of these officials.

Furthermore, within each bureau and each territorial circumscription, a second broader category of civil servants and agents have their normal vacations uniformly set at 30 days.

Vehicles - It seemed advisable to prohibit formally by Order of June 14, 1956, the departure from Algeria of all touring vehicles licensed in Algeria, of more than 13 horsepower, with the exception, however, of those belonging to persons returning definitively to Metropolitan France, to the diplomatic corps, etc.

Regulation of the Importation and Sale of Arms in Algeria

The Order of March 22, 1956 prohibited the importation, purchase or sale of firearms of any nature and caliber whatsoever, of powder, explosives and munitions, and of parts and accessories of weapons. Exceptions can be made only by special authorization of the Director of the National Security in Algeria.

Likewise, five Orders of May 31, June 18 and 19, and July 9 prohibited the importation and sale in Algeria of various categories of side arms: knives, poignards and various other types of equipment.

The Requisition of Algerian Students Exempted from Military Service

Decree No. 56-630 of June 28, 1956 empowers the Governor General to requisition, during the academic vacations, young men of Algeria who have been granted deferred military status in order to continue their studies.

The aim of that requisition is to enable the General Government, if it deems it useful so to do, to call on exempt students with a view to their employment in various projects contributing to the pacification in Algeria. It is worth noting that, from the beginning of the summer vacations now under way, the opportunities offered by these provisions have been extensively used and that they have made possible a number of measures of a special nature.

Dissolution of the U.F.N.A.

The extremist group, "Union Francaise Nord-Africaine," was pronounced dissolved by a Decree of March 16, 1956.

REFORMS

Algeria suffers from economic and social underdevelopment, which calls for urgent and far-reaching action.

It is advisable, nevertheless, to guard against a too frequent tendency to evaluate this situation, not in terms of what this country may have been in a still recent past, but in terms — so it would seem — of an ideal development which one would like to see universally achieved in our time.

The Algeria of 1956 has merely reached the end of a 126-year period of development which transformed it from a medieval state almost completely lacking in organization into an extensively developed country open to all forms of progress. That it has still not been sufficiently developed is only too apparent. But its structure is so strong today, economically as well as administratively, that it may be hoped it will soon be able to stand the most vigorous comparisons provided its expansion, far from being slowed down, is rapidly increased.

In order to accelerate the rate of this evolution, the Government was authorized, by the Law of March 16, 1956, to put into effect a program of economic expansion and social progress in line with Algeria's need to reorganize its basic structures.

Although it is quite obvious that the immediate purpose of the policy of social justice and emancipation which the Government is anxious to promote is to put people's minds and hearts at rest, its essential justification is awareness of France's historical responsibilities, apart from all present considerations, in this land whose destinies she has resolutely taken in hand.

That is the spirit of the program of reforms undertaken by the French Government in Algeria. The measures taken since March 16, 1956 have two fundamental aims in view:

- social equality through the training of new elites, the decentralization of administrative institutions, and the improvement of working conditions;
- social progress through greater productivity, increased food production commensurate with demographic growth, and expanded administrative action.

The Territorial Reorganization of Algeria

The 12 Algerian Departments

The Law of March 16, 1956 authorized the Government to initiate a reform of the circumscriptions in Algeria, warranted by the necessity of further adapting the country's administrative structure to the area and population of the territories administered. The purpose was to give maximum effectiveness to the means which have been, or will be, used to ensure a better future for the Algerian people as well as their social and political advancement.

It is an obvious fact that the area and population of these circumscriptions, set up in 1948 and actually corresponding to the former provinces under military command, were far too large for practical public action and that Algeria had, for a long time, been inadequately administered.

A first step was taken toward territorial reorganization when the Department of Bône and 12 new Algerian "arrondissements" were created by the Law of August 7, 1955 and the Decrees of August 23, 1955 and January 11, 1956.

Nevertheless, it has seemed preferable since then to reorganize the departmental structures according to an over-all program which does not prejudice the future statute of Algeria and which fundamentally aims at determining the bases for the future development of public initiatives in the administrative, economic, social and cultural fields.

Decree No. 56-641 of June 1956
departmental collectivities in northern Algeria.

This reform is expected to have the exercise of public power, which, at these vast territories; and secondly a more active part in the administrative

Finally, this territorial reorganization in more homogeneous units, which characteristics of each region. The new map of Algerian Departments al zone and the area of the high population density, medium sized area where a much smaller population program adapted to their particular

The territorial reorganization

- 1) The former Department of Orléansville
—Department of Orléansville
Massifs;
—Department of Médéa;
—Department of Tizi-Ouzou
unity;
—Department of Algiers;
part, it will never
Algiers and will
Algerian Department

- 2) The former Department of Tlemcen
—Department of Tlemcen
Morocco's outlet
—Department of Mostaganem
—Department of Tiaret
—Department of Oran
population, agriculture
ment of Algiers.

- 3) The former Department of Setif
—Department of Setif
Little Kabylia
—Department of Batna
Nementchas Mountains
—Department of Constantine
and Mila.

- 4) The Department of Algiers

The New Algerian "Arrondissements"

Also in the desire to put works better adapted to the

Decree No. 56-641 of June 28, 1956, by creating eight new territorial circumscriptions, raised the number of departmental collectivities in northern Algeria to twelve.

This reform is expected to have two types of results. In the first place, deconcentration will facilitate the exercise of public power, which, at present, encounters too many difficulties resulting from the extensive area of these vast territories; and secondly, decentralization will satisfy the aspirations of the people, who wish to take a more active part in the administration of their local interests.

Finally, this territorial reorganization reflects the desire to respect Algeria's natural divisions. It results in more homogeneous units, which take into account both the geographical nature and the ethnic and economic characteristics of each region. Thus, with the exception of the frontier Departments of Tlemcem and Bône, the new map of Algerian Departments will be divided into two major sections, corresponding respectively to the coastal zone and the area of the high plateaus. The coastal Departments will have certain traits in common: high population density, medium sized area, modern-type economic activity. For the Departments in the high plateaus, where a much smaller population is scattered over vast stretches of land, there will be a special development program adapted to their particular needs.

The territorial reorganization may be summed up as follows:

1) *The former Department of Algiers has been divided into 4 Departments:*

- Department of Orléansville: consisting of the Chécliff Valley, and bounded by the Ouarsenis and Dahra Massifs;
- Department of Médéa: composed basically of the high plateaus;
- Department of Tizi-Ouzou: consisting of Great Kabylia, which has pronounced geographic and ethnic unity;
- Department of Algiers: reduced to its own "arrondissement" and to that of Blida, excluding its western part, it will nevertheless continue to have a large population concentrated in the urban center of Algiers and will continue to represent an economic force which cannot be compared with the other Algerian Departments.

2) *The former Department of Oran has been divided into 4 Departments:*

- Department of Tlemcem: extending along the Algerian-Moroccan border, it will constitute eastern Morocco's outlet through the port of Nemours and will be much more distinctly Moslem;
- Department of Mostaganem: this will unite the agricultural regions of Mostaganem, Mascara and Relizane;
- Department of Tiaret: made up exclusively of a region of high plateaus, it will closely resemble Médéa.
- Department of Oran: reduced to the "arrondissements" of Oran, Ain-Témouchent, and Sidi-bel-Abbès; in population, agricultural and industrial strength and port facilities, it will be comparable to the Department of Algiers.

3) *The former Department of Constantine has been divided into 3 new Departments:*

- Department of Sétif: comprising the Soummam Valley and the Babor Mountains—in other words, primarily Little Kabylia—it will require a special development program;
- Department of Batna: it will include the high plateaus of the Constantine area, and the Aurès and Nementchas Mountains;
- Department of Constantine: made up of the "arrondissements" of Constantine, Philippeville, Djidjelli and Mila.

4) *The Department of Bône will retain its present boundaries.*

The New Algerian "Arrondissements"

Also in the desire to promote the economic and social development of Algeria within administrative frameworks better adapted to the special characteristics of the various regions, and in order to give fuller play to the

unique quality of each of them, this reorganization had to be accompanied by the creation of new "arrondissements." This primarily affected the former Department of Algiers where local differences had been given insufficient recognition.

Therefore, the Decree of April 28, 1956 also provides for:

- 1) The creation of 5 new "arrondissements":
 - Ténès, made up of the northern part of the "arrondissement" of Orléansville;
 - Boghari, made up of the southern part of the "arrondissement" of Médéa;
 - Bordj-Ménaiel, made up of Lower Kabylia, from the coast to the Palestro region;
 - Teniet-el-Haâd;
 - Biskra.
- 2) Territorial changes in the "arrondissements" of:
 - Miliana, enlarged by adding the western part of the "arrondissement" of Blida;
 - Aumale, to which are attached the mixed and fully organized communes of Ain-Bessem;
 - Bouira, enlarged by adding the Dra-el-Mizan region.

The Three Inspectors General of the Administration on Special Mission

In order to supplement this reform and extend still further the trend toward deconcentration, the Decree of June 28, 1956 provides, in addition, that the Prefects of the Departments of Algiers, Oran and Constantine will be respectively charged with the functions of Inspectors General of the Administration on Special Mission for each of the three groups of Departments corresponding to the three former Departmental divisions.

The three Inspectors General will exercise their duties within a regional structure corresponding to the present military divisions of Algeria. These new administrative echelons will prove extremely valuable in Algeria, because of the need to ensure effective coordination of administrative action, within the framework of the Government's policy of reforms, at the time when the eight new Algerian Departments are just beginning to function. It can therefore be said that the three Inspectors General will be called upon to play a leading role in furthering governmental action.

Organization of the New Department of Bône

Created by the Law of August 7, 1955, the Department of Bône began to receive its first organic elements on that date and its various services were gradually and actively set up so as to enable it to fulfill, as quickly as possible, all of its functions as a Departmental collectivity.

In that spirit, Decree No. 56-575 of June 14, 1956 fixed the composition of the General Council of Bône and determined the electoral circumscriptions of the general councillors, so that this assembly could be installed without having to wait for elections to be held in order to complete it.

In the same way, Decree No. 56-576 of June 14, 1956 dealing with reorganization of the public administration provided that the Prefect of the Department would, with certain reservations, exercise all of his responsibilities in his capacity as the representative of the Department, before October 1, 1956. It should be noted that he already assumes all of his attributes as depository of the authority of the State.

In addition, the Decree provided that the General Council of Bône, which was to be installed before October 1, 1956, would exercise its attributes as of that date, except in budgetary matters for the current fiscal year.

Finally, various other provisions of a temporary nature, coupled with administrative instructions, complete this administrative organization and the setting up of the various services. These provisions will make it possible, within a very short time, to give the Department of Bône effective independence on the administrative level.

Reform of the System of Communes

Elimination of the Mixed Communes
The reform of the municipal organic Statute of Algeria of the Communes and the Department. This provision shall gradually be

Although the principle of a series of plans had nevertheless administrative unit, thus by this 1884.

It is quite obvious that the centers, douars—a certain number of elected officials or the uncertainty

Nevertheless, the time series of the countryside by entrusting them of their local affairs.

Therefore, in pursuance of effective unification of the present April 5, 1884, while at the same time effectively guided and supported

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The municipal councils take into consideration the force in Metropolitan France that the problem of enabling framework, will be dealt with

Finally, the communities cultivate a good many of them and to avoid excessive fragmentation provisions governing communal necessary action.

Reform of the System of Communes

Elimination of the Mixed Communes

The reform of the municipal system in Algeria had long been awaited by the Algerian people, as Article 53 of the organic Statute of Algeria of September 20, 1947 had already provided: "The Algerian collectivities shall be the Communes and the Departments; consequently, the mixed communes ("communes mixtes") shall be abolished. This provision shall gradually be implemented..."

Although the principle of abolishing the mixed communes has not been implemented until the present time, a series of plans had nevertheless been prepared. But all led to replacing the mixed communes by a special type of administrative unit, thus by this fact still departing from French municipal law as defined by the Law of April 5, 1884.

It is quite obvious that when this system is extended to the small rural collectivities — settlements, municipal centers, douars — a certain number of real difficulties arise, primarily as a result of the inexperience of the locally elected officials or the uncertainty of the resources likely to be available to them.

Nevertheless, the time seems to have come today to satisfy the political aspirations of the people living in the countryside by entrusting them, in the familiar setting of their most immediate interests, with the administration of their local affairs.

Therefore, in pursuance of the Law of March 16, 1956, Decree No. 56-642 of June 28, 1956, provided for effective unification of the present communal systems in Algeria, according to the system set up in the Law of April 5, 1884, while at the same time enabling the small rural communities, which benefit by this reform, to be effectively guided and supported in their first efforts.

A certain number of temporary provisions have been included, in fact, with the sole purpose of mitigating the difficulties which the new municipalities are bound to experience during a period of adjustment. But these modifications in the usual system — which, moreover, are strictly limited — do not in any way prejudice the basic principles of the Law of April 5, 1884 and constitute, in a matter so fraught with consequences for the future of Algeria, the minimum of prudence required to prevent communal reform from being doomed to certain failure from the start.

Following are the main provisions of the Decree of June 28, 1956.

The first title determines the method of dividing the territories of the mixed communes and the municipal centers into communes. A commission with headquarters in each "arrondissement" will be charged with studying the basis upon which these communities can be set up. The commission may, however, also consider creating new communes from portions of territories of the fully organized communes ("communes de plein exercice") which often included far too many persons with local civil status.

The municipal councils of these new communes will be elected by a single electoral college. But, in order to take into consideration the existence of certain European settlements, the system of proportional representation in force in Metropolitan France will be used in the communes with more than 9,000 inhabitants. It is explicitly stated that the problem of enabling Moslem women to vote in the elections, which will be solved within a more general framework, will be dealt with at a future date.

Finally, the communities may group themselves into associations of communes, in order to mitigate the difficulties a good many of them are bound to encounter. But in order to concentrate financial and material resources and to avoid excessive fragmentation of the development program which will be launched on their behalf, the legal provisions governing communal associations have been modified in various ways so as to enable them to take the necessary action.

Moreover, the second title of the decree includes temporary provisions, which stipulate, in particular:

- 1) That it will be possible to give full freedom of action at any time to municipalities giving proof of sufficient maturity.
- 2) That administrative supervision will be decentralized and delegated to an intermediary administrative echelon with sufficient specialists and close enough to the communes to assist and advise the local officials. The civil administrators who will no longer have to serve as heads of communes seem to be the most qualified to fulfill this mission of supervision and assistance.
- 3) That police powers will be divided among the new communes and the prefectural delegates, according to the way they are apportioned in the communes provided with national police.

In conclusion, this over-all reform constitutes an essential stage in the development of the new Algeria which the Government has pledged itself to promote. It is sure to receive the support of the rural populations and will facilitate the restoration of calm and confidence.

Implementation of the Reform - The Order of July 12, 1956 determined the membership of the commissions in the "arrondissements" as well as how they will function. These commissions will include the general councillors, heads of mixed communes, presidents of the "djemaâs" in the "arrondissements" concerned and, on occasion two representatives of different electoral colleges from each fully organized commune where the establishment of an autonomous community on part of its territory is under consideration.

Finally, it will be incumbent upon the commission to propose that the area and chief city of the new communities be fully and exactly determined. It may also propose regrouping these communities into associations of communes.

The commissions - as they have been defined and which the Prefects of the Departments may set up very quickly - are destined to play an essential role since, in short, their diligence in completing their task will determine the effective and final elimination of all mixed communes in Algeria.

Supervision of the Communes in Algeria

In accordance with the Law of March 16, 1956, the Decree of May 29, 1956 abrogated the special Algerian system for supervising the budgets of the communes and approving the loans they floated, and determined that the legislation in force in Metropolitan France concerning those matters would apply to all the communes in Algeria without exception. This measure, which constitutes a new element in the policy of administrative deconcentration pursued by the Government, brings about an important reform in matters of municipal administration.

Dissolution of the Municipal Councils of the Fully Organized Communes (Decree No. 56-1264 of December 11, 1956)

The municipal councils of the fully organized communes of Algeria in office at the present time were appointed for six-year terms in 1953, under the Ordinance of March 7, 1944. This ordinance divided the voters into two colleges and also stipulated that three fifths of the elected municipal councillors should belong to the first college, and the remaining two fifths to the second.

This 3/5 to 2/5 ratio applied only to the municipal councils, since the Law of September 11, 1954 had extended to the general councils of the Departments the principle of equal representation of both colleges, already in force in the chambers of the French Parliament and in the Algerian Assembly. The disparity between the size of the populations of the two communities and the number of their representatives in the communal assemblies was further aggravated by the resignation of a considerable number of local councillors belonging to the second college.

Thus, in the 333 fully organized communes of Algeria, in which 934,487 inhabitants of European origin live side by side with 3,189,908 inhabitants with local personal status, many municipal councils found that they

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had lost some or all of their members representing the Moslem population.

Such dislocations, which may be attributed to the circumstances, seriously affected local life by frequently depriving a considerable section of the population of any share in the management of municipal interests, contrary to the spirit and letter of the texts governing the assemblies. Consequently it is obvious that the very legality of the Ordinance of March 7, 1944, which calls for joint representation of the two communities — even though its provisions already no longer correspond to the present facts of coexistence — may be questioned.

Now it is the very essence of the French Republic's power of arbitration that it should step in when equality and respect for the rights of either community is compromised.

The situation described above had not escaped the attention of the Government which had already considered methods of remedying it. But the concrete and constructive approach to a problem of great complexity with many ramifications necessitated the choice of an opportune moment for putting into effect a transitional system, which would respect both the rights and the interests of the two communities and be compatible with the general spirit of France's effort in Algeria.

At the present time, in the areas where the mixed communes have been abolished by the Decree of June 28, 1956, the civil authorities are engaged in setting up new communes as well as provisional administrative organs which — until elections are held for the municipal councils — will represent the people and administer the local interests. By this far-reaching political action, which is a true measure of the spirit of pacification, the Government is anxious to stimulate renewed contact between the populations and the various elements of the administration in order to restore confidence, which for a while was shaken by the rebellion. This action is already under way: 500 new communes have been created; almost 200 of them have already been provided with a special delegation which brings together qualified representatives of the populations.

Such an effort could not be confined to the former mixed communes, alone, since the results expected have value for Algeria as a whole and constitute one of the essential aspects of the policy of pacification. With this broad outlook in mind, the Government decided — by decrees taken pursuant to Article 5 of the Law of March 16, 1956 on special powers — to dissolve the municipal councils of the communes of Algeria and set up in their place bipartite delegations representative of the populations as a whole.

It is self-evident that in cases where it is impossible to set up these delegations in a satisfactory manner, special delegates, either civil or military, will be designated, who will assume full responsibility for the municipalities in question.

The setting up of these provisional organs of administration will take place gradually, beginning with those communes in which the Moslems are not represented on the municipal councils. Such an operation requires a certain amount of time. It ought to be completed at the latest two months before the first elections scheduled in Algeria. Before these are held the electoral rolls will have to be brought up to date. As for the actual elections, the Government intends to ensure and guarantee their genuineness by seeing that the polling places are under the supervision of bodies removed from all local pressure.

Thus, the Government is taking into account the concrete situations which actually exist in the majority of the communes, as well as the necessity of encouraging, at the level of communal administration, a new awareness on the part of the various communities of their collective interests, which it is incumbent on them to manage and defend together, in a spirit of constructive and democratic cooperation.

The Government has set itself the following objectives:

- To normalize the management of local interests, rendered inadequate by the fact that in too many instances no elected representatives of the second college are taking part in the work of the municipal councils;
- To renew on the communal level — where the determination to live together must take shape around concrete tasks to be performed — discussions which have been interrupted by events;

- To make the Town Hall once more the "Common Building" as it is traditionally intended to be;
- To promote the formation of new elites for the Algeria of tomorrow.

The Government intends to offer men of good will an ideal of social progress and of human betterment, with due respect for, and understanding of, the rights as well as the interests of individuals and communities.

The Access of French-Moslems to the Civil Service

The purpose of Decree No. 56-273 of March 17, 1956, enacting measures intended to encourage the access of the French-Moslem citizens of Algeria to the civil service, was to promote a series of measures in derogation of the organic statute of Algeria and the general statute concerning civil servants.

There has, of course, been full legal equality in this domain for a long time among all the inhabitants of Algeria, but it must be recognized that this equality is not adequately reflected in actual practice.

The steady increase in school enrollments, along with the raising of the social and intellectual level of more strata of Algerian society, will in the near future effectively enable the Moslems, to the same degree as other French citizens, to take their rightful place in the administrative life of the country.

The Government wished to correct at once the difficulties still encountered by Moslem youth in taking the open competitive examinations. These young people often remain in school longer or begin their schooling later than their European counterparts, and as a result fail to meet the age requirements usually set for access to government positions or for admission to institutions of higher education and to technical schools.

Article First of the decree therefore provides (during a ten-year period) for extending these age limits by five years, on an extraordinary basis, for the benefit of young Moslems. The extension thus provided on their behalf must not be interpreted as constituting a special privilege, but rather as a measure intended to reestablish equality of opportunity to succeed for all civil service candidates.

Article Two has a different bearing. Its aim, notwithstanding the traditional principles of the Civil Service, is to allow a certain number of civil servants to be hired on a contractual basis for positions usually filled by competitive examination. This special measure, which has been adopted on behalf of Moslem candidates, will apply for a limited time and will, at most, affect only half of the positions vacant.

It will, in the first place, enable the present vacancies in Algeria to be filled more rapidly than by the customary procedures; these vacancies are causing the administration of the country's public affairs to suffer considerably. The measure will, above all, make it possible for the more advanced Moslems to accede to the Civil Service insofar as they possess the desired aptitudes, even though they do not always have the official diplomas which are a compulsory requirement for candidates.

Thus the way has been paved for the Moslems to take a broader part in the administrative life of Algeria. Through contact with those of French stock, they will soon acquire solid experience in administrative practices and traditions and no doubt some will show great ability in the field of public administration.

Measures Preparatory to the Implementation of the Reform

While waiting for the methods of implementing the decree to be put into effect, the Minister Residing in Algeria, by the Orders of March 24 and 29, 1956, temporarily halted all hiring of personnel, whether civil service or not, for the administrations of the State in Algeria, for the Algerian public services, for local collectivities and also for their public agencies.

Next, the first order implementing the reform, issued on April 19, 1956, set up a commission of ten, five of whom were French-Moslems, which is destined to play an essential role in putting this new policy into practice.

Under the chairmanship of Mr. May intellectual integrity and high moral staff of the Minister Residing in Moslems, as well as a representative enables the work of the Commission

The jurisdiction of the Commission vice personnel. In order to fulfill sesses very broad means of investigation

M. Robert Lacoste made a clearly the importance he attaches to the French-Moslems integrating the French-Moslems into its work uninterruptedly since its and devotion of its members, w expressed will of the Government

The First Texts Implemented

Two Orders of May 4, 1956 of the State functioning in Algeria

A) The first order determines the basis in pursuance of Article 1

In the first place, the concerning civil servants (French degrees, depending on the category the Algiers "Institut d'Etudes

B) The second order specifies the conditions for hiring of temporary, auxiliary, contractual) by the special consultative commission

C) Finally, a third order decree in the local administration. By virtue of this text, half of hired on a contract basis.

In the same way, by Moslems. The candidates must be a commission made up of leaders with a view to implementing the dates must meet for each type

D) Moreover, the Order concerning the positions offered

E) A single general restrictions that are definitely technical. The two Orders of June 7, and they satisfy the requirements

Under the chairmanship of Mr. Madhi Salah, Judge of the Algiers Court of Appeal, a distinguished figure of great intellectual integrity and high moral authority, the Commission includes—along with the head of the personal staff of the Minister Residing in Algeria—highly placed civil servants who are specialists in Civil Service problems, as well as a representative of the veterans and war victims, and five prominent persons whose cooperation enables the work of the Commission to proceed in the direction desired by M. Robert Lacoste.

The jurisdiction of the Commission extends to the hiring of both employees under contract and non-civil service personnel. In order to fulfill the important mission assigned to it by the Minister Residing in Algeria, it possesses very broad means of investigation.

M. Robert Lacoste made a point of installing the Commission in person on April 21, 1956, so as to indicate clearly the importance he attached to this reform, which will have far-reaching effects on the prospects of integrating the French-Moslems into the administrative life of Algeria. Immediately after it was set up, the Commission began to study the first measures prepared by the administration for implementing the reform and has continued its work uninterruptedly since then. There is no doubt that this Commission's action, strengthened by the ability and devotion of its members, will, in the very near future, reinvigorate the administration, in accordance with the expressed will of the Government.

The First Texts Implementing the Reform

Two Orders of May 4, 1956 laid down the rules for implementing the Decree of March 17, 1956 in the services of the State functioning in Algeria, in the Algerian services and in the Algerian public agencies.

A) The first order determines the conditions of appointment of the French-Moslem employees hired on a contract basis in pursuance of Article 2 of the Decree of March 17, 1956.

In the first place, these employees must meet the general conditions stipulated in the general statute concerning civil servants (French nationality, good moral conduct, etc.) and, in particular, hold one of the required degrees, depending on the category of position; second, as soon as they assume their duties, they must enroll in the Algiers "Institut d'Etudes Politiques" (Institute for Political Studies).

B) The second order specifies that by 1956 two thirds of the non-civil service personnel (occasional, temporary, auxiliary, contractual) hired must be French-Moslems. The candidacies of these employees will be studied by the special consultative commission.

C) Finally, a third order, also issued on May 4, 1956, determined the conditions for implementing the basic decree in the local administrative services of the Algerian Departments and communes and their public agencies. By virtue of this text, half of the vacancies at each level in these services are to be filled by French-Moslems hired on a contract basis.

In the same way, by 1956, two thirds of all types of non-civil service employees hired are to be French-Moslems. The candidates must prove that they hold one of the diplomas required for each category. Finally, a commission made up of leaders in a wide variety of fields is set up in the capital of each Algerian Department; with a view to implementing the decree, this Commission is charged with establishing the prerequisites the candidates must meet for each type of position.

D) Moreover, the Order of July 10, 1956 specified certain methods for implementing these different texts regarding the positions offered by the territorial communities in the Southern Territories.

E) A single general restriction was made, necessitated by the general interest. It concerns access to positions that are definitely technical in nature, for which it is indispensable that the candidates have special training. The two Orders of June 7, and 25, 1956 therefore specified that French-Moslem candidates will have to prove that they satisfy the requirements of diplomas or degrees usually required for access to these positions. Nevertheless,

these posts are enumerated very specifically in the orders mentioned above and the same rules of proportion apply to access to these positions as to the others.

F) Finally, the Order of June 27, 1956 specified the conditions for filling vacancies, previously declared reserved for French-Moslems, when there are more such openings than candidates. The same order also grants powers of investigation to the commission charged with seeing to the implementation of the reform.

The First Practical Steps in Implementing the Reform

In pursuance of this regulation, the first list of posts in the central and departmental administrations and the civil services, declared vacant and open exclusively to French-Moslems, was published on May 5, 1956 and widely circulated through the *Official Journal of Algeria*, the local press and radio. It included executive positions in the central and departmental administrations and the various branches of the Algerian civil service.

Between May 15 and August 10, 1956, this first list was followed by many others pertaining to the services of the State and of Algeria, making a total of 5,093 positions, divided as follows:

485 positions in category A
1,081 positions in category B
2,761 positions in category C
766 positions in category D

To these must be added the administrative positions in the Department of National Education. Finally, publication of the vacancies in the staffs of elementary and secondary school teachers was postponed until the beginning of the 1956-1957 school year, for practical reasons.

Most of these 5,093 vacancies are for administrative and supervisory positions. Among them are openings for inspectors in the Department of Taxation, the Department of Maritime Navigation, the Land Title Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the Bureau of Standards; for engineers in the Department of Public Works, the Department of Highways and Mines, the Land Title Department, the Department of Land Settlement and Hydraulic Works, the Department of Agriculture, the Conservation Department; for police officials and officers; for doctors and a hospital administrator in the Department of Public Health; for a director of research and a research assistant in the Algiers National Agricultural School; for directors of social centers and directors of archeological excavations.

Since August, well over 4,000 applications for these positions have been received from French-Moslem candidates. During its May, June and July meetings alone, the commission charged with drawing up the list of approved candidates selected 758 candidates, all of whom have been hired; they have already been placed or are being placed in the central and prefectural administrations. Of these 758 candidates, 17 (8 of them civil administrators in the ministries) are in category A; 56 in category B; 115 in category C; 570 in category D.

The work of the consultative commission, moreover, is continuing uninterruptedly and so is the publication of lists of new openings and the filing of the new applications which are constantly being made. The result of the commission's work during the first week of September shows that 719 new applicants have been accepted in the financial services, the Department of Public Works, the "Sûreté Nationale" (National Security Department), the broadcasting services, the central and departmental administrations, the postal, telephone and telegraph services. Positions have been filled on the staff of the Joint Fund of the Departments and Communes, in the Police Department, the financial administration, the postal, telegraph and telephone services and in the ministries and prefectures. These figures apply to the services of the State and of Algeria.

There remain the services of the local collectivities and their public agencies which require—and this is more delicate—that consultative commissions be set up in the Departments beforehand. At present, 1,141 positions have been offered and these openings have been published at different times in the press. Of these vacancies, 658 are in the communal administrations and 483 are in the hospitals of the four Departments.

Measures to Combat Unemployment
Decree No. 56-289 of March 1956
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aid, in the development of Algeria
certain warranted exceptions —

The Nature of These Enterprises

In order to implement this
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Priority in Hiring

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Measures To Be Taken

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The Effect of This Decree

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Measures to Combat Unemployment: The Employment of French-Moslems in Private Enterprise

Decree No. 56-289 of March 26, 1956 determined that the organizations, establishments and enterprises in Algeria which furnish a public service, as well as all the private enterprises which are cooperating, with public aid, in the development of Algeria, are required — in line with the measures applying to the Civil Service, and with certain warranted exceptions — when hiring new employees to reserve half the vacant positions for French-Moslems.

The Nature of These Enterprises

In order to implement this decree, an Order of May 30, 1956 specified, in the first place, the types of enterprises or establishments covered: category A, those furnishing a public service, such as the railroads, the Algerian Gas and Electric Company, etc.; category B, those which receive financial aid from a public collectivity, or in which such a collectivity may own stock, either for their running expenses, establishment or expansion; category C, those holding contracts from the State, Algeria, or local communities and their public agencies, with regard to the employees working on those contracts.

Priority in Hiring

The order goes on to stipulate that the employer, in addition to setting aside at least half the positions for French-Moslems, must, when he has to replace an individual French-Moslem wage earner, give priority in hiring to another French-Moslem.

Measures To Be Taken If These Regulations Are Not Complied With

If these regulations are not complied with, enterprises in category B may be deprived of financial aid, as well as all other advantages granted by the public collectivities, including contributions of capital, and they are generally required to make a special payment, the rate of which may, however, be reduced by at least half upon proof that these regulations could not be met because of the absence on the Algerian labor market of candidates with the necessary requirements.

The Effect of This Decree

In spite of the practical difficulties which the complexity of this regulation may entail for its implementation, it will take effect very soon and there is no doubt that it will cause far-reaching changes in the character of the labor market.

In the first place, it may be noted that the regulation applies to an extremely broad group of enterprises and businesses, not only those providing a public service but also — and this group is especially numerous — those which receive financial aid from a collectivity or which do work for a collectivity. It is thus likely to produce substantial results from the quantitative standpoint. This decree, is actually aimed at the skilled worker more than at the ordinary worker since, in private enterprises, almost all of the latter are Moslem. It will be an appreciable factor, therefore, from the qualitative point of view as well, in improving the conditions of the labor market in favor of the French-Moslems.

By what practical methods will this be accomplished? In the first place, the decree will make it possible for the Administration to expand considerably its program of vocational training for adults, since this training can have a much broader field of action in the future. Moreover, besides encouraging the Moslem workers to acquire vocational training, which will make it easier for them to find work, it will also, above all, encourage enterprises to cooperate with the Administration in its effort to improve the position of the unskilled worker, either by granting French-Moslems opportunities to acquire this training, or even by directly organizing or developing an educational program for them.

The system of payments demanded in case the decree is not complied with may no doubt seem severe at first glance. The enterprise, in fact, will have to make the payments even when the impossibility of hiring French-

Moslems meeting the requirements for the position has been certified.

Nevertheless, this obligation which is imposed upon the employers must not in any way be considered a penalty. Its necessity must be weighed in terms of the end in view, which is both to increase the value of the Moslem working class and to promote its rapid advancement on a large scale. It should be pointed out, in this connection, that all the payments for noncompliance will be turned over to a special fund for the extension of apprenticeship and vocational training opportunities.

Thus, although this reform will result in an increased financial burden on the enterprises covered by the decree, far from considering themselves penalized, these enterprises must gladly and without reservation pay their share of the cost of the government's action.

This group of provisions constitutes, beyond all doubt, an important remedy for the grave problem of under-employment in Algeria and expresses the concern of the Minister Residing in Algeria to press all the vital forces of this country into the service of a policy of cooperation and concord.

Agricultural Measures

Reform of the Government Agencies Concerned with Agriculture

The reorganization of the Department of Agriculture of Algeria's General Government emphasizes M. Lacoste's determination to turn his attention to this important sector of the Algerian economy.

Agricultural production represents 37% of the gross domestic product and furnishes the livelihood of 80% of the population. Along with the modernized farming carried on by Europeans or Moslems, there exists a traditional method of farming practiced by 600,000 fellahs and their families. The major problem is to improve these traditional farming methods as soon as possible.

The growth of the population jeopardizes anew each day the gains that have been made while, as a result of erosion, the soil is deteriorating at an alarming rate. Moreover, the technical lag constitutes one of the greatest obstacles for there is shortage of adequately trained personnel to advise those still using traditional methods.

An effort on this scale, intended to raise the standard of living of a whole segment of the population, cannot be accomplished without the adherence and cooperation of the people. Such a policy calls for coherent action and considerable financial means and for putting an end to administrative overdepartmentalization and the scattering of agencies. Two of them, up until the present time, have never had sufficient funds at their disposal.

The Order of April 30, 1956 provides for:

- 1-As close coordination as possible - while preserving a high degree of flexibility - between the services concerned by integrating them into a larger department;
- 2-The creation, within the department, of a Commissariat for the "Paysanat" and for the Agricultural Provident Societies;
- 3-Strict coordination in programs drawn up by the Department of Agriculture, the "Paysanat," the Conservation Department, the Department for the Restoration of the Soil with those of the Department of Hydraulics.

Thus reorganized, the agricultural agencies of the General Government will be able without delay to set about implementing the reforms decided upon by the Government, as outlined below.

Agricultural Wages

By the Order of March 17, 1956 the Minister Residing in Algeria decided that individual agricultural wages cannot be lower than the sum of the rates of the guaranteed minimum daily wage fixed by the Order of October 12, 1951 and a daily across-the-board bonus which has risen as follows:

Wage Zone	Minimum guaranteed daily wage (Order Oct. 12, 1951)	Minimum guaranteed daily wage (Order Oct. 12, 1956)
First	345	316
Second	316	276
Third	276	

The same Order stipulates

The Agricultural Part

There exists in Algeria which contains elements of Moslems, it is generally known that the harvest is divided, the ten-

Actually, it is a custom and which assumes the form of a closely links the "khamm" are not especially connected denied the classification owner deducts from the total, with the result that the new advances.

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This is the aim of D between the landowner and given to the arrangement or service, either in kind declared to be public pol

Finally, it must be of rural wage earners, so fore advisable to prevent place the tenant contract those intended to benefit such that the farm could system of wage labor.

In order to give the t sions will be set up to de under the "khamessa" s

Wage Zone	Minimum guaranteed daily wage (Order of Oct. 12, 1951)	Daily bonus fixed by Order of April 14, 1955	Daily bonus fixed by Order of March 17, 1956	New minimum daily wage	Increase in the minimum daily wage
First	345 fr.	82 fr.	180 fr.	525 fr.	98 fr.
Second	316 fr.	74 fr.	164 fr.	480 fr.	90 fr.
Third	276 fr.	64 fr.	164 fr.	440 fr.	100 fr.

The same Order stipulates the penalties to be imposed on employers paying wages lower than the above rates.

The Agricultural Partnership Contracts

There exists in Algeria an agricultural contract which is very widespread among the Moslem population, and which contains elements both of the tenant system and of farming on a partnership basis. Practiced only among Moslems, it is generally known as "khamessa" or, in French, as "métayage au quint." It means that when the harvest is divided, the tenant takes a fifth of the crop and the landowner keeps the rest.

Actually, it is a customary contract which is found in the legal evolution of most countries at a given period and which assumes the form of a partnership, even though it is basically a matter of hiring someone's labor. It closely links the "khammes" to the interests of his employer and leads the worker to perform tasks for him which are not especially connected with farming. Under the pretext that the "khammes" is legally a partner, he is denied the classification of wage earner and all the ensuing advantages. When the harvest is divided, the landowner deducts from the tenant's fifth the advances in kind he has made to the "khammes" since the last distribution, with the result that the latter's share is below the subsistence level for himself and his family for the coming year. He will therefore inevitably be doomed to remain within the bonds of his contract in order to ask for new advances.

There are at present between 130 and 140 thousand "khammes" in Algeria and only 100 thousand permanently employed agricultural wage earners; no effort to improve the condition of agricultural workers will be possible if the "khamessa" remains unchanged in its ancient form. It is therefore important to put an end to this anachronistic situation by transforming the "khammes" either into an agricultural worker protected by the labor laws or into one who shares in the products of the soil, with his share fixed at a half.

This is the aim of Decree No. 56-292 of March 26, 1956 which requires the harvest to be equally divided between the landowner and the other party to the contract, whatever name—contractual, traditional or customary—is given to the arrangement between them. The tenant or partner cannot, in addition, be subjected to any fee, labor or service, either in kind, money, or work. In order to make the measure effective, the provisions of the decree are declared to be public policy and are applicable to current contracts.

Finally, it must be pointed out that whenever a social measure has been put into effect in the past on behalf of rural wage earners, some farmers have evaded the legal provisions by employing only "khammes." It is therefore advisable to prevent the implementation of the present decree from leading the farmers systematically to replace the tenant contract by a system of farming the land themselves, which could work to the disadvantage of those intended to benefit from the reform. There may nevertheless be cases where economic conditions would be such that the farm could show normal profits only if the owners were able to replace the tenant contract by the system of wage labor.

In order to give the two categories concerned all the necessary guarantees, the decree specifies that commissions will be set up to deal with the demands of lessors or landowners who would like to take land now being farmed under the "khamessa" system and farm it themselves.

Improving the Lot of the Tobacco Growers

In an Order of June 9, 1956 the Minister Residing in Algeria required the cooperative agencies which have a monopoly in the purchasing of the tobacco crop to pay an additional 60 francs per kilogram (2.2 lbs.) to producers for the 1955 harvest.

Three measures deal with the financing of this step:

- 1—An Order of June 9, 1956 modified the tax on domestic consumption of tobacco, resulting in a slight uniform increase of 1 franc per package or tin of tobacco, in the price paid by the consumer.
- 2—The "Caisse Algérienne de Compensation des Prix" (Algerian Price Stabilization Fund) is also asked to participate and to collect all the proceeds from the increase paid by the consumer.
- 3—Finally, about \$1.7 million will be realized from the increase of 60 francs per kilogram added to the purchasing price of Algerian tobacco sold to the "Régie Autonome des Tabacs et Allumettes" in Metropolitan France.

As soon as M. Lacoste became aware of the plight of the Algerian tobacco farmers, he focussed his attention on it. There are, in fact, about 20,000 tobacco growers in Algeria, almost all of them French-Moslems; including khaddars, khammes and families, around 200,000 Moslems are dependent on tobacco culture for their livelihood.

This group of measures is therefore intended to ensure this hardworking group of fellahs of a more equitable compensation since it will result in a total of about \$2.7 million being placed in circulation in Algeria. This sum—to be paid over in its entirety and with as much publicity as possible to the planters as well as to their khaddars and khammes—will supplement wages by an average of \$57 per hectare (2.47 acres) under cultivation.

The decision taken by the Minister Residing in Algeria clearly demonstrates the determination of the Government to give priority, by every possible means, to raising the standard of living of the most impoverished Algerian masses.

Raising the Wages of the Alfa Grass Pickers

The Order of July 13, 1956 raised the minimum wage to be paid to the alfa grass pickers during the 1956-57 harvest by the lessees of the land in alfa grass. The minimum price per quintal (220 lbs.) brought to the processing area has been raised to 400 francs, a one third increase.

This measure has a far-reaching social effect. It will considerably increase the income of a large number of extremely poor rural workers on the High Plateaus. Although it is difficult to determine the exact size of this group, which consists of as many migratory workers as of nonmigratory ones and varies in number from year to year, it can nevertheless be estimated that an average of about 50,000 heads of families will be the exclusive beneficiaries.

Reform of the Landholding System

There are several legal categories of land in Algeria:

- 1—"melk" land, or privately owned land;
- 2—"arch" or collectively owned land, which is inalienable and of which the members of the collectivity have only the right of enjoyment;
- 3—land said to be "francisé," because, since 1873, it has come under French Law, regardless of the personal status of the landowner.

The complexity of the landholding system in the Algerian Departments has always severely restricted agricultural development. The breaking up of land into small holdings, a situation which is made worse by joint possession, the uncertainty as to the rights of a great many occupants of the land in Moslem areas, the collective nature

of much of the land have always been able to meet the increasing need.

There is no doubt that the measures of a legal nature dealt with in this aim in view, Decree No. 156 of June 28, 1956, which provides for the development of farmland, reclamation and restoration are being carried out.

advisable:

- a) Friendly exchanges between communes.
- b) Landholdings will be grouped in order to facilitate drainage and irrigation of enclaves.
- c) Farms will be regrouped in order to be constituted as such.

Finally, the decree sets up a Commission for conducting investigations.

Fund for the Encouragement of Agriculture

This Fund was established by the Government in order to encourage the development of the essential factors in settlement. In order to encourage the development of agriculture, the Fund will lend up to a maximum of 3 million francs.

This system, however, is not without its drawbacks. The central organ, a public agency, must coordinate the measures and means employed in the parceling out of land.

The general purpose of the Fund is to help farmers or to those with little means. The Fund may of course be used for other purposes.

Moreover, all land exploited by the State or by the communes is also turned over to the Fund. It may be fully developed. In order to encourage the development of agriculture, the Fund will lend up to a maximum of 3 million francs where there is particularly poor land.

Finally, the Fund is part of the "Paysanat" which will make possible the development of agriculture.

Following are the first steps taken by the Board of Directors of the Fund, June 28, 1956 entrusted the management of the Fund to the State.

of much of the land have always been and still are obstacles in the way of implementing an agricultural policy able to meet the increasing needs of a rapidly growing population.

There is no doubt that the level of agricultural production can be raised very considerably by conditional measures of a legal nature dealing with the landholding system.

With this aim in view, Decree No. 56-290 of March 26, 1956 determined that in order to accelerate and intensify the development of farmland in Algeria, especially in the irrigable areas and the areas in which soil conservation and restoration are being carried out, the following landholding reforms will be put into effect wherever advisable:

- a) Friendly exchanges will be encouraged and a committee for this purpose has been set up in each commune.
- b) Landholdings will be reorganized by a series of detailed operations. This will facilitate the opening of drainage ditches and canals, the construction of banquettes for soil conservation, and the elimination of enclaves.
- c) Farms will be reparable through a new distribution of lots. This regrouping of land will enable farms to be constituted which could successfully use modern agricultural techniques.

Finally, the decree sets up the very complex framework for carrying out these operations as well as a procedure for conducting investigations of the landholding system with a view to putting Moslem holdings on a firm basis.

Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership and Development

This Fund was established by Decree No. 56-291 of March 26, 1956 for the same reasons that led to a reform of the landholding system: small-farm ownership is, in fact, a social necessity since lawful ownership is one of the essential factors in settling the rural populations on the land and ensuring their economic and social advancement. In order to encourage farm ownership the Algerian administration has up to now made available to the credit agencies (Mutual Agricultural Credit Fund and Agricultural Provident Societies) long-term grants enabling them to lend up to a maximum of 3 million francs (around \$8,600) to small farmers who wish to purchase a farm.

This system, however, can produce only limited results. That is why it was deemed advisable to set up a central organ, a public agency possessing financial autonomy and legal status, and charged with coordinating all the measures and means employed to accelerate small-farm ownership and to assist in the initiatives being taken in the parceling out of land.

The general purpose of the Fund is to acquire farmland in Algeria and to turn its development over to landless farmers or to those with little land. In addition, land may be expropriated for public purposes on behalf of the Fund and the Fund may of course receive real estate free or for a price, with full rights of ownership.

Moreover, all land expropriated for purposes of landholding reform as well as that expropriated in the irrigable areas is also turned over to this Fund. It will have to make all necessary improvements on all this land so that it may be fully developed. In order to fulfill its purpose, the Fund has at its disposal resources coming either from grants or advances from public funds, or from loans, and its activity will take place primarily in certain areas where there is particularly widespread fragmentation of farms.

Finally, the Fund is perfectly in keeping with the present organization of agricultural credit and with the program of the "Paysanat" since these different agencies will provide those who will be resettled with the funds which will make possible the rational development of their family farms.

Following are the first measures for implementing this reform. Since the administration of the Fund is in the hands of a Board of Directors which includes representatives of the Government and Agriculture, the Order of June 28, 1956 entrusted the chairmanship of this organ to M. Chavanon, "Maître de Requêtes" to the Council of State.

In addition, a decision of April 4, 1956 defined the methods for dividing up the farmland intended to be sold in accordance with the Decree of March 26, 1956. This decree defines the nature of these lots, their topography, shape, and the encumbrances and other obligations which might be attached to them.

Development of the Irrigable Areas and Possibility of Expropriating Inadequately Developed Land Within These Areas

Since 1920, a great effort has been made to construct huge storage dams. The landowners, however, have not always constructed the facilities necessary for taking full advantage of the investments made by the public powers. It is estimated, in fact, that at least about 74,000 acres of land in the irrigable areas could be converted from dry farming to irrigated farming.

It is quite obvious, that, under the present circumstances, it is inconceivable that all the water collected at great cost in the storage dams should remain unused. Any landowner who remains indifferent to this requirement will not, in the future, be allowed the full enjoyment of his land. He will make himself liable to expropriation of that portion of his land in which irrigation is possible but which has not been normally developed.

This is the main purpose of Decree No. 56-293 of March 26, 1956 which aims at effectively stepping up the irrigation program in the designated areas by compelling the farm owners to develop their land through the consistent and regular practice of irrigated farming. If, within a specified time limit, the lots of land have not been or are not being normally developed, full or partial expropriation of these lots will be ordered.

However strict they may be, the measures considered are not lacking in flexibility. On the one hand, a lot is considered sufficiently developed if two thirds of it is being irrigated. On the other hand, the deadline has been postponed for some time in the case of landowners concerned when an order has set up a partially equipped area; nevertheless, this postponement does not prevent expropriation when the landowner does not do sufficient work on his property before the deadline.

Whenever the machinery of expropriation must be put into motion, the Governor General will be able to resort to an accelerated procedure. As soon as there is proof that the land has not been sufficiently developed, he will have the power to issue an injunction ordering the landowner to irrigate the land and, at the end of a year, he will be able to order expropriation, provided, however, that he consult the commission set up for that purpose. Finally, it must be emphasized that land is expropriated on behalf of the Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership and Development. In all, the implementation of this decree will contribute greatly toward furthering the economic and social advancement of the Algerian rural populations.

Cooperative Administrative Agencies for the Irrigation and Soil Restoration Projects and the Limitation of the Size of Farms in the Irrigable Areas

Decree No. 56-414 of April 25, 1956 provides for agrarian reforms designed to hasten the economic development of Algeria and encourage the social advancement of the rural populations.

Its purpose is, first, to set up compulsory administrative agencies for the irrigation and soil restoration projects so as to obtain the optimum development of the irrigable regions and, second, to limit the size of farms, which, considering the high yields obtained in these regions, will enable new farmers to be settled on the land.

Finally, a Department of Hydraulics and Rural Development is set up within the central administration, replacing the Department of Land Settlement and Hydraulics.

1. *The Establishment of Administrative Agencies* - Wherever the agricultural associations seem unable to develop the land rapidly by irrigation or to build the hydraulic works for defense against destructive waters, the Governor General, may, after investigation, set up collective irrigation zones termed, depending on their condition, irrigable areas or immediately irrigable areas and zones termed conservation areas. In each of these zones, the Department of Hydraulics and Rural Development is in charge of constructing and repairing the installations.

In addition, depending on the technical management and the hydraulic works, assisted by a legal status and run by a board of directors, taxes are levied to cover the costs of making major repairs or

Finally, with regard to the Administration of Farm Ownership and Development, the total size of the area of approximately 50 of this amount will be expropriated when this decree is published after that date.

Within the areas already exceeding the limit, have a

The landowners who take into account the increment. On the other hand, in the event of this increment, equal to this increment, must be paid by the owner. Ownership and Development

In conclusion, this irrigable zones will make assistance of the Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership and Development

Agricultural Credit

In line with the evolution of the mutual credit setup, the Government seemed desirable to give greater flexibility of operation

The important role of the development of the trade and improving their agricultural production

Decree No. 56-294 of March 26, 1956 relates to that of the Central Agricultural Credit Fund for the determination of the minimum funds which are made available to the board, 9 h

Decree No. 56-295 of March 26, 1956 relates to the Loans by modeling it after the Fund to be represented

In addition, depending on whether it is a question of irrigable areas or immediately irrigable areas, the technical management and the maintenance of these installations will be the responsibility either of the Department of Hydraulics, assisted by a local consultative committee made up of irrigators, or of a local agency, possessing legal status and run by a board of directors made up of civil servants and representatives of the users. In all cases, taxes are levied to cover mainly the annual amortization of expenditures made by Algeria in replacing equipment and making major repairs of the networks.

Finally, with regard to the soil conservation areas only, when Algeria's economic and social interests warrant it, the Administration may expropriate land within these areas on behalf of the Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership and Development.

2. Limitation of the Size of Farms in the Irrigable Zones.—Within the different irrigable or immediately irrigable areas, the total size of the lots belonging to a single landowner cannot exceed 123.5 acres, to which is added an area of approximately 50 acres for each child living or with heirs, up to a maximum of 370 acres. All land in excess of this amount will be expropriated. In the case of land belonging to joint-stock companies already in existence when this decree is published, the size is limited to 247 acres. This is reduced to 123.5 acres for companies established after that date.

Within the areas already set up, Algeria may waive expropriation of all or part of the lots which, although they exceed the limit, have actually been improved with a view to regular irrigation.

The landowners whose property has been expropriated are compensated but this indemnification does not take into account the increment in land value resulting from the improvements made by Algeria with a view to irrigation. On the other hand, in the event Algeria waives expropriation of certain lots, the landowner must pay an amount equal to this increment. The expropriated lots, as well as the sums representing the unearned increments, which must be paid by the owners of nonexpropriated land, are turned over to the Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership and Development.

In conclusion, this decree will probably have far-reaching effects since merely limiting the size of farms in the irrigable zones will make it possible to recover over 47,000 acres in the areas already constituted which, with the assistance of the Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership, will facilitate the settling of nearly 10,000 fellahs and their families.

Agricultural Credit

In line with the evolution of agricultural credit—which will gradually make it possible to integrate within the mutual credit setup, the complementary systems of the Agricultural Provident Societies and the Bank for Farm Loans—it seemed desirable to unify the structure of the three central Algerian agricultural credit agencies so as to obtain greater flexibility of operations and an identity of theory and method in the allotment of agricultural credit.

The important role of the Agricultural Provident Societies is common knowledge. Their purpose is to further the development of the traditional methods of farming by placing at the disposal of the fellahs the funds necessary for improving their agricultural methods.

Decree No. 56-294 of March 26, 1956 changed the name of the Common Fund of the Agricultural Provident Societies to that of Central Fund, and modeled the organization of its Board of Directors on that of the Algerian Mutual Agricultural Credit Fund. An Order of April 10, 1956 appointed the members of the Board of Directors. It reflects the determination of the Minister Residing in Algeria to have the representatives of the interested parties administer the funds which are made available to the "Paysanat" with a view to improving the lot of the fellahs. In fact, out of 17 seats on this board, 9 have been given to French-Moslems, who will thus be in the majority.

Decree No. 56-295 of March 26, 1956 modified the membership of the Board of Directors of the Bank for Farm Loans by modeling it also on that of the Algerian Mutual Agricultural Credit Fund and enabled agencies assisted by the Fund to be represented on this Board. An Order of April 18, 1956 determined the composition of the Board of

Directors. Positions have been established for two Government Commissioners so as to enable the Administration to control the allocation of public funds made available to these agencies.

Agrarian Reform: Decree of July 13, 1956

Landholding reform, the development of the irrigable areas, the limitation of the size of the farms and the expropriations likely to be ordered within these areas, reform of agricultural credit agencies, establishment of the Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership—all these constitute a group of measures intended to enable as many Moslem farmers as possible, who now have little or no land, to own and operate small family farms. These measures form the necessary bases for any serious effort to renovate the economic and social structure of such a fundamentally agricultural country as Algeria.

But there is danger that these measures would remain ineffectual if they were not part of a larger whole and especially if they were not supplemented by a method of implementation clearly marking the Government's determination to put its intentions into practice.

This was the purpose of Decree No. 56-691 of July 13, 1956, which culminates the structure of agrarian reform in Algeria. It has a twofold bearing: first, because the action the Government wishes to undertake is urgent, it institutes extraordinary procedures on behalf of certain methods by which the Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership and Development may acquire landed property, with concern for safeguarding the essential rights of those involved; second, in order to bring about far-reaching reforms, it authorizes the transfer to the Fund of large estates which were formerly carved out of the common domain.

A. The Transfer to the Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership and Development of Large Estates and Forest Tracts and the Justification of This Measure—The essential purpose of the promoters of the policy called "large-scale settlement," inaugurated by the Second Empire, was to accelerate the peopling of Algeria and its development by granting large estates either in the form of mere grants for farming purposes or in the form of actual transfers of property. Later on, these estates were all finally ceded to those to whom they had been allotted, generally not in return for any appreciable consideration, and sometimes completely free of charge. But it has now been established that this policy was only partially effective, for European settlement was less definitive where these large estates were concerned than in the case of more limited grants, and even the management and exploitation of these estates met with unequal success.

For that reason, transferring them to the Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership during the present population crisis is dictated, as much by economic necessity, as by an elementary desire for fairness.

The Decree of July 13, 1956 therefore provides that all the large estates or tracts of forest land of more than 2,470 acres, which had been assigned one or more times by the State gratuitously or for valuable consideration may be immediately transferred to the Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership in their entirety by statutory texts. This applies also to all assets situated in Algeria, to charges and obligations attached to these estates, with the exception, however, of all assets of an industrial nature and of course, of the accounts and investments belonging to the owners of the estates.

B. The Procedures of Expropriation and Transfer—Taking into account the provisions of the Decrees of March 26 and April 25, 1956, the Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership and Development will thus have property from five different sources at its disposal. For each of these sources, the decree of July 13, 1956 determines or specifies the particular terms of acquisition. It is certainly advisable to try to eliminate as far as possible all the pitfalls concealed in such innovating measures which are often fatal to their effective implementation—pitfalls which risk hampering their execution, even making them inapplicable.

1—The decree therefore establishes, in the first place, a procedure for transferring large estates of over 2,470 acres, guaranteeing fair indemnification of the parties concerned, without their being able on that account to profit from their dispossession.

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Since the nature of this property is indeed very complex, there is danger that the proceedings for expropriating land for public purposes will prove ineffective or too lengthy and an over-all procedure seems more suitable.

A commission set up for that purpose will be charged with determining in each case the amount of indemnification to be paid for expropriated property. The method of determining this has been established with a desire to husband the financial resources of the Fund and at the same time to ensure equitable treatment. To that end, those who are indemnified will receive bonds with a definite value which can be readily converted into cash.

2-With regard to the expropriations that must be or can be ordered in the zones of irrigation, the Decree of July 13, 1956 unifies the procedures and sanctions the derogations from the common law concerning the expropriations already made by the Decrees of March 26 and April 25, 1956 in order to simplify the function of the Fund and enable it to accomplish its task more rapidly. Thus, as soon as notification of the order providing for the transfer of property has been given, the Fund may take possession. But in exchange, a provisional indemnity for dispossession must be paid or deposited beforehand.

Commissions set up for that purpose, made up of an equal number of representatives of the Administration and the interested parties, will determine the amount of indemnification in case of expropriation, the payment of which may be made in several installments, with interest at the legal rates to be added to the sums, payment of which is deferred.

3-As for the expropriations for public purposes of estates which the Fund proposed to acquire, when it has been unable to reach a friendly agreement for the transfer of this property, the decree confirms that each time the demand of the Fund is allowed in such cases, expropriation may be ordered only by recourse to the procedure of common law, which the Governor General can declare urgent.

4-The Decree of July 13, 1956 contains no provision relative to the procedure to be used in expropriating land situated within the zones for defense against destructive waters. But the provisions of Article 11 of the Decree of April 25, 1956 are sufficiently explicit. Expropriation will take place as provided by common law. Consequently no provision is made here for a derogation from it.

5-Finally, the decree completes the range of methods available to the Fund by authorizing acquisitions with or without compensation under the terms of private law, but without the principles of oversight which normally apply to public agencies entering into play.

C. Supplementary Methods of Action Available to the Fund-In another connection, various supplementary methods of action are made available to the Fund to accomplish its task.

1-In the first place, instead of dividing up the property accruing from the transfer of the land of the large estates, it can work the land, especially the forest land, and retain the profits.

2-It can, within a certain time limit, cancel the leases on the estates which it acquires.

3-Finally, the Fund's resources already enumerated in Article 8 of the Decree of March 26, 1956, are supplemented by a grant from the Algerian budget, which will be earmarked for it, and which must be at least equal to the entire profit from the royalties paid by the grantees of land inalfa on the domains of the State or of Algeria.

This provision of a financial nature was immediately followed by a measure raising the rate of the alfa royalties to be in effect during the 1956-57 crop year (Order of July 13, 1956). This rate may be changed again during the course of the crop year if the development of the world market permits.

Conclusion-Rounded out in this manner, agrarian reform in Algeria is sure of being rapidly and effectively put into effect. This is both the justification and the purpose of the Decree of July 13, 1956.

The Fund for the Encouragement of Farm Ownership was set up very quickly and began to function without waiting for all aspects of its organization to be finally set up. It would be useless to hope for immediate spectacular results since it is a question of a long-range project, both in terms of its newness as well as of its scope and diversity. But inspired by a firm determination to move forward, the Fund has already embarked on the path of no

return. While the foundations of the Fund's methods of operation are being laid during the coming months, its first real estate transactions will be completed and it will be assigned new objectives.

Social Measures

Establishment of the "Direction Générale" of Social Action

The establishment of the "Direction Générale" (Department) of Social Action by the Order of July 20, 1956 is part of the series of reforms affecting the basic structure of the General Government's central administration, which has already been analyzed above. This newly created department has a technical aspect, however, which must be discussed separately.

Social problems are of paramount importance in a country such as Algeria with few natural resources, where problems of labor and full employment arise daily because of the population growth, resulting from the work of the Public Health Department which, in fifty years, has lowered the death rate from 20 to 13.5 per thousand inhabitants.

While the rate at which the European population has increased seems stabilized at 1%, that of the Moslem population exceeds 2.6%; this was reflected in 1955 in an excess of 270,000 births over deaths out of a total of 8,600,000 inhabitants (compared with 1,200,000 Europeans).

In addition, the Moslem population is extremely youthful: 55% of the Moslems are under 19.

Continuing the work in the field of public health, educating the children who reach school age each year, giving them vocational training so that they may find work at the proper time, increasing employment opportunities, safeguarding workers' rights, generally improving their living conditions—the tasks are many but they are interrelated in many ways. That is why it seemed timely and indispensable to regroup and coordinate the activity of all the bureaus of the General Government in charge of Public Health, Medical Assistance, Labor Legislation, Social Security and health and social welfare equipment in general.

This coordination will be ensured by organizing bureaus for both general studies and programs, which will work closely with the various inspection and supervisory agencies and be charged, as it were, with establishing the framework for the action of the administrative divisions proper.

Thus organized, this "Direction Générale" will be one of the best instruments for forging the ties of the Franco-Moslem community and for assuring its future through social progress.

Reform of the System of Free Medical Assistance

Decree No. 56-697 of July 16, 1956 changes the organization of the system of Free Medical Assistance with a view to increasing its effectiveness both by improving the quality of the services rendered as well as by extending its coverage.

The Present Organization—At present, in Algeria, the communes take the initiative in purchasing the equipment for the Division of Medical Assistance and in the operations of that division. The Algerian budget covers up to 75% of their expenses in this field and the remaining 25% is paid by the communes and Departments, prorated according to the number of persons helped.

The result is that the vast majority of Algerian communes, most of which are in genuine financial difficulties, have been able to make only a relatively modest effort with regard to free medical assistance, and their accomplishments are far from meeting the growing requirements of the neediest elements in the rural populations. Thus, since inadequate medical care is available to ambulatory patients, many more people are hospitalized than necessary, the budget of the Division of Medical Assistance is overburdened and the Algerian hospitals are overcrowded.

In addition, the very complex rule that part of the cost of medical care be defrayed by the collectivities re-

quires the patient's residence to be in a large staff. In addition there are del the hospitals.

Finally, this same rule causes the brunt of the expenditures. This means to their resources.

The Object of the Reform—It is cal assistance in the countryside and
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Improving the Traditional H

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In addition, for the disaster earthquake of September 1954, t
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quires the patient's residence to be determined beforehand. This is a lengthy and difficult procedure and requires a large staff. In addition there are delays in meeting expenses, thus leading in turn to financial difficulties for the hospitals.

Finally, this same rule causes the collectivities with the highest proportion of persons assisted to bear the brunt of the expenditures. This means that the collectivities carry the burden of the expense in inverse proportion to their resources.

The Object of the Reform - It unifies and simplifies the system for effectively developing a program of medical assistance in the countryside and for providing the indispensable equipment. In order to do this,

- the initiative in this field is transferred from the commune to the Administration, which will primarily have to work out a plan for equipping mobile health units;
- the expenses of medical care are taken over by the Algerian budget; the Departments and communes participate, too, but their share will henceforth be determined in proportion to their resources;
- it will no longer be necessary in the future to inquire into the patient's residence; he will merely have to be a resident of Algeria.

Its Implementation - But this text is merely the basis, the starting point of a more far-reaching reform which, with the help of a well coordinated system, will extend medical assistance and decentralize it.

An agency will be charged with setting up a central accounting system to ensure apportioning the cost of this care among the collectivities and will lend money to the various hospitals, etc. The criterion for determining indigence will be changed so that the really needy isolated populations in the countryside may avail themselves more easily of free medical care.

At the level of the "arrondissement," medical assistance sectors will be in charge of coordinating the civilian hospitals and the Free Medical Assistance centers, including the specialized dispensaries and the Municipal Health Boards, so as to achieve a more rational technical and administrative organization.

Finally, compulsory files of case histories and local hospitalization of patients will help solve the problems of preventive medicine and of hospital overcrowding. The drawing up of medical forms by the dispensaries will also mean an appreciable step forward for the often illiterate country people.

Its Effects on Social Security - On the other hand, attaching the health centers and specialized dispensaries to the hospitals makes it possible to consider wide-scale use of these centers for dispensing Social Security benefits. Those covered by this system, both agricultural and nonagricultural workers, may then be cared for by the mobile health units, without having to pay fees or for medicine, and those eligible for free care will not have to pay even the minimum fee. This would remove the most serious obstacles preventing the working masses from receiving normal Social Security benefits.

Improving the Traditional Housing of the Rural Populations

An Order of the Minister Residing in Algeria, dated May 11, 1956, instituted a system of individual or collective subsidies without security which may be granted to persons residing in rural areas still to be defined who wish to improve their housing conditions by using strong material to construct simple, sturdy houses meeting the elementary standards of comfort.

Forms of the Subsidy - The subsidy, fixed at 150,000 francs (\$428), will take the form of grants of material and services provided; means of transportation, building material and semi-skilled workers to direct the work may also be made available to the allottees free of charge by the Reconstruction Commission who will act under its supervision.

In addition, for the disaster area in the Chéiff Valley where this system has already been in force since the earthquake of September 1954, the Order of April 17, 1956 also raised to 150,000 francs the subsidy that may be paid to allottees in the same category, whether or not they were victims of the earthquake.

The Scope of These Texts - These texts mark an important stage in the wide-scale program undertaken in the past several months to change rural housing conditions. They concern only the populations in the countryside, whose crude housing is an anachronism in these times and on whose behalf it is not possible, in view of their limited resources, to apply the customary methods of aid to construction.

There is a twofold aim in adapting, to both the possibilities and needs of this group, a special housing plan which will be readily available to them: first, to emancipate these populations by helping them to adjust gradually to more modern family living conditions; second, to facilitate their settling down by making it possible for them to fulfill on the spot their aspirations for material well-being.

Concrete Results Possible - This system undoubtedly offers great possibilities for concrete results as was shown when it was tried out in the disaster area of the Chéiff Valley. More than 3,000 small houses have replaced the traditional "gourbis" since the earthquake and most of them have families already living in them or about to move in. Moreover, for Algeria as a whole there was a system, not of subsidies, but of loans without interest granted in kind primarily through the Agricultural Provident Societies. This system had encouraging results each time local initiatives succeeded in stimulating the inhabitants of the same region to emulate each other.

The Order of May 11, 1956 thus marks an important transition since it takes the old regulation out of the experimental stage and makes it general procedure, by henceforth making the Reconstruction Commission of the disaster area of the Chéiff Valley responsible for its implementation. This Commission is thus permanently entrusted with a new and very important task.

With a first budgetary grant of \$1.4 million, which may be increased during the fiscal year, an Order of June 15, 1956 defined the first two areas in which the Order of May 11 would be applied. One is made up of the Department of Bone, excluding the communes of Tebessa; the other consists of Great Kabylia where the delegates from the Reconstruction Commission have already been installed to give real impetus to this work. This is the framework of what is no doubt a long-range venture; but enough of a start has been made to warrant great confidence in the results. It is an indispensable corollary to the program of modernization and social progress undertaken by the government.

Emigration of Workers

1) The Interministerial Action Committee for Social Affairs Concerning the Algerian-Moslem Population in Metropolitan France was set up by Decree No. 56-684 of July 7, 1956. It is charged with coordinating the activities of the different administrations involved and with drawing up programs of action on social questions affecting that population. This committee consists of the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior, the Director General of Population and Mutual Aid in the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Director of Manpower in the same Ministry, the Director of Algerian Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior, the Director of the University Division of Relations with France Overseas in the Ministry of National Education.

2) The Order of April 9, 1956 set up within the central administration of the General Government a technical bureau charged with studying the problems of settlement, underemployment and emigration of workers as regards Algeria, in cooperation with the ministerial departments and agencies concerned in Metropolitan France.

3) A decision of the Algerian Assembly of December 14, 1955 established, on the initiative of Governor General Jacques Soustelle, an Algerian Manpower Office, charged with putting into effect a manpower policy, in all its aspects, and in particular, with defending the moral and material interests of Algerian workers in Metropolitan France; with gathering all the necessary information concerning manpower needs; with organizing the movement (whether seasonal or not) of Algerian workers; and finally, with selecting Algerian workers who wish to go to Metropolitan France and training them beforehand. Attaching a great deal of importance to the operations of this agency, which will make it possible to improve the working conditions of Algerian workers in Metropolitan France, M. Lacoste issued, on June 9, 1956, the first order implementing the decision of the Algerian Assembly.

This text named the members of the Board. The Board includes equal representatives, among whom is the chairman. The Board of Directors was France, delegates from the most important Government, and immediately before the Algerian Manpower Office.

Voting by Moslem Women in the labor conciliation boards.

Decree No. 56-598 of June 15, 1956. Although the principle of Moslem labor conciliation boards was established by the law of September 20, 1947, it has not been applied.

Nevertheless, it seems that the principle has been settled in general by an extremely important first step.

Action on the Cost of Living.

Decrees No. 56-378 and 56-379 of June 15, 1956, to suspend, in full or in part, the purpose of these texts is a social aim, the tax burden on sugar.

By virtue of these texts, the tax collected on sugar sold in Algeria is reduced.

This tax reduction was not a sale and operated solely to the benefit of the Algerian worker, that sugar is one of the most important products of the Algerian economy.

This text named the members of the Board of Directors of this Office and appointed a distinguished Moslem as chairman. The Board includes equal numbers of those elected by the first and second electoral colleges, employer representatives, among whom is the President of the Association for Preselecting Algerian Workers for Metropolitan France, delegates from the most representative workers' organizations, and representatives of the Administration.

The Board of Directors was solemnly installed on June 20, 1956 by M. Chaussade, Secretary General of the Government, and immediately began work on the program laid out for it.

The Algerian Manpower Office has been operating since July 1, 1956.

Voting by Moslem Women in the Elections to Labor Conciliation Boards

Decree No. 56-598 of June 16, 1956 recognized the right of Moslem women in Algeria to vote in the elections to the labor conciliation boards and determined the conditions under which this right may be exercised in the future. Although the principle of Moslem women exercising the right to vote was stated in the Organic Statute of Algeria of September 20, 1947, it has never been applied until now because of the serious difficulties it raises.

Nevertheless, it seems neither necessary nor desirable to wait until the question of Moslem woman suffrage has been settled in general before allowing them to vote in the elections to conciliation boards. This measure is an extremely important first step toward the indispensable social emancipation of the Moslem woman in Algeria.

Action on the Cost of Living

Decrees No. 56-378 and No. 56-638 of April 12 and June 28, 1956 authorized the Minister Residing in Algeria to suspend, in full or in part, for a fixed period, all the indirect taxes in force affecting everyday consumer products. The purpose of these texts is to enable the Minister to check any abnormal rise in prices or merely to lighten, with a social aim, the tax burden of the Algerian consumer.

By virtue of these texts, therefore, the Orders of April 13 and 17, 1956 suspended the combined fees and taxes collected on sugar sold in Algeria.

This tax reduction was necessarily and immediately reflected in the price paid by the consumer at the point of sale and operated solely to the advantages of the consumer; its full import becomes apparent when it is realized that sugar is one of the most widely consumed products, especially in Algeria.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

MR: VA

I. 1028

Sent: 18th January, 1957
1207
Rec'd: 19th January, 1957
0900

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

27. SECRET.

I saw the American Ambassador 17th January. He leaves for Washington end of January to be Deputy Under Secretary Economic Affairs. It is a posting which Clayton held in the immediate post-war period and Dillon hopes to have similar wide scope.

2. He first spoke of Israel and the difficulties of getting them to withdraw from Sinai. He thought a settlement would be worked out within a fortnight.

3. As regards Algeria he emphasized the success of the Dulles-Pineau meeting in Washington. The French had now abandoned their foolish idea of strongly contesting the competence of the United Nations, which would have meant resounding defeat. It was just as well Pineau had gone to New York and seen the situation for himself. While the French would of course formally deny competence they would not leave the United Nations. Dulles had explained fully to Pineau his plans to help French over the Algerian Debate. They would do their best to achieve a "more or less procedural" resolution stating that Algeria had been under discussion and that improvement in the situation was hoped for or noted according to how events developed. Lodge had instructions to concert action closely with Pineau.

4. As regards Togo the United States had been able to help the French over a difficult situation and greatly satisfied the Minister for Overseas France Defferree.

5. He thought the financial crisis in France would come to a head before July. The Minister of Finance Ramadier was too optimistic and doing nothing to relieve the situation. It was perhaps an "after me the deluge attitude". He believed the Government were now weary and likely to fall any time between mid March and July. They would probably get over the hurdle of Algeria at the United Nations but this or another issue would bring them down before long. He did not think either Pineau or Faure would be able to go to S.E.A.T.O. meeting because of the common market issue being in the forefront during March.

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SECRET

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SECRET

I. 1028

2.

He considered the recent split in the Poujade movement very significant. The formation of a new party when Poujade's former Lieutenant Le Pen returned shortly from service in Algeria would mean that 30 more deputies were "thrown into the Parliamentary pool" and would thenceforward be available for a right wing leader such as Pleven if he wanted to form a new Government.

6. Egypt. Acknowledged that we are making no headway with them. Only pressures available to us are economic - freezing assets and grain supplies". He insisted that United States would maintain these pressures until there was an overall settlement and especially settlement of the Canal problem. Meanwhile the Egyptian people whipped up over Suez were now getting disillusioned and he thought there might be a reprising before very long.

7. He stressed Dulles' good relations and trust in MacMillan. He understood the President felt the same way. Dulles had never got on with Eden personally.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

20th January, 1957.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF
DL MT O&P

G

SECRET

F 25/2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RESTRICTED
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

DBB:SH

I. 961

Dated: 17th January, 1957
1343
Rec'd: 18th January, 1957
0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
P A R I S

25. RESTRICTED

Algeria.

The Prime Minister has stated that he has asked a number of Ambassadors to see him this week. I am going on Friday 18th January. The United Kingdom Ambassador told me 16th January of his visit yesterday. Mollet had said that it was a large pro forma request as he was seeing 25 others. He gave Jebb, to send to the United Kingdom Government, the full text and translation of his declaration (press, radio and television) 9th January. In particular he mentioned his stressing autonomy of administration (Gestion) throughout the declaration. This apparently means non-interference from France in municipal affairs.

2. The Prime Minister asked Jebb to tell the United Kingdom Government in confidence that he himself and several of his Ministers had hoped for a more liberal declaration but it represented the absolute limit to which he could go without upsetting the Government. Moreover, if he went further there would be revolution in Algiers amongst the Colonists, the army would probably side with them and many Moslems would be killed. Jebb told the Prime Minister he had had no instructions from his Government re Algeria (though he feels sure they will back the French).

3. Jebb commented that the promised elections three months after the cease fire will certainly mean the return of a large number of Arab deputies who can only hope for election if they are pledged to press for independence and therefore Algeria must before long go the way of Morocco. Having regard to this the rebels were very foolish not to accept the present offer.

4. Jebb told me that Pineau had been "more reasonable than might have been expected" in his talk with Dulles last week. According to the French Embassy, Washington, Pineau proposed to make a three hour speech to the United Nation Assembly putting the French view very fully and apparently moderately. He had decided not to withdraw from the United Nations if the question of competence went against the French but he would leave a third Secretary from the French delegation in his seat (Jebb said he had himself suggested this course to Pineau). Jebb even hoped Pineau would vote for a resolution on Algeria (though Pineau had not said that he would do this), if the United States did so too. It seemed that Dulles had been very pleased with Pineau. I asked if there were any signs of Dulles having promised any support (or abstention) to the French. Apparently

RESTRICTED

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **RESTRICTED**
INWARD CABLEGRAM.
I. 961

there was none.

5. Jebb said that Mollet, who was in good spirits, has also talked about a Western European movement and thought the United Kingdom would come closer to it. He felt a nucleus consisting of Great Britain, France and Germany was essential to developments which he felt could be achieved first on economic lines then political and all inside the N.A.T.O. framework.

Stirling.

MIN & DEPT EA.
P.M.'s

18th January, 1957

RESTRICTED

SECRET

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11

I. 530.

DBB:O.A.

Sent: 10th January, 1957.
1425.

FROM:

Recd: 11th January, 1957.
0830Australian Embassy,
PARIS.16. SECRET.Algeria.

On the eve of the return of the French Parliament and with the United Nations debating Algeria at the end of the month the main preoccupation of the French Government is with Algeria.

2. Pineau left for New York, 6th January, with Soustelle, former Governor-General of Algeria. There has been talk of Lacoste and even of Mollet flying to New York to strengthen the French cause.

3. At the weekend French nervousness about the situation led to:

- (a) The arrest by the Minister of Defence of General Faure recently recalled from Algeria to Paris;
- (b) Seizure by Lacoste of all copies of the three main Paris evening papers including Monde for tendentious reports;
- (c) Postponement of Under Secretary M. Faure's visit to Tunisia.

4. Tunisia has signed treaty of friendship with Libya and made a joint declaration of solidarity demanding Algerian independence.

5. Mollet's statement of intentions regarding Algeria is scheduled for the 11th January and is assumed to contain little new, although the press speculate whether he will offer supervision of elections by observers from democratic countries (see my telegram 487 paragraph 3).

6. Lloyd comes to Paris 14th January (enroute to Italy) to see Pineau who is due back from New York that day. They will discuss Suez but apparently still more Algeria.

7. Jebb told me 9th January he had been "making encouraging noises" to the French over Algeria but he did not know Lloyd's intentions. He confirmed that the French know nothing of American intentions and are worried. He thought from symptoms such as the "plot" which led to the arrest of General Faure, revolution by whites was not unlikely and might even lead to invasion from Morocco and Tunisia.

Stirling.

MIN & DEPT. E.A.
F.M'S.

11th January, 1957.

SECRET

SEC A/Ss UN PACAM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAP&ME E EAP&ME INF DL MT

G



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *The Times*
Published at *London*

File No. *25/2/11 g 6*

Date *5th January 57*

**FRANCE PREPARES FOR U.N. DEBATE
ON ALGERIA**

TESTING ISSUE FOR M. MOLLET

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, JAN. 4

Political and diplomatic preparations are being made here in earnest for the debate on Algeria in the General Assembly of the United Nations. This debate, and its outcome, are widely regarded as being of vital importance not only for M. Mollet's Government, but also for the future of Algeria. M. Lacoste, the Resident Minister in Algeria, arrived in Paris yesterday evening and has been conferring to-day with M. Bourges-Maunoury, Minister of Defence, and the Prime Minister. Some time before the debate—the timing is not yet certain—M. Mollet is to make a statement, to serve presumably as grist for the French mill.

Judging from all that is being written and said about the United Nations debate, the French are none too happy about the result. They can certainly argue that because Algeria is considered French metropolitan territory, the United Nations has no business to intervene in its affairs. Here they might get more support within the General Assembly than if they allowed the Algerian case to go forward on its own merits, when there would be the danger of seeing the permanent "anti-colonial" majority assert itself. The American attitude is of special importance, and M. Pineau, the Foreign Minister, is leaving for New York on Sunday to prepare some of the ground.

NATIONAL FRONT CLAIM

Meanwhile, messages from New York report that Mohammed Yazid, the "delegate" to the United Nations of the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N.), has submitted a memorandum to the chairman of the political committee. This document asserts that the F.L.N. is the only valid organization for future negotiations with France, a fact which, it is claimed, has already been recognized by the French Government by reason of its previous contacts with the F.L.N. The memorandum asks that new negotiations should be held under the auspices of the United Nations, on the basis of the Algerian right to independence. The F.L.N. will not accept a cease-fire without having a previous agreement on this right.

The memorandum declares that the French have never gone further than to grant certain political reforms, the effect of which would have been to transform Algeria from a group of French departments into a sort of French province endowed with limited administrative autonomy. "The French Government has never had the political courage to face up to realities in Algeria and to put through a solution in accordance with historical evolution and the understandable interests of France." The Algerians, it concludes, would accept the existence of a European minority in an Algerian community, on a basis of equality, with the choice between integration in the Algerian nation, or retention of their French nationality, with the status of foreigners.

VISION OF FEDERATION

As an increasing number of liberal Frenchmen have come to realize, relations with Tunisia and Morocco can be established permanently on a sound basis only if the Algerian question is finally settled. Some, though they are still a minority, do even further and think that Mr. Bourguiba,

in Tunisia, and the Sultan of Morocco are in fact essential components of any lasting solution.

In the light of these feelings, Mr. Bourguiba's latest remarks are pertinent. Speaking in Tunis, where he is receiving a visit from the Libyan Prime Minister, Mustapha ben Halim, Mr. Bourguiba returned yesterday to his old conception of a unified Arab *maghreb*, which he now defines as the grouping of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, "which would constitute a material and above all a moral power that other nations would take into account."

As *Le Monde* points out this evening, this wider vision of a North African federation opens up new international prospects: by bringing Libya into his plans, Mr. Bourguiba is also implicitly (at least in French eyes) introducing Britain and the United States into the North African complex.

In Algeria, meanwhile, there are continued signs that the rebels, with their eyes on the United Nations, are increasing the pressure of their urban terrorism, probably to provoke reprisals. In Algiers and its outskirts yesterday there were several incidents. A time bomb exploded in a trolley bus, killing two passengers and injuring 10 others. The French Army and authorities have been active against the terrorists, killing 27 of them in the department of Constantine and 63 more in the Akbou region, in the department of Algiers.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

File No. 2572/118

Published at London

Date 3rd January 57

Y 10 1957

FRANCE'S POLICY FOR ALGERIA

"NOT CONCERN OF UNITED NATIONS"

TERMS FOR ELECTIONS

From Our Own Correspondent

PARIS, JAN. 9.

M. Mollet this afternoon read a 5,000-word "statement of intentions" about the Government's policy in Algeria in front of representatives of the French and foreign Press, as well as a battery of television and news cameras. The statement added little, if anything, to what was known already about the Government's aims.

Its main points were that France will never abandon Algeria, that the Algerian question is one for France alone, that the United Nations is not competent to deal with it, and that the future settlement in Algeria, to be based upon the co-existence in equality of the French and Muslim communities, will be negotiated with the representatives of the Algerian population as chosen in free elections to take place three months after a cease-fire.

The French offer for a cease-fire, without any political pre-conditions, still stands; and France is ready to invite representatives of free nations "with a tried democratic régime" to witness the freedom of the elections in Algeria. Hitherto, the statement pointed out, the attempts to arrange a cease-fire with the rebels have failed because, in M. Mollet's words, what the rebels want "is not a cease-fire but a capitulation."

FEELINGS WOUNDED

M. Mollet began by explaining that he had nothing new to say, but that it was essential that no doubts about French intentions should exist in the minds of national delegations to the United Nations. The legal situation left the matter in no doubt—"the drama that is rending Algeria is a French drama, and it is France that will produce its solution."

He would not, he went on, attempt to justify France's Algerian policy to the United Nations, whom it did not concern. Nor did France set any value on the judgments of certain Governments who had made up their minds in advance. But where French feelings were often wounded was in the lack of understanding which she encountered among free and democratic nations which had insufficiently studied the facts (this was an obvious reference to the United States).

He then repeated the Government's known proposals for bringing the war to an end: a cease-fire, followed by elections, with international supervision, followed by negotiations with the representatives of the Algerian population thus elected for the future organization of Algeria.

"What France intends to preserve with regard to Algeria and its local or territorial communities," the Prime Minister said, "is essentially a power of arbitration, to ensure that the recognized rights of all Algerians shall be respected, and that no one of the communities shall be oppressed by the other." Algeria was the keystone of a great Franco-African structure of a new type, a structure in which Tunisia and Morocco would have a part to play. Indeed, it was more than a Franco-African affair, it was a "Euro-African" structure, for France's European partners would be associated via the common market, with the overseas territories.



THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILITY.

5,000-word "statement of intentions"
about the Government's policy in

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DOUBLE APPEAL

In conclusion, M. Mollet made a double appeal: to the enemies of France in Algeria to lay down their arms, and to the United Nations not to intervene in a problem which was essentially the national concern of France. If the United Nations were, in defiance of the rules of the Charter, to discuss the substance of the Algerian question, then France could not recognize as having any authority any resolutions which might be adopted.

Meanwhile, the French claim to have killed at least 107 rebels in operations in Algeria yesterday — 47 near Tiarret, 30 south of Burdeau, 20 in the southern part of the Algiers département, and 10 in Kabylia. In the cities and in the countryside there has been comparatively little terrorism since the weekend, which is regarded as a good omen on the eve of the United Nations debate.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. **CONFIDENTIAL**
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.0006

Mo/BH

Sent: 31st December, 1956.
1220
Rec'd: 1st January, 1957.
0900

25/2/11

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

485.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Australian Mission to the United Nations,
New York..4.

United Nations Assembly.

(1) Algeria.

De Menthon told Deschamps on 28th December that
the uncertainty of United States attitude is causing concern.
France will seek to defer items until late in agenda and
would appreciate Australian support.

(ii) Togoland.

He emphasised the great importance France attaches
to a announcement ending the trusteeship in accordance with
the recent referendum result. Two Cabinet Ministers will
attend Assembly for discussions of this item.

Stirling.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. TERRITORIES
P.M'S

1st January, 1957

SEC A/Ss UND PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAP&ME E AP&ME
INF DL MT C&P
G.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/2/11
5

AMENDED COPY

UNCLASSIFIED.

I. 15737.

TO:

Sent: 15th November, 1956.
2329.

PRESS:

FROM:

Recd: 16th November, 1956.
2020

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

883. UNCLASSIFIED.

Assembly's morning session adopted the General Committee's recommendation regarding Eighth Vice Presidency. First ballot Italy, 36, Liberia 36, Spain 2, Uruguay 1. Second ballot Italy 40, Liberia 37.

Christmas recess and closing dates approved.

Appointment of special political committee adopted 26 - 0 - 31 and question of revision rule referred Sixth Committee.

Afternoon session approved General Committee Agenda recommendations.

South African items. Assembly voted 63 - 2 Italy South Africa - 13 Australia, to include item 24 and 61 - 8 Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom - 7 to include item 61.

Louw made exhaustive statement on application of Article 2(7) of items. He mentioned on several occasions that this would be the last time on which South Africa would protest inscription. Menon replied. Following the Assembly vote, Louw stated he would seek instructions from his Government regarding South Africa's attitude following inscription.

Cyprus not voted on. United Kingdom outlined its position as in general Committee.

South Africa asked to place on record its opposition to inscription.

The Minister outlined Australia's view that

A Was completely inadmissible and that Australia would confine its participation in debates to matters coming under

B Full text our 882.

Algeria. No vote taken. South Africa sole speaker, requesting its opposition to inclusion be recorded.

West New Guinea included. 47 - 18, Australian, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Dominion, Finland, France, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal Sweden, South Africa, United Kingdom - 14 Austria Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Turkey, United States, Venezuela.

/ Netherlands

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED.

- 2 -

I. 15737.

Netherlands repeated yesterday's arguments forcefully. Indonesia began by regretting the intervention of Australia in General Committee consideration pointing out that it had no quarrel with Australia but sought only friendly relations. Otherwise arguments were similar to yesterday's with emphasis on the clear cut Colonial nature of the problem.

El Salvador and Ceylon also spoke in favour.

Debate on Chinese representation item continuing night session.

/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
I.M'S.

16th November, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN@ CR P.C.M.M AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL MT C&P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **RESTRICTED**
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.15716

OK/BH

Sent: 16th November, 1956.
1830

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

493. RESTRICTED.

General Assembly - Algeria.

1. The French Embassy has asked for our support in seeing that the item on Algeria is placed at the end of the Agenda. Embassy says that they wish to have the item considered as late as possible in the hope that a cease-fire in Algeria will be arranged before the item is considered; United Kingdom and United States have promised support.

2. We have told the Embassy that we felt sure that our delegation would co-operate with the French delegation in endeavours to have France's wishes met.

(Cost £9.10.0)

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M'S.

19th November, 1956.

SEC //98 UNW P&C&M AM&SP SAS&A SA L.F&ME E
AF&ME INF DL C&P MT

Kearney
25/2/11
g
RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL 75/2/11

ALGERIA

France has now more than 400,000 soldiers in Algeria in action against about 20,000 rebels. Although the military situation has steadily improved during the past six months, the rate of improvement has been much slower than the French authorities expected. In amassing a large force in Algeria the French had hoped that the campaign would be over by the end of this year, but competent foreign military observers have expressed the firm opinion that the earliest the military situation could be stabilized would be the end of 1957. Even the French themselves are now less optimistic than they were six months ago. French officials have described the situation as "very difficult"; they admit some progress towards the restoration of law and order but the likelihood of reaching a settlement with the rebels on the basis of Algerian continuance as a part of Metropolitan France is "a thing of the past".

There had been a considerable difference of opinion in the French Government on the future status of Algeria. M. Mollet, the Prime Minister, although at first in favour of integration of Algeria within Metropolitan France, was in the difficult position of having to look for his steadfast support to the opposition parties of which the majority of members were opposed to integration. These in turn were divided, some in favour of federation, or some looser association within the French Union, and others in favour of independent status. M. Mollet has other difficulties: the French residents in Algeria will not have federation and integration is anathema to the Algerians. M. Mollet is therefore now attempting a difficult middle-of-the-road course in order to pacify both sides.

In a statement on 29th October, M. Mollet appealed to the Algerian rebels to lay down their arms and guaranteed safety of both person and property to those who respond. He also outlined a programme setting out the Government's intentions on the future of Algeria.

Some of the important points in the programme are:

1. A guarantee of absolute equality of all the citizens in Algeria;
2. Free and democratically supervised elections with a single college system (that is, no distinction between Muslim and European voters) to elect Algerian deputies to the National Assembly;
3. The "basic law of the new Algeria" and the representative institutions of "the Algerian personality" will be drawn up, following the freest possible discussion with the citizens of Algeria;
4. The fundamental law of the new Algeria will assure, under the arbitration of the French Republic, the co-existence and co-operation of the peoples who make up Algeria.

CONFIDENTIAL

25/2/11
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

JC:SHA

I.13672.

Dated: 16th October, 1956.

1810

FROM:

Recd.: 17th October, 1956.

0830

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

355.

RESTRICTED.

General policy debate begins in the Assembly today, 16th October, with three sittings devoted to Suez, followed by three on Algeria. The Government does not appear to be threatened. It has the general support of the M.R.P. and the Moderates. The latest split in the Radical Party caused by the Mendes-France strong-arm methods at the Party Congress paradoxically may strengthen Mollet's position in view of the Radical leader's recent opposition, particularly over the Algerian policy. The Radical Minister will remain in the Government. The dissident Radicals will issue a manifesto supporting the Socialist alliance and the Government's Algerian policy. Lacoste remains strongly opposed to the elaboration of the new statute for Algeria until pacification completed. The remarkable success of national loans has greatly strengthened the Government's financial position.

Deschamps.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

17th October, 1956.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *Political Intelligence Bulletin* File No. 25/2/11

Published at *Dept. of External Affairs* Date *July 26 A 1956*

25/2/11

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY COUNCIL : ALGERIA

Terrorist activity first broke out in the Constantine area of Algeria in October, 1954, and by mid-1955 the movement had become a large scale rebellion against French rule. Although the impetus of the rebellion has come from local nationalist groups pressing for constitutional and social reforms, Arab propaganda, particularly Cairo radio, and support from Morocco and Tunisia have encouraged the rebels.

Consideration at the 10th General Assembly

In view of the deteriorating situation in Algeria, 13 members of the Afro-Asian bloc requested that the question of Algeria be included in the agenda of the 10th Session of the General Assembly. Despite the General Committee's recommendation that the item be excluded from the agenda, the Plenary Session of the General Assembly voted 28-27 in favour of inscription. In protest against this decision France withdrew from all participation in the General Assembly and agreed to return only after the Assembly had voted "not to consider the item further".

Consideration by the Security Council

On 12th April this year the Permanent Representatives of the Afro-Asian countries sent a letter to the President of the Security Council, bringing to the attention of the Council, under Article 35(1) the "grave situation" in Algeria. The accompanying explanatory memorandum recalled that the item had been put on the agenda of the 10th Session and went on to say:

"The Asian-African States, along with other States, later in the 10th Session of the General Assembly, agreed to postpone discussion of the Algerian issue. This move was inspired by the new constructive steps taken by France on the questions of Tunisia and Morocco, and was intended to give France an opportunity to reconsider its policy also on the question of Algeria The French Government, however, persisted in ignoring the legitimate demands of the Algerian people and the appeals of the Bandung Conference".

The memorandum stated that the French Government had intensified its policy of repression, and concluded:

"On the strength of available evidence, it seems abundantly clear that conditions are deteriorating and are likely to endanger peace and security in the area. In our opinion, the United Nations cannot remain indifferent to the situation in Algeria which is a threat to peace and security, involves the infringement of the basic right of self determination, and constitutes a flagrant violation of other fundamental human rights".

The group did not, however, at this stage ask for a meeting of the Council, but during the next two months consulted on whether to ask for a meeting of the Council or for a Special Meeting of the General Assembly. The latter course was rejected, probably because there was little hope of a majority of the members of United Nations supporting, as required by the Charter, a request for a special meeting. India and most of the Asian members of the group were known to be opposed to any United Nations action at this stage, believing that direct negotiations were preferable. Finally on 13th June the delegates of only 13 Afro-Asian countries formally requested the President of the Security Council to call an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the "grave situation" in Algeria under Article 35 (1). Their letter claimed that since the previous representation from the group in April the situation had further deteriorated due to French military action which had resulted in "grievous loss of human life".

/ At the commencement

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *Political Intelligence Bulletin* File No. *25/2/11*Published at *Dept of External Affairs* Date *July 26 1956*CONFIDENTIAL

At the commencement of the debate on 26th June, the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Sobolev, requested that the Council should defer consideration of the question indefinitely, claiming that, as the issue was important, the Council members needed further time to "ponder on the situation". It is believed that this proposal was concocted, if not in conjunction with, at least with the connivance of the Arab group, and aimed at leaving the question in abeyance after a round of speeches in the Council. Representatives of France, Belgium and the United Kingdom argued that the proposal was specious and out of order, since urgent consideration had been requested and the Council could not very well postpone a meeting on discussion of the Algerian item until it had decided whether or not to admit it to the agenda. The Soviet motion was rejected by 1 (U.S.S.R.) - 7-3 (China, Iran, Yugoslavia).

The representative of France opposed inscription on the grounds that the matter was entirely within French domestic jurisdiction and thus not within the competence of the Council. The United Kingdom and Belgian representatives adopted a similar attitude. In reply, the representative of Iran reviewed the history of the conflict, claimed a denial of human rights and the right to self-determination, and denied the French claim that it was a question of domestic jurisdiction. The Soviet representative asserted that since it was necessary to hear the parties in order to establish whether there was a threat to the peace, the item should be inscribed. The representatives of China, Cuba, Peru and Yugoslavia expressed doubts as to whether a debate at this time would serve any useful purpose. The Australian representative, as President of the Council during the debate, was not called on to make a statement on the substance of the issue. In the ensuing vote the motion to inscribe the item was rejected 2 (U.S.S.R., Iran) - 7 (Australia) - 2 (China, Yugoslavia).

The Arabs must have expected this defeat, and their motive appears to have been to satisfy domestic pressures for some action on Algeria. The debate was concluded expeditiously (in one day) as desired by the Western delegations, despite some attempts before the meeting by the Arab delegations to have discussion spread over a number of days. The Russians, while moderate in their comments during the debate, gave comfort to the Arabs by suggesting postponement (which the Arabs wanted, but having asked for urgent discussion, could not very well suggest) and by voting in favour of inscription.



In reply quote No

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

10 JUL 1956

CANBERRA.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
13, RUE LAS CASES,
PARIS (7^e)

25/2/11

2nd July, 1956.

File No. 1/3/8

Memo No. 482

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

*copy sent to UN
copy sent to
on 16/2/2*

ALGERIA

I enclose an article by André François Poncet of the Académie Française (a former French Ambassador to Germany), which appeared in the "Figaro" of to-day, 2nd July. M. François Poncet had just returned from Algeria which he had visited as President of the French Red Cross. He makes the following points:-

1. The situation to-day is much better than three months ago - "the worst moment is passed, the skidding has stopped." France is now holding well."
2. The Minister Resident, M. Robert Lacoste, is the embodiment of energy and is universally respected.
3. The Algerians of French stock are now reassured and no longer complain that the Mother Country will abandon them.
4. He raises the question "Has a deep chasm been created between the Moslems and the French?" and in reply says that the French in Algeria hold that the mass of the population is still

*see list
see Bulletin
11/7*

/not.....

GR

4. not fundamentally hostile to them.
5. He maintains that the uprising is not in any way spontaneous, but that it has been prepared from abroad and staged with the collaboration of the Arab League, strengthened at given points by emissaries recruited and trained in the specialised schools of Moscow. He links the North African war with that in Indo-China, "the first manifestation of the plot hatched against us, aimed at giving a death blow to France, to France regarded as the weakest element in the Atlantic Alliance."
6. He concludes that the first act in Algeria is turning out to the benefit of the French.

In the second act the adversary will try to wear out French patience, hoping that the troops recalled to the Colonies will soon want to go home and that the French Government, yielding to public opinion and financial difficulties, will be forced to negotiate.

The final act, and probably the most difficult, will be the political phase when the new status of Algeria will have to be worked out - "nothing clear or sensible has yet been put forward on this subject."

Alfred Stirling

AMBASSADOR.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *The Age*

File No. *25/2/11*

Published at *Melbourne*

Date *6th July 1956*

Tension High in N. Africa

LONDON, July 5 (A.A.P.-Reuters).
—Tension is high in two North African trouble spots today—Algiers City and the desert region of Agadir, in South Morocco.

In Algiers, strongly reinforced troops and armed police are ready to strike at the first sign of violence in today's general strike called by Moslem nationalists.

The troops were ordered to act—and act quickly—wherever a call went out for them.

Today is the anniversary of the French capture of Algiers City in 1830.

Nationalist leaflets distributed yesterday said that Nationalists would open fire on any vehicles—military or civil—using the roads during the strike.

In Morocco, the Moroccan Chief of Staff, Prince Moulay Hassan, and the French Commander in Chief, (General Rene Coen) By today to Agadir where tension has developed over the arrival of French troops and a widespread strike of Moroccan workers.

A French communique said the French troops had taken up positions in the Agadir region after a series of raids on French military depots.

The strike has been called in protest against the arrival of the French troops.

E.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper

The Sydney Morning Herald

File No.

25/2/11

Published at

Sydney

Date

3rd July 1956

French Socialists And Algeria

The Mollet Government, a only to defeat the rebel coalition of Socialists and bands, but to restore the Radicals, has been "at the weakened confidence of iso-point of death" several times lated native communities in in the five months since it the French ability to protect took office. But every time them.

The Socialist Prime Minister The growing scope of the stakes the life of his Adminis- French military operations tration on a vote of confi- has clearly created great dif- dence, he gets his vote. Per- ficulties for the rebels in the haps the principal explana- field, but after a period of tion of this survival is that in relative quiet, there has been the handling of France's most in the last ten days a disturb- bitter and pressing problem, ing recrudescence of terror- the situation in Algeria, the- ism in urban areas. This has Socialists are using their led to further counter-terror- political power in a manner- ism. Despite all the deploy- inconsistent with their tradi- ment of French strength, a tional beliefs on colonial re- solution of the Algerian pression—a departure which problem—except perhaps in guarantees them support on terms of repression—seems the Right—and yet with such as far off as ever.

a firm purpose on the need M. Mollet has declared for reforms that they do not that Algeria, where there are forfeit the loyalty of their a million French people, as rank and file. well as the Berbers, cannot

The Prime Minister has become an Arab State. now been notably encouraged Equally, he admits, the pres- by an overwhelming vote at ence of eight million Mos- the annual Socialist congress lems makes the status of a in favour of his Algerian French province impossible. policy. However much em- He has prescribed for the phasis is placed on political country a "special persona- and economic gains for the lity," excluding both a return Arabs in that policy, the Gov- to the past, with its inequality ernment is determined to re- of rights, and a break with store law and order, without France. Since the larger which, of course, there could peace in North Africa, and be no effective administra- security in Europe, could be tion, reformed or not. Against gravely affected by a long objections in Cabinet, Parlia- continued struggle in Algeria, ment and the country, it has the friends of France can called up reserves to give the only hope that the gulf be- Resident Minister, M. La- tween the French and Mos- coste, the armed strength lem communities has not be- which he considers essential come too wide to bridge. to pacify Algeria. The French Meanwhile, it is significant forces doing this job now that the French Socialists are number some 400,000 men. proving themselves not so This great strength is neces- much doctrinaire Socialists sary, the officials say, not as French patriots.

European

FIGARO 2/4/88

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

RETOUR D'ALGÉRIE RETOUR D'ALGÉRIE

par André FRANÇOIS-PONCET

Suite de la première page

J'ai rendu visite, ces jours derniers, à la Croix-Rouge française d'Algérie, dans les trois chefs-lieux d'Oran, d'Alger et de Constantine. Il était naturel, étant le président de cette grande famille, que j'allasse, dans les circonstances où elle se trouve du fait du drame algérien, lui porter le témoignage de la sympathie et de la solidarité de la Croix-Rouge métropolitaine, me confirmer dans la certitude qu'elle accomplissait parfaitement sa mission, et surtout m'enquérir de ses besoins.

Je ne m'étais pas trompé. Sous la conduite de sa délégation générale, la Croix-Rouge française en Algérie est, avec ses quatre conseils départementaux et ses 64 comités locaux, une organisation vivante, vibrante et efficace, animée par des hommes et des femmes dont le dévouement, l'ardeur, l'idéalisme, la foi ne sauraient être trop loués. Elle est à la hauteur de sa double tâche. Elle s'empresse autour de nos soldats dès qu'ils débarquent ; elle les reçoit, veille à leur détente et à leur distraction dans ses foyers d'accueil, les visite et les soigne dans les hôpitaux. En même temps, elle ouvre les portes de ses dispensaires à la population musulmane qui, après un fléchissement passager, s'y présente de nouveau en foule et manifeste, en recourant à son aide charitable, la confiance qu'elle lui conserve.

Sur le plan de la fraternité humaine elle intervient en pacificatrice, en conciliatrice, en amie et remplit à cet égard un rôle émi-

nemment utile. Elle jouit d'ailleurs de l'estime de tous. Chacun lui rend hommage. Les autorités publiques ne lui ménagent pas leur soutien. Elle est, selon sa vocation, le lieu de rencontre de toutes les bonnes volontés. Jamais, de leur côté, les fellagha n'ont molesté ceux ni celles qui se réclament d'elle et portent son insigne. On lui demande, aujourd'hui, de fournir un supplément d'infirmières et d'assistantes sociales. Elle les fournit, avec le secours de la métropole, aussitôt qu'auront été définies les conditions des contrats d'engagement. Ce qu'elle demande, à son tour, c'est un supplément de ressources pour accroître son activité, notamment celle de ses vingt comités des territoires du Sud, dits « sahariens », où l'indigence et la maladie sont le plus répandues.

Mon voyage a été, au surplus, trop rapide pour que je puisse prétendre en rapporter des opinions solidement fondées. Les conversations multiples que j'ai eues avec les personnes les plus diverses, les spectacles que j'ai eus sous les yeux, m'autorisent cependant à penser que la situation est, à l'heure actuelle, bien meilleure qu'il y a trois mois. Le glissement est arrêté. La France tient bon. Les troupes, dont les chefs font l'éloge, ont rendu vaine toute ambition de nous chasser du pays et de nous jeter à la mer. Elles mènent la vie dure aux rebelles, qu'elles traquent et déciment. Quels que soient les épisodes plus ou moins orageux auxquels elles restent exposées, elles traduisent, de façon non douteuse, la résolution de la France de ne pas lâcher pied et de lutter avec toute l'énergie nécessaire, telle que l'incarne le ministre résident, M. Robert Lacoste, universellement respecté, secondé par des préfets intelligents et qui sauront entraîner une administration encore trop lourde et formaliste.

Les Algériens de souche française sont rassurés. Ils ne se plaignent plus de la métropole et ne la soupçonnent plus de se préparer à les abandonner. Quand on voit, d'ailleurs, ce que cette terre d'Afrique, où, successeurs des Romains, nous avons construit des routes et des aqueducs, est devenue grâce à leur effort et à celui de leurs pères, on conçoit qu'ils aient été indignés à l'idée que certains nous conseillaient de nous en détourner. Ils m'ont semblé, pour l'instant, pleins de sang-froid, vaquant, comme d'habitude et avec calme, à leurs affaires, aussi éloignés que possible de cette mentalité de « vaincus d'avance », de « résignés à l'échec », que l'on ne rencontre, à Paris que trop souvent.

André FRANÇOIS-PONCET.
de l'Académie française.

(Suite page 5, col. 7 et 8)

Les grandes villes où j'ai séjourné ne sont pas seulement animées par une circulation intense, elles grouillent d'une foule bariolée qui se presse sur les trottoirs et où les porteurs de turbans et les femmes voilées coudoient de l'air le plus naturel les Européens. Les rues offraient un aspect absolument normal, n'étaient les patrouilles qui s'y promènent et les jeeps garnies de soldats qui y roulent à vive allure. On n'est pas moins surpris d'apprendre par les journaux que des attentats ont été commis aux endroits mêmes où l'on était passé sans rien remarquer de suspect.

Le dessein des rebelles est, en effet, de régner par la peur, de terroriser la population musulmane et la population française. Leurs tentatives d'intimidation ne réussissent guère auprès de cette dernière, qui a eu, jusqu'à présent, le mérite et la sagesse de ne pas se laisser aller à des représailles. Mais sur la première, elles sont efficaces. La population musulmane subit la hantise de la dénonciation, la crainte de l'égorgement, l'oppression de la peur, savamment entretenue. Sans doute souhaite-t-elle d'en être délivrée et nous saurait-elle gré d'y mettre fin. Mais comment prévoir et prévenir le geste d'un assassin qui surgit, tout à coup, le revolver au poing, tire, en ayant soin de viser la tête, comme il en a reçu l'ordre, et disparaît dans le couloir d'une maison ?

Entre les Musulmans et les Français un fossé s'est-il creusé ? Est-il profond ? Des uns aux autres y a-t-il un courant de haine ? Les crimes perpétrés supposent l'existence d'un pareil sentiment, au moins chez ceux qui les inspirent et chez ceux qui les commettent. La propagande et les menaces des rebelles ont effectivement réveillé le fanatisme religieux et nous assistons à l'une de ces éruptions qui soulèvent périodiquement l'Islam. Il faut également tenir compte de l'aspiration des couches les plus évoluées à exercer elles-mêmes le gouvernement du pays. Les Français considèrent, pourtant, que la masse de la population, quelques raisons de mécontentement qu'elle ait eues, ne leur est pas devenue foncièrement hostile, qu'elle commence à s'apercevoir qu'on l'a fourvoyée et qu'elle serait heureuse de revenir à une vie commune, où des avantages substantiels lui seraient garantis par des réformes opportunes.

Le soulèvement est-il spontané ?

Je ne l'ai jamais cru. Je le crois encore moins aujourd'hui. Je demeure convaincu qu'il a été préparé de longue date, à l'instigation de l'étranger, monté soigneusement avec la collaboration de la Ligue arabe, tenu prêt en réserve et déclenché à point nommé par des émissaires répétés, recrutés et instruits dans les écoles spécialisées de Moscou. Je reste persuadé qu'après la guerre d'Indochine, première manifestation du véritable complot ourdi contre nous, il a pour but de porter à la France un coup fatal, à la France regardée comme l'élément le plus faible du Pacte atlantique, comme l'anneau à faire sauter pour que la chaîne se brise. La cause que la France défend avec ses seules forces ne concerne donc pas qu'elle seule. C'est aussi la cause des puissances démocratiques et libérales d'Occident.

En Algérie se heurtent deux volontés, celle qui cherche, en dépit des sourires et des déclarations contraires, à établir sur le monde la domination communiste, et celle qui est décidée à sauvegarder les valeurs essentielles de la civilisation européenne.

La bataille qui se livre est une bataille des Champs Catalauniques, ou une bataille de Poitiers. La perdre serait tout perdre.

Le premier acte du drame algérien est en train de tourner à notre avantage. Mais nous approchons du second.

L'adversaire va s'efforcer d'user notre patience. Il compte que nous nous laserons bientôt, que les « rappelés » voudront être licenciés et regagner leurs foyers, que la métropole fléchira et que, devant l'état de l'opinion et les conséquences financières d'une entreprise trop coûteuse, nous serons obligés de négocier.

Il nous appartient de ruiner ce calcul et de faire, de son échec, le point de départ du redressement moral de la France.

Nous en aurons la force si nous savons mesurer l'importance vitale de l'enjeu.

Après quoi viendra la phase politique, celle où il faudra déterminer le statut nouveau de l'Algérie. Ce sera, peut-être, la plus difficile. Rien de clair et de sensé ne se dessine encore à ce propos.

André FRANÇOIS-PONCET.
de l'Académie française.

25/2/11
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED.

:MB

I. 8596.

PRESS

Dated: 26th June, 1956.

FROM:

2024
Rec'd: 28th June, 1956.
0830

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

381. UNCLASSIFIED.

Security Council.

Algeria.

The Soviet moved a formal proposal under Rule 33 that the Council should defer consideration indefinitely. The issue was important and the Council needed further time to consider the situation and collect information.

France requested that the Soviet motion, which France would oppose, be voted on because there was no reason for further postponement. The Council had met at the urgent request of thirteen States but if there was no urgency, then the request should be withdrawn. The Council would appear ridiculous if it asked for adjournment without having adopted an agenda.

Iran had no objection to postponing the question and hoped sincere efforts would be made to assure better understanding on Algeria.

Belgium and the United Kingdom said the Soviet motion was not in order because the Council could not postpone the meeting on Algeria when it had not even decided whether or not to discuss the item.

The vote on the Soviet motion was 1 (U.S.S.R.)
- 7 - 3 (China, Iran, Yugoslavia).

France then asked the Council not to inscribe the item on the agenda as the question was within French domestic jurisdiction.

Iran said that as France contested the Council's competence the question must be examined. Iran had no animosity towards France but discussion of Algeria would help France find an equitable and just solution. Expressed appreciation of France's attitude towards Morocco and Tunisia and hoped discussion would bring better understanding on the Algerian situation and open the way for a greater attempt for conciliation. Only in this way can France's relations with Afro-Asians improve. The decision to submit Algeria to the Council not hasty action. International concern shown at Bandung Conference and inscription of item on 10th Assembly agenda. Afro-Asian States convinced denial of right of self determination only leads to international friction. The present situation shows that despite the good intentions of some members of the French Government, France was unable to resist the interest of a certain group and repressive measures have been intensified. Recalled the African Asian letter of 12th April drawing the Council's attention to the
2./.....

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UNCLASSIFIED.
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I. 8596.

situation and explained that group delayed action to give France further opportunity to settle the question peacefully. French intransigence compelled the present action.

Cultural and religious links of the group with Algerian people give these States the right to be heard. Rejection of inscription will only aggravate the situation. The situation falls under Articles 34 and 35 and the Council should discuss the question because of its primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace. The size of French forces and armaments demonstrate that the struggle is an armed conflict of incontestable gravity attaining the proportions of Colonial war. Loss of life and destruction of property reflect the size of the conflict. The conflict has repercussions in Morocco and Tunisia and shows signs of becoming a threat to peace not only in those countries but in the whole of Africa.

The French claim of domestic jurisdiction was invalid because

- (a) Before 1830 Algeria was independent,
- (b) Sovereignty of Algerian people did not disappear when France conquered the territory,
- (c) The Algerian people have never been invited to state their views on France's decision,
- (d) The right of self determination is inalienable,
- (e) If the claim of domestic jurisdiction was valid, legitimacy of existence of many members of the United Nations could be contested,
- (f) The Algerian people are far separated from France by religion, race, language and territory and therefore cannot be considered an integral part of France,
- (g) The United Nations has already expressed its competence on somewhat similar questions e.g. South African items,
- (h) Violations of Human Rights which affect relations between States cannot be considered to be within Article 2(7),
- (i) Passages in the France-Soviet and France-Yugoslav declarations imply that France does not consider Algeria to be essentially a French affair,
- (j) Discussion of the question is not intervention in the sense of Article 2(7).

Requested the Council to inscribe the item.

France said Algerian affairs are essentially France's own responsibility because

- (a) As all institutions of Government and Law in Algeria are branches of the Government of France it follows that sovereignty essentially lies with France,
- (b) French sovereignty has been internationally recognized and uncontested and all international treaties to which France is a party refer to Algeria as French territory.

3./.....

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I. 8596.

- (c) France is exercising one of the most natural rights of sovereignty in repressing rebellion,
- (d) The charter establishes the principle of non intervention in domestic matters of States,
- (e) The Council's competence under Chapters 6 and 7 was limited to a situation which endangers international peace and security. The situation in Algeria does not fall within this category,
- (f) African Asian States claim the situation is a denial of self determination and violation of other human rights, neither of which claims are within the Council's competence.

Justice has given way to passion. France was not a Colonialist power and will not give up her intention to prevent a return to Barbarism and Anarchy. The aim was progress towards peace. Requested the Council to refuse inscription.

Texts of French and Iranian statements by bag.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

29th June, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UNQ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA S EA E.A.P&ME
E AF&ME INF DL C&P MR. GOSS.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.
UNCLASSIFIED

~~25/2/11~~
25/2/11

AS

I.8592

PRESS.

Dated: 26th June, 1956
2018
Rec'd: 27th June, 1956
1555

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

382. UNCLASSIFIED.

Security Council.

Algeria.

Our 381.

In reply to certain points in the French statement, Iran said -

(A) There was no difference between Algeria and Morocco

(B) Articles 34 and 35 speak of the possibility of a situation which might endanger international peace and Algeria is such a case. War in Algeria is a consequence of French refusal to grant self-determination. The Council has followed liberal tradition on inscription of items except on Colonial questions. Deplored the tendency of the Council to reject discussion on such items. Even if it is claimed that such cases are not well-founded they should be inscribed to permit examination of this allegation.

China said the question was "could the Council help in re-establishing peace in Algeria by consideration of the item?" Action to be fruitful must have the willing co-operation of France. Unconvinced inscription at present would have any benefit. Responsibility rests on France to avoid worsening the situation.

Cuba said it had voted against inscription at the last Assembly because the United Nations was incompetent to discuss the matter. Non-intervention of domestic affairs of State was principle binding on all members of O.A.S. Cuba has nevertheless not been indifferent to the principle of self-determination e.g. position on Tunisia and Morocco. Algeria is a different situation and if the United Nations intervened, no member would feel safe. Unable to support inscription.

Peru said discussion was inadvisable because it might upset the peaceful atmosphere created in recent statements of the great powers.

United Kingdom agreed with France that the item should not be inscribed because -

(A) The Council is precluded from discussion by the provisions of the Charter and discussion would be interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state

Jill
2/11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
UNCLASSIFIED
INWARD CABLEGRAM

-2- I.8592

- (B) Members who played a large part in the foundation of the United Nations, would not have joined if they had foreseen that an item such as Algeria would be discussed
- (C) The United Nations should not be used as an instrument to encourage violence
- (D) Inscription would greatly undermine the foundation of the United Nations
- (E) Debate could do nothing to help solve the situation.

Belgium said the United Nations was incompetent to deal with the question because of the provisions of Article 2(7). United Nations' interference on this issue would put an end to National sovereignty. Opposed inscription.

Yugoslavia said "no one would deny Algeria is a matter of growing international concern." Wish to see a solution which would take account of the views of both parties. It appeared doubtful at present whether debate would be conducive towards settlement.

Soviet Union said request could not be ignored by the United Nations. Necessary to hear parties in order to decide whether there is a threat to peace. Hoped the Council would consider the complaint and help solve the problem in the spirit of United Nations' co-operation.

United States said it would not be easy to solve the Algerian question. Hoped for liberal constructive solution. The United States had concluded that consideration by Council at this time would not be helpful.

Request for inscription of the item was rejected by 2 (U.S.S.R. Iran) 7 - 2 (China Yugoslavia). After explanations of vote by Iran and France, Australia, as president, summed up and the Council adjourned.

MIN&DEPT EA
P.M'S

27th June, 1956

SEC A/Ss UNO PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME E
AF&ME INF DL MT C&P MR. GOSS
G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *The Age*
Melbourne

File No. *25/2/11*
Date *23rd June 1956*

French Given Warning by Insurgents

ALGIERS, June 22.

Algerians distributed pamphlets yesterday announcing "eye-for-an-eye" reprisals for every insurgent executed by the French authorities.

Violent attacks, in which three Frenchmen died and 14 were wounded in Algiers on Wednesday followed the execution on Tuesday of the first two insurgents to be sent to the guillotine since the uprising began 19 months ago. The deathroll rose to four today when one of the wounded died.

Insurgents' Threat

The pamphlets, found in letter boxes in Algiers, said the insurgents would "carry the war into the towns."

"If one of our men is executed again, the French will pay dearly for it," the writers said.

Big insurgent attacks are continuing, but the French expect them to cease soon, as powerful reinforcements flow into Algeria, where France will have 360,000 troops by the middle of July.—(A.A.P.).

E.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

25/2/11 81
RESTRICTED

RTT:ABK

I. 8389.

Dated: 22nd June, 1956.

FROM:

Rec'd: 23rd June, 1956.
0900.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

198. RESTRICTED.

Repeated Savingsgram London 41, Cairo 8.

Algeria.

Government has decided to introduce immediately under special powers three reforms:-

- (a) Creation of 8 new countries (Departments) raising total to 12. Possibly Sahara will be added as 13th.
- (b) Transformation of present "mixed" (i.e. partly nominated) Municipalities into bodies with elected and responsible Councils.
- (c) "Re-organisation" of central Administration.

This general statement may mean "more Muslims".

2. Lacoste in interview said intention is to seek pacification simultaneously on civil economic and psychological plane.

3. Washington Talks. Press here emphasize divergences in interpretation of Soviet "new look" between Pineau and Dulles and many share the latter's misgivings over Pineau's optimism. "Herald Tribune" claims some concessions by Pineau to American standpoint on disarmament. ~~It~~ ^{It} also features his insistence on need for greater cultural and commercial exchanges with U.S.S.R.

4. Budget. Prime Minister will seek vote of 28th August on budget including financing Algerian Prime Minister by fresh taxes.

5. Prices. Government has approved a decree for general blocking of prices at February 1954 level to combat recent inflationary trends.

Stirling.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

(~~8~~ ¹ ~~Corrupt~~ group)

23rd June, 1956.

SEC A/SS UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.A.P&ME B. AP&ME INF DL.

RESTRICTED

Name of Paper

The Times

File No.

25/2/4

Published at

London

Date

21 June 1956

URGENT REFORM IN AFRICA

FRENCH INNOVATION

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, JUNE 20

By approving the second reading of the Bill which will enable the Government to undertake the extensive reform of institutions in overseas territories, the National Assembly has taken a step that could be of lasting importance for the future of the French Union.

The Bill is known as an "outline law" (*loi cadre*), the purpose of which is to associate the overseas populations—principally those of French Equatorial Africa and French West Africa—more closely with the management of their own affairs. An important feature of it is the creation in the different territories of "councils of government," which will have real administrative responsibility.

These councils are to consist partly of elected, and partly of nominated members, though the French governor in each territory will retain the right to appoint the head of the local government. Simultaneously, the powers of territorial assemblies are to be extended, and the governments-general in the African territories will be reorganized so as to become coordinating rather than ruling organizations. The Bill also foresees the Africanization of local services. As it stands, it could well pave the way to a system of federal governments and parliaments in the French African territories, which would fit into the frame of an eventual federal French republic.

NATIVE REPRESENTATION

As voted in its first reading in the National Assembly, the Bill postponed the creation of a single voting college (*i.e.*, Africans and Europeans together) in the overseas territories until the "councils of government" and constituency councils had been established. The Upper House, the Council of the Republic, somewhat surprisingly changed this provision to allow for the immediate application of the single-college principle; this change was yesterday accepted by the National Assembly, and thus becomes law.

When this innovation comes into effect—it will be at least four months before the necessary decrees are prepared and approved—it will inevitably give a larger native representation in the territorial assemblies, as well as in the overseas elections for the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic.

Elections to the territorial assemblies are to take place next year. The Government had previously been in favour of delaying the single-college reform, but M. Defferre, the Minister for Overseas France, explained yesterday in the National Assembly that it could not afford the delay that would be caused in the passage of the Bill as a whole if the Assembly were to reject the Council of the Republic's text. Urgency took priority over all other considerations, he said, thus indicating clearly the growing awareness that black Africa is on the move, and that the same mistakes and delays that have cost France so dear in North Africa must, if possible, be avoided farther south.

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

SHA:HMCC

I.8013

Dated: 13th June, 1956.
1819
Rec'd: 14th June, 1956.
1830

FROM:-

Australian Mission to the United
Nations,
NEW YORK.

New York
25/2/11
"Algeria"

349. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Addressed Canberra 349, repeated Washington UNE
206, London for External cable 36, (London please pass to Paris)
repeated Ottawa Savings 71.

From Walker.

Algeria.

Your 182.

1. Alphand asked to see me today. He said he had not received instructions from Paris as yet and was consulting with his colleagues here preparatory to sending Paris his recommendation regarding the handling of the matter. His personal view was that our objective should be to dispose of the matter quickly and as calmly as possible and that France's case should be handled with dignity and without recrimination, scrupulously avoiding discussion of substance. He said that he was prepared to let pass moderate and limited references to substance from Abdoh (Iran) or other Council Members supporting the proposal for inscription although, if France were attacked, he would have to reply. He was most anxious that past Council practice should be followed in refusing to allow countries not members of the Security Council to speak during the inscription debate. There were only five precedents and in each case the Council decided not to hear non-members before adoption of the agenda, namely Greece 30/8/46, Formosa 27/11/50, Iran 1/10/51, Tunisia 14/4/52, Morocco 3/9/53. Alphand hoped that by starting, say, next Tuesday morning the matter could be finished in one day. When he received his instructions from Paris he proposed to discuss the matter privately with Abdoh and myself in an attempt to work out agreed conduct for the Council's Meeting. Alphand said he had a high regard for Abdoh's understanding and restraint.

2. I told Alphand that I, as yet, had no instructions from you but that I saw no reason why we should not support an attempt to facilitate the handling of the matter in the Council along the lines he had in mind. He would be aware of Australia's support for France on other issues affecting French North Africa. I welcomed his suggestion for a prior Conference between himself, Abdoh and myself.

3. Alphand thanked me and said he would complete his consultations with Members of the Council and keep me informed. He said support for France from seven of the Council Members (either with Opposition to Inscription or Abstention) was certain. He would prefer France's friends to oppose rather than to abstain although this made no difference to the real result. Doubtful countries besides Iran were, in his view, China, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia although it was by no means certain that in the present circumstances all of these would support Inscription.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **CONFIDENTIAL**
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

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I.8013

4. From a discussion on procedure which I had with Protitch earlier today, it seems clear that Alphand's ideas would fit in well with the established practice of the Security Council in similar cases.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

15th June, 1956.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM S&SEA SA EAP&ME E AP&ME INF
DL

CONFIDENTIAL

Name of Paper

The Times
London

File No.

25/2/4

Published at

Date

*30 May 1958*NEW PLAN FOR
ALGERIAM. LACOSTE ON PAST
MISTAKES

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, MAY 29

As a prelude to Thursday's debate in the National Assembly on the Government's policy as a whole, the Resident Minister in Algiers, M. Robert Lacoste, has issued a directive to Government officials, civil and military, serving in Algiers. This directive reveals a new procedure for arriving at a redefinition of the relationship between France and Algeria, a procedure which is already a considerable departure from that laid down by M. Mollet in his inaugural speech as Prime Minister.

The original idea had been that negotiations for a new statute for Algeria should be held with the Muslims chosen in free elections to represent their compatriots. That obviously meant a prior restoration of law and order; but now M. Lacoste speaks of negotiating the new statute with the representatives of municipal councils, if need be, before the country has been completely pacified.

FOREIGN PROPAGANDA

How these local representatives will in that case be chosen or appointed, M. Lacoste does not specify, any more than he attempts to describe the form the new statute should take. This, indeed, must remain the responsibility of the Government as a whole, but M. Lacoste lays it down as an essential condition that the local population shall remain within the French community (i.e. no Algerian independence) and that the new statute "might surround the Republic with a less rigid framework which in particular would leave Algeria its originality."

M. Lacoste's document is very frank about the errors made by France in the past in Algeria, especially the non-application of the 1947 statute. He describes the 8,000,000 Muslims in Algeria as, for the most part, underdeveloped, under-administrated, under-employed, and underfed, and refers to the effect upon them of foreign propaganda.

This propaganda, he says, "unhappily aided by the innumerable errors or hesitations of our country" has begun to open a profound breach between the French and Muslim populations in Algeria. The Muslims are looking attentively, M. Lacoste goes on, towards the rapid—too rapid—development of the young Tunisian and Moroccan states, and are asking themselves whether the fact that they have the same Islamic faith as those countries does not automatically confer a non-French nationality.

REGIONAL AUTONOMY

One of the ideas which is apparently being considered by the Government as the new constitutional link with Algeria is the so-called "Sicilian" solution. This foresees a large degree of regional autonomy for Algeria, with a provincial government the head of which would also be a member of the French Government. Thus Algeria would remain a part of France, just as Sicily, with its autonomous régime, is a part of Italy, but with a "personality" of its own.

It is an ingenious notion, though it may be wondered how many people who compare it with the Sicilian constitution really appreciate the enormity of the differences—principal among which is that eight-ninths of the population of Sicily, whatever their separatist feelings, do not, as do the Algerian Muslims, belong to another race and religion from the people of the mainland.

The special branch of the Paris police, following up the judicial inquiry which has been opened in Algiers into an attempt on the external security of the State, has searched the home of Mlle. Claude Gérard, a heroine of the wartime resistance, who now runs a Press agency specializing in African questions. Recently she published in the weekly *Démocratie* an account of conversations she had had with the Algerian rebels. Mlle. Gérard is to be taken by the police to Algiers to continue the inquiry.

M. Lacoste, who returned here last night, spoke to-day in a debate on Algeria in the Council of the Republic. He said that by next month there would be 364,000 Frenchmen in Algeria, and this force should ensure victory.